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I NTRODUCTI UN
The Symposium held in Boulder on July 17-19, 1986, offered a rare
opportunity to look back and assess the strengthS and weaknesses of postdisaster research and policy initiatives. The meeting drew together
participants from a wide range of disciplines to analyze the premise that
disasters are opportunities for change, and to set the flash flood research and
policy agenda for the remainder of the century.
Part One provides an overview of the Big Thompson flood in light of recent
experiences. Gruntfest's "Common Ground" describes the flood and appraises the
progress in flash flood hazard mitigation in the Big Thompson Canyon, the state
of Colorado, and the United States as a whole. In his paper, Wright, the
governor's representative to the recovery effort, reflects on the state's role.
Kistner presents an overview of the 1982 Estes Park dam-break flood, analyzing
how the 1982 recovery process was influenced by lessons learned after the 1976
Big Thompson experience. Charney, forensic anthropologist in charge of body
identification after the Big Thompson flood, discusses the operation of a
temporary morgue following a disaster, a frequently ignored aspect of emergency
preparedness.
Part Two is comprised of ten papers that address mitigation issues, as they
arise at various levels of government. At the federal level, Steinberg
presents the Corps of Engineers' flood damage reduction program, and Olson and
Gore discuss direction in the National Flood Insurance Program since 1976.
Truby, Stanton, and Wright examine state mitigation efforts: Truby focuses on
dam failure hazards; Stanton concentrates on the Colorado Flood Hazard
Mitigation Plan; and Wright provides a legislator's perspective in appraisal of
mitigation efforts over the last decade.
Regional and local impacts are considered in papers by DeGroot and Tucker
and Havlick. DeGroot and Tucker's paper identifies the nationally recognized
efforts of the Urban Drainage and Flood Control District in the Denver
metropolitan area. As a member of the Boulder City Council, Havlick looks at
the impacts the Big Thompson flood has had in Boulder, 35 miles away from the
Big Thompson Canyon. The mitigation section is rounded out by Platt's paper on
the post-disaster mitigation teams begun by FEMA in 1979, and by Dye's
discussion of the private sector's role in selling flood insurance.

Part Three covers forecasting innovations.

The paper by Belville and

Wagoner provides an overview of changes in National Weather Service policies
and programs since 1976. Johnson's paper, the Tucker and Reiter contribution,
and Scofield's paper deal primarily with innovations in forecasting models of
hydrologic systems and precipitation. The section concludes with a paper by
VanBlargen identifying the technological advancements in flash flood
forecasting within the National Weather Service in the past decade.
Part Four concentrates on warning and response. Graham's paper details the
warning experience preceding the 1982 Estes Park dam break. Boulder's
sophisticated automated flash flood warning system is described by Van Wie.
Sorensen examines the 1985 Cheyenne flood warning system and compares the
situation to the Big Thompson. Minnesota's innovative network for disaster
stress intervention is described by Huber. Handmer and Penning-Rowsell 's paper
discusses Australian experiences with flood warnings. Hostetter wraps up the
section with his paper on Mennonite studies of social impacts of disasters.
Part Five contains papers on geomorphology and hydrology. Jarrett documents
hydrologic research relevant to the 1976 flood, and Hoyt's paper compares
the Big Thompson impacts with those of the 1982 Estes Park dam-break flood
Part Six includes a summary of the recommendations made by participants in
the Symposium.
The Symposium participant list is included as Appendix I. Appendix II has
background papers for additional information on the actions people took during
the flood, and on the land acquisition program implemented following the flood.
Abstracts of papers not included in the Proceedings but presented at the
Symposium are in Appendix III. An extensive bibliography of articles and books
written on the Big Thompson flood serves as Appendix IV.
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COMMON GROUND
Eve C. Gruntfest
Department of Geography and Environmental Studies
University of Colorado, Colorado Springs
This paper is divided into four parts: an overview of the Big Thompson
flood for those who were not "on the scene" in 1976, the rationale for
organizing this Symposium, initial thoughts on what has and has not been
learned since the Big Thompson flood, and reflections on the challenges for the
fut ure.
The Flood
The Big Thompson Canyon is one of the most scenic in the Rocky Mountain
region. U.S. Route 34 runs through the canyon, adjacent to the river in many
spots. It is the main link between the plains and Rocky Mountain National
Park. Before the flood, the full-time canyon population was 600 and the parttime residents numbered approximately twice that. There were many tourists
attracted by the trout fishing, streamside motels, and campgrounds.
There are three major communities in the 25-mile canyon (see Figure 1).
West from Loveland they are: 1) Cedar Cove just above the Narrows; 2) Drake,
the largest community, located at the confluence of the North Fork and the Main
Fork of the Big Thompson; and, 3) Glen Comfort. One community on the North
Fork of the Big Thompson, Glen Haven, was also affected by the flood.
On July 31, 1976, the Big Thompson Canyon was filled with tourists. It
was the Saturday of the weekend commemorating Colorado's Centennial and the
last holiday weekend before the start of school. That night a flash flood
ravaged the canyon, causing the worst natural disaster, in terms of lives lost,
in Colorado state history.
Heavy rain fell over a 70 square-mile area in the central portion of the
Big Thompson watershed between 6:30 and 11 :00 pm. The most intense rainfall,
over 12 inches, fell over slopes in the western end of the canyon (see Figure
2) •

The impact of the flood could have been worse. The North Fork peak
streamflow occurred approximately 40 minutes later than the Main Fork peak. If
the two peaks had coincided, the peak streamflow would have been even greater
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FIGURE 2
TOTAL PRECIPITATION (in inches) July 31-Aug. 2, 1976
(From NOAA, 1976, p. 3, and Revisions of April, 1977)
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than the 31,200 cubic feet per second officially recorded at the mouth of the
canyon.
At least one hundred thirty-nine people died in the flood, and eightyeight people were injured. The flood destroyed 316 homes, 45 mobile homes and
52 businesses. Seventy-three mobile homes suffered major damage.
l)i~t..~~~PPQ.r:t..lJ..~~t..t.:.-H0I:!._t..~~_~IT!I2.Q.s..~lJ..il!._~de~_~~~~oped

After the Big Thompson flood, there was grave resolve that a disaster of
this magnitude should never happen again. This was particularly true in
Boulder, where officials realized that they faced a worse catastrophe if the
same Big Thompson storm materialized over the Boulder Creek drainage. Downtown
Loveland is four miles from the mouth of the Big Thompson Canyon and was
basically unaffected by the Big Thompson flood; downtown Boulder, however, lies
directly at the mouth of Boulder Canyon. Hazard awareness following the Big
Thompson flood was high. A similar disaster only four years after 237 lives
were lost in Rapid City served to focus official attention on flash floods and
western flood problems.
In the decade following the flood, many scientific, technological, and
educational advances have been made, and the idea for the Symposium grew out of
our interest in evaluating the notion of disaster as opportunity. In what ways
have we learned from the Big Thompson catastrophe? Are we more or less
vulnerable? This question has many facets, and everyone at the Symposium had
his or her own perspective. The Symposium brought together forecasters,
hydrologists, sociologists, geomorphologists, local civil defense officials,
utilities department managers, state emergency preparedness officials, water
engineers, members of the insurance industry, lawyers, and geographers.
Three characteristics distinguished our gathering. First, the
participants were drawn from an extremely wide range of disciplines and
professions. Second, the Symposium provided a rare opportunity to look back
and assess the strengths and weaknesses of post-disaster research and policy
actions. The post-audit provided a real event and time period focus for
reflection on the commonly held premise that disasters are opportunities for
change to reduce losses from a future event. Third, after we spent a day-and-a
half discussing advancements and disappointments, we met on Friday afternoon
and Saturday morning to make research and policy suggestions for the remainder
of the century.

Gruntfest
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A summary of the research and policy recommendations can be found in the
concluding section of this proceedings volume. We have been able to appraise
our progress and identify those areas where progress is slower than we would
hope. The suggested adjustments can reduce our vulnerability to flash flood
losses.
How
Far Have We Come?
------------In the Big Thompson Canyon, safe areas have been established and the
county law enforcement officials have streamlined their handling of potential
emergencies. Fewer structures are located in the flood plain because many were
washed away and few have been rebuilt. The land acquisition program, through
extensive interagency cooperation, has purchased numerous parcels for open
space.
Colorado is much better prepared today for flash flooding than it was in
1976. New levels of interagency cooperation were apparent in the 1982 Estes
Park dam-break flood response. The interagency post-disaster mitigation team
provided ideas and incentives for Estes Park to improve the community land use
to reduce flood loss potential and to beautify the community.
The state mitigation plan not only informs local community officials of
the range of options they have for flood hazard mitigation, but also stresses
how frequent flash floods are in the state. More than twice as many Coloradans
have purchased flood insurance today than had in 1976. All flood plain
residents in the Denver and Boulder metropolitan area have received brochures
indicating the possible actions to take to reduce losses. Many communities,
including Boulder, have warning systems now. Several communities have retained
private meteorologists to assist in local predictions and data analysis. Signs
have been placed at canyon entrances increasing public awareness of the flash
flood potential.
The PROFS program which has been developed at the NOAA Environmental
Research Laboratory is being tested in Denver in November. It has great promise
to assist Weather Service meteorologists. Regional flood plain management has
been highly successful in the Denver metropolitan area, and similar districts
are planned in the Pikes Peak region and on the western slope.
At the national level, there has been a greater value placed on
cooperative efforts among researchers and government officials, various levels
of government, and diverse scientific disciplines. The 1978 Executive Order

8
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11988 has made "mitigation" nearly a household word. The Interagency PostDisaster Mitigation Teams coordinate teams to streamline the recovery process
and facilitate anticipatory thinking for long-term flood loss reduction.
Federal aid is predicated on long-term plans for reducing future flood loss
vulnerability.
There are many more examples of successful mitigation efforts, including
relocation and acquisition programs, and preflood/postflood planning. The
Association of State Floodplain Managers has actively fostered the adoption of
innovative strategies for mitigation. At the June, 1986, ASFPM meeting in
Pittsburgh, officials had opportunities to learn state-of-the-art techniques
for warning, mapping, stormwater management, and innovations in hydraulics and
hydrology.
~emai ni ~Cha~~~~
In spite of these gains, the facts are that more than 200 people die
annually from floods in the United States, many in their cars. This situation
has not changed much since the Big Thompson flood. Recommendations in the 1986
Unified Program for Floodplain Management look remarkably similar to
suggestions made in the 1966 original Task Force report.
While there are local communities taking initiative to reduce flash flood
vulnerability, the pressures placed on local governments by the new federalism
seem unlikely to be accompanied by the funding necessary to implement
innovative flood hazard mitigation, especially in communities where there have
been no recent floods. Smaller communities will disproportionately be squeezed
since they are less likely to have planners and personnel to enforce existing
land use regulations.
Forecasting improvements will increase the probability that flash floods
will be predicted. However, there are many flash floods over small watersheds
caused by localized conditions, like the recent Pittsburgh floods, and these
storms will still be difficult to anticipate.
The remaining papers in this section will describe in greater detail the
1976 flood and the response to it, and papers in subsequent sections will
address many of the pertinent issues related to mitigation, forecasting, and
warning and response.

STATE RESPONSE TO BIG THOMPSON CANYON DISASTER

Kenneth R. Wright
Wright Water Engineers, Inc.

Introduction

The response of the State of Colorado to the 1976 Big Thompson Canyon flood
disaster was outstanding thanks to the interest and caring demonstrated by Colorado's chief executive, G:lvernor Lamm, coupled with many dedicated civil service
employees.
The governor was alerted to the disaster during the night of July 31, 1976. By
the morning of August I, the I'kleel s of state response \\ere turning. The Colorado
National Guard was mobilized. The first state employees directly involved in the
disaster \\ere those of the Colorado State Highway Patrol. One patrol officer lost
his life I'klile warning canyon residents to take to high ground.
The governor immediately appointed top-level assistant Lee Wlite to the disaster recovery I>Ork. By Day Two, Larry Lang of the Colorado Water Conserv at i on Board
(CWCB) had contracted for aerial photography to survey the damage wit~ certainty.
On Tuesday, Oay Three, the governor met in Lovel and with state, federal and local
officials, all of whom participated in important functions.
Support of the chief executive was critical in implementing many special programs of the relief effort.
Fa 11 owi ng the fl ood pe ak and phys i cal di saster occurrence, the Co lorado National Guard moved to Loveland at the governor's direction with expert helicopter
crews and equipment. Access was gained to the canyon and rescue efforts commenced.
Guardsmen dropped off by hel icopter \\ere able to assemble victims at access points
for air rescue.
Extraordinary powers are conferred on the governor to "meet the dangers to the
state and people presented by disasters" under the Colorado Disaster Emergency Act
of 1973. This legislation is well thought out and effective.

STATE RESPONSE
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Five days after the flood, the governor appointed a special
charge was to pl an and coordinate the overall state effort.
to operate horizontally across all

consultant l'A1ose

The consultant was able

state departments and divisions without being

hamstrung by organizational charts or normal protocol.

He reported directly to the

governor.
The effort by the state continued at a high level

for more than

a year to

assist the victims and their famil ies recover from the disaster and to pl an for the
future.
While the initial actions by the state \\ere quick and effective due to excellent organization and a wide range of resources l'A1ich could be brought to bear, it
was in the long months afterward that the expertise and dedication of state employees made an even more significant impact.
The state effort in recovery was unified, integrated and consistent.

Do's and Dont's

Rather than merely react, the governor directed state agencies to provide leadership l'A1erever a probable vacuum existed so that the resources of the state \\Ould
be fully available to assist victims.
During the first \\eek, the Mayor of Rapid City was flown to Denver for consultations.

The objective was to enhance efficiency and to determine and define

predictable issues l'A1ich \\Ould likely arise.

Recovery expert Professor J. E'Jgene

Hass, of the University of Colorado, was also consulted initially, as was Professor
Gil bert Wh ite .
Plans \\ere laid for the restoration and reconstruction phases at an early date
in consultation with the commissioners of Larimer County and the city leaders of
Estes Park and Loveland.
A list of do's and don'ts (Haas, et al, 1977) was prepared to alert officials
to the type of challenges l'A1ich \\Ould soon arise.

1.

This list follows:

Don't wait until the restoration period is nearly over before starting to

examine, systematically, the upcoming reconstruction issues.

Hright

2.
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Begin immediately to consider whether new decision-making mechanisms, in-

cluding the possibility of advisory groups, are going to be needed.
3.

Do examine, at an early stage, the avail abi1 ity of an adequate number of

local specialists who may be needed to carry out rapid but thorough efforts early in
the reconstruction process.
4.

Don't assume that decision-makers in the private sector will

hold off on

their decisions until the most important public policy decisions have been made.
5.

If there is to be significant relocation of families or businesses, con-

sider the full range of services needed and the full array of consequences which may
follow.
6.

Remember that despite the best efforts to shape the character of the re-

constructed canyon area, fundamental change is un1 ike1y.
celerated in most cases.

Past trends wi 11 be ac-

Design the planning process with this in mind.

7.

Don't assume that all temporary housing will be temporary.

8.

Don't confuse

physical

reconstruction with recovery of the canyon as a

whole.
9.

Do use every reasonab 1e opportun i ty to make the city safer, but don't make

invulnerability an ultimate objective.
10.

When tempted to delay an important decision, don't.

Goals, Objectives, Policy

To develop a common effort at all levels of government, a written tabulation of
goals, objectives, and pol icy was prepared by the state for consideration by local
and federal government.

This was adopted by the Big Thompson Canyon Advisory Com-

mittee on August 23, 1976.
The goals for the Big Thompson Canyon Advisory Committee \>ere short and simple,
but meaningful.

1.

They \>ere (Wright, 1977):

Economic and Social - assist survivors, property owners, and cOl1lllunities in

readj ustment.
2.

Physical and Pub1 ic Works Projects - recovery and rehabil itation of canyon

to be accomplished in safe and orderly manner.
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3.
4.

Planning - achieve positive results and avoid duplication of past mistakes.
Financial - assure maximization of planning and public \\Orks financial as-

s i stance.

Response Strategy for Governor's Office

State government can be cumbersome, hureaucratic and slow moving.

However,

this was not the case l'oIlen the Colorado State Government was called upon to assist
in the recovery effort in the Big Thompson Canyon. To ensure coordinated actions by
the numerous departments and divisions within the state government, <l response
strategy report was prepared by the Special Consultant for the governor's office.
Approval was swift.
Thi s response document was pI aced in the hands of key department heads.
It
meant that each individual dealing with the flood recovery in state government was
able to understand that there was a unified approach, that the direction and means
of achieving the establ ished goal s and objectives \\ere approved and, in a nutshell,
all members of the State of Colorado family had a road map for action.
The strategy framework commenced with the period immediately following the
search phase and proceeded into long-range pI ann i ng for the canyon rehab i I itat i on.
In addition, the strategy dealt wi th simil arly situated hazards throughout Colorado.
A financial strategy was developed utilizing flexible funding and blending of private and public monies.

Unavoidable Conflicts in the State Response

Whil e the di saster response for the Big Thompson Canyon flood was a good proving ground for the effectiveness of state government and its abil ity to mobil ize
quickly, <l repeat performance \\Ould likely be more successful if lessons learned
from the the Big Thompson disaster \\ere fully used in planning for the next disaster.

13
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As the Big Thompson Canyon di saster response moved from the emergency phase
into the recovery phase, it was noted that a leadership vacuum tended to exist at
the local government level.

Reverend Bob Schell ing was quoted in the July 29, 1977

issue of the Estes Park Trail Gazette as saying, "The Governor really tried to let
the county run the program, but they \'.ere not ready for the di saster and they come
off like they're campaigning rather than trying to solve problems".

About the same

time, the County Flood Coordinator said, "the timing of the flood relative to the
September primary election and the November general election in Larimer County contributed to the problem of slow recovery."

These discussions took place during the

period of recovery regarding whether local versus state or federal
covery

progr~ns

control of re-

is in the best interest of good disaster responses.

The observations of Reverend Schell ing and the Larimer County flood coordinator
were not far off target.

However, the local leaders \'.ere not to bl ame.

what they thought was best at the time.

They did

After long years of experience serving the

citizens of Larimer County and the two cities, the local officials took the position
that they knew vmat was best for the area and for its citizens.
The problems that did arise and which \'.ere manifested by dissatisfaction, unhappiness, and a sense of frustration on the part of the victims and their famil ies
were caused by the system, not by the local officials.
The system was set up in the traditional democratic il'nerican way of assuming
that 1oc al government s know wh at is best for the i r cit i zens .

In thi s case, the

local pol itical leaders \'.ere thrust without warning or training onto center stage
for disaster response even though this would be their first and only such experience
in administering a national disaster recovery.
Placing the local political leaders into the key decision-making role for recovery was a no-win proposition for them.

In fact, the ensuing 1976 primary and

general elections in Larimer County where two of the incumbents \'.ere up for reelection represented the second disaster for them.

One commissioner was voted out of

office in the September primary election and the other was ousted at the November
general election.

N:l matter what they decided, and no matter how the recovery phase

went, the voters reacted as if the commissioners had been responsible for the flood
and its ensuinq confusion and hardships.

STATE RESPONSE
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Financiql Assistance Provided

The total funds either spent or committed as of December 31, 1977, for disaster
relief and related expenses amounted to $57,987,441. Table 1 shows a breakdown of
these funds as provided by local, state and federal governments and private organizations.
Tab 1e 1
Big Thompson Disaster Assistance
Spent or Committed as of December 30, 1977
(Based on Best Available Figures)
Source
Federal
State
Local
Pr i vate

$ Ampunt

54,936,170
1,398,974
684,474
967,823

Total
57,987,441
Technical and physical assistance was also provided in the disaster response.
These aspects are less quantifiable, because technical assistance may be given in
the daily course of duties of an agency, such as the extensive assistance provided
by the Colorado Geological Surveyor the ewCB (Wright, 1977).

Floodplain Regulations

In July 1974 (two years before the flood), Larimer County joined the National
Flood Insurance Program, and property owners became el igible to purchase insurance
at subsidized rates. At the time of the flood, only one flood insurance policy was
in effect in the Big Thompson Canyon and only 23 policies had been purchased in all
of Larimer County.
On February 26, 1975, the Colorado Water Conservation Board (CWCB) adopted a
model floodplain regulation. That same month, Larimer County adopted a floodplain
regulation similar to that of the ewCB.

l~ri
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The floodplain of the canyon had not been delineated at the time of the flood;
but, five months later (December 1976), preliminary floodplain maps were made available for review.

The Big Thompson Canyon floodplain was "designated" by the state

six months after the fl ood.
It is interesting to note that only eight and a half months after the flood,
where many of the victims were overnight campers down close to the river, the Commissioners of Larimer County approved use of the floodway in the canyon for overnight camping as a "use by right."

However, three months later, this approval was

changed to require a special permit.
Had the floodplain

been delineated

and

administered,

and

had

the residents

purchased flood insurance, the entire recovery effort would have been easier and the
financial assistance provided to survivors l'.Ould have been more generous and effective.

A better pre-flood state program of floodplain management l'.Ould have made a

lot of difference.

Progress in State Response Capability

The response of the State of Colorado to the Big Thompson Canyon flood of 1976
was professional, energetic, and thorough.

This was due to a thoughtful and caring

governor and a handful of ded i c ated and capab 1estate employees who were tr a i ned and
knew wh at to do.
Pre-flood planning and preparation in general and, specifically for the canyon,
was not ina good st ate of preparat i on for both 1oc a1 and state government.
The ability of the state to respond in 1986 is better than in 1976, but is not
adequate lII1en measured against the state-wide threat.

A state cannot rely solely on

the abil ity and readiness of a chief executive as a measure of its response and
recovery capabil ity.
ployees.

N€ither should the state rely on a handful

of select em-

Both are subject to retirement and moving on.

State response needs to be institutionalized.

Pre-flood planning is needed.

Post-flood redevelopment pl ans for hazardous locations should be prepared.

Decision

trees must be ready to avoid having inexperienced local official s handle an emergency wi thout warning.

STATE RESPONSE
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The legislature must provide adequate funding to support the \\Qrk of the dedicated and professional fl ood response staff of the State of Colorado.
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SOME THOUGHTS ON FLASH FLOOD PREPAREDNESS
OF PUBLIC ENTITIES IN COLORADO
Brian Hyde
Colorado Water Conservation Board
The 1976 Big Thompson flood showed graphically the deficiencies of the current
system. It led to short-term and some long-term awareness in government agencies,
and to some specific actions. It also fostered academic research.
Gettin~__:th~!oIar!1inq Out in Time
Boulder County and the Urban Drainage and Flood Control District have developed
warning systems. It is clear that radio stations, television stations, and the
National Weather Service can all have a role in warning people (i .e., KCOl warning
helped prevent a Kodak employee party in the Big Thompson Canyon the night of the
fl ood) .
The 1986 Pittsburgh flood has reinforced the question of relying on gauges
alone for warnings. It seems that we need to rely more on meteorology to supplement
or replace gauges.
A significant problem can be what to do with the warning so that people are
~ffectively moved to safety. In Cheyenne, people were told to go to their basements
to avoid tornadoes, and thereby risked drowning. During the Big Thompson flood, why
were roads not more effectively closed to vehicles?
There are severe flood warning systems in Colorado, but many communities are
not covered and there is no statewide system.

Recognizing tre Problem
An argument frequently heard is that "This is not the Big Thompson Canyon, this
is different." Debate over whether a 350-year or a 10,OOO-year flood occurred tends
to reduce concern.
There is conflict between a community's economic objectives and property
owners' rights vs. protecting public safety. Sometimes public officials have
financial or other interests in the flood plain which may affect their perceptions.
Examples include the use of CDBG money in Manitou Springs to expand their downtown,
or directives from public officials "not to scare tourists away with threats of
floods. "
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FLASH FLOOD PREPAREDNESS

A lot of flood plain mapping has been done, so more information is available.
Sometimes lenders, insurance agents, and realtors are aware of the problem;
sometimes they are not. We still need better communication. Some communities that
are growing rapidly are not getting flood plain maps or map changes from developers.
It is difficult to be aware of hazards if your maps are out of date.
There is a tendency to focus attention on snowmelt floods instead of
considering all potential causes. Serious problems have largely been caused by
thunderstorms.
Regulating the Flood Plain
The two most common deficiencies in local administration of National Flood
Insurance Program regulations are out of date maps and an inadequate or nonexistent
permit system. All levels of government need to do hetter here.
An important question to ask is how local governments (large and small) can
obtain technical expertise to evaluate land use proposals in flash flood areas.
Many communities prefer structural approaches to flood mitigation. If future
conditions are not considered in designing such facilities, problems can arise due
to increased flows from increased urbanization. Structural approaches have their
limitations; they can't always fix everything. Existing development cannot always
be protected. Communities could consider structural approaches as one component in
a comprehensive program.
The ability of flood-proofing or actual structures to withstand hydrostatic and
hydrodynamic forces is not addressed in flood plain regulations. Emergency response
plans for evacuating buildings in flash flood areas are not usually required. As
growth occurs, how will we know how safe a location is?
How many people in the Big Thompson Canyon died in campgrounds or on roads or
bridges? What kinds of regulations do we need for motor home facilities and
campgrounds, bridges and roads?

BUILDING ON A DISASTER
Robert L. Kistner
Colorado Division of Disaster Emergency Services
The early dawn of July 15, 1982, brought a definite change to the Town of Estes
Park, Colorado, a mountain town located 30 miles northwest of Boulder at an elevation of 7,700 feet.
Lawn Lake dam, located at an elevation of 11,000 feet, 12 miles to the east of
Estes Park failed, sending 817 acre feet of water down the Roaring River through
Rocky Mountain National Park into Fall River and then Estes Park. The flooding was
brief, lasting only a few hours, but of unprecedented severity. It washed away
bridges, destroyed road systems, a hydroelectric plant, a state fish hatchery,
inundated 177 businesses and 108 residences, and caused three deaths.
On July 19, 1982, the Governor of Colorado requested that a major disaster be
declared for the Lawn Lake Dam failure and Fall River flood in Larimer County. On
July 22, 1982, the President of the United States determined that the flooding was
of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant a Major Disaster Declaration under
Public Law 93-288. Larimer County and the Town of Estes Park were declared eligible
for federal assistance.
As the flood waters receded, shop owners, volunteers and town clean-up crews
began the job of renewing Estes Park to what it had been before the disaster. The
town hired a professional disaster recovery manager to coordinate all of the
reconstruction activities. Town officials realized that intergovernmental relations
would probably be a high priority during the initial stage of reconstruction
decision making, especially if the disaster was of the magnitude of the Big Thompson
Flood. An obviously important element of intergovernmental relations for Estes Park
officials was the process of obtaining federal grants to supplement the efforts and
available resources of Estes Park, the State of Colorado, and various disaster
relief organizations. At the same time a group of businesspeople organized the
Forward Estes Park Foundation (FEPF) to use the disaster as an opportunity to
The FEPF had actually been organized earlier in 1982,
rebuild a "new" Estes Park.
when a group of 14 business leaders in Estes Park contributed 51,000 each, incorporated, and began to study the economic problems of the Estes Park area.
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The town discovered that within a presidentially-declared disaster area, state
law makes it much easier to create an Urban Renewal Authority than in more normal
times. The FEPF pressured the town with the idea of creating the Estes Park Urban
Renewal Authority (EPURA). The Town Board on September 14, 1982 created the EPURA
and proceeded with the creation of a downtown improvement plan. A Boulder planning
firm was contracted to prepare an Urban Renewal/Downtown Revitalization Plan for the
town.
At the same time the Urban Renewal activity was underway the clean-up from the
flood was proceeding, including the reconstruction of II bridges. Along Fall River,
property owners were requesting assistance in their rebuilding efforts. Several of
the greater than 50% flood-damaged buildings were not allowed to rebuild due to new
flood plain regulations adopted by the town. Many of the structures destroyed in
the flood had been constructed prior to flood plain regulations and were cantilevered out over Fall River. In some cases the corners of buildings were built into
the stream, with the only corner support being a concrete-filled 55 gallon barrel
anchored into the stream bottom. The disaster recovery manager assisted business
owners in obtaining 1,362 National Flood Insurance Grants to purchase damaged
properties and replace the structures with parks and open green space.
In May of 1983 the completed Urban Renewal/Downtown Revitalization Plan, with a
suggested development time-frame of 20 years or more, was presented to the town.
The plan proposed:
1)

To eliminate the existing conditions of both economic and physical
blight

2)

Through new commercial development and redevelopment, new opportunities will be provided to strengthen Estes Park's economic base

3)

To develop implementation plans and strategies for the downtown area
to guide, enhance and encourage the development and redevelopment of
the area by joint private/public partnerships

4)

To insure that development and redevelopment will be sensitive to,
and protect surrounding areas, and that . . . relocation of existing
residents and businesses be fair and equitable

5)

To develop a pedestrian-oriented Activity Center, which will create a
visually . . . attractive downtown
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6)

To develop a plan that will encourage the use of alternative transportation modes into and throughout the downtown area. These should
include shuttle transit, pedestrian, equestrian, and bicycle uses

7)

To effectively develop and enhance the natural beauty of the streams
and rivers flowing through the downtown area, while . . . providing
for more effective flood protection measures

8)

To encourage the conservation of energy resources at all levels of
use

9)

To implement the adopted Estes Park Comprehensive Plan to assist the
orderly growth of the Estes Park area.

Funding the Process
In December, 1983, the Town Board adopted a tax increment plan for financing
EPURA programs. The town will receive the first $949,790 of sales tax and the EPURA
will receive all monies above that mark up to a proposed cap of $400,000 each year
within the designated downtown district. Sales tax revenue for the EPURA the first
year totaled $88,732, the second year $212,287, and the third year, 1986, $368,429.
The increases are due mainly to an increase in retail sales tied directly to
beautification of the downtown district. Total expenditures for the two phases of
streetscaping exceeded $1,000,000. The extra funds were obtained in loans and
grants from the town. No federal dollars were used in any of the urban renewal
projects. Town figures show that net taxable sales have increased at a faster rate
in the urban renewal area (URA) than in the town as a whole: 28% within the URA in
the last 30 months vs. 23.5% in the remainder of the town. Several traffic modifications have been made, including realigned intersections, better turning lanes, and
a one-way street system. Since the URA was created, at least six major building
renovations have taken place in the core downtown area.
Summary
Estes Park "Building on a Disaster" is taking place before all to witness. A
disaster as tragic as the Lawn Lake Dam failure and flash flood has uncovered
opportunities for development and redevelopment that could not be achieved by other
means. The business and political leaders of Estes Park are to be commended for
their dedication.

THE TEMPORARY MORGUE OPERATION
Michael Charney
Forensic Science Laboratory
Colorado State University
The identification of the victims of the Big Thompson flood was a success in
that all 139 bodies were individually, positively identified. This is the only mass
disaster that has occurred where all the dead were so identified. This is also the
only mass disaster where, to my knowledge, the necessary scientific personnel came
together at the very start of the work: a forensic pathologist, a forensic odontologist, a forensic anthropologist and law enforcement agents expert in dermatoglyphics.
In two previous papers (Charney, 1978, 1980), I dealt at some length on the
organization of the temporary morgue at Big Thompson Canyon. Receiving, holding,
and eventual evacuation of the bodies; records, missing persons, body examination,
dental and fingerprint work, supplies, psychological and religious counseling, vitai
statistics and other such sections formed quickly and easily. A third paper
(Charney and Wilber, 1980), gave some details as to the identi~ing techniques, suc~
as dental restorations, sinus prints, ear comparisons, and radiological comparisons,
A major problem confronting the successful, scientific operation of a temporar)
morgue is the lack of any statutes or regulations to determine just who is responsible for the identification of unknown human remains. This vacuum, if I may
violate physical laws and irritate the spirits of Noah Webster and Ben Jonson,
relates to both individual instances of unknown remains and to multiple deaths in
mass disaster. The task of identification is taken over by the local coroner or
medical examiner. However competent within their own expertise, which could be
pathology or dentistry, no one is sufficiently competent in all areas necessary for
individual identification, particularly in the case of multiple deaths. To assume
such expertise is either intellectually arrogant or plain stupid or both. Such a
person harbors a "Quincy Complex" that, unfortunately, is all too prevalent. The
concept of a team approach to body identification is not mine alone but was voiced
by Reals and Cowan (1979) as well. Theirs was the sad task of identifying the
victims of the Teneriffe crash, where more than half of the some 350 dead were neve
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identified. To my knowledge, no anthropologist was employed. I had been asked to
make myself available but that was all.
The personnel of a temporary morgue must incorporate many people, including:
1)

Three forensic scientists:
pologist.

a pathologist, odontologist, and anthro-

2)

A keeper of records. This role is essential if anything is to be
learned for future analysis. The records at the Big Thompson were a
disaster in themselves. I was given to believe that the head of our
section was in hospital records, which was true--but only as a
transcriber.

3)

Communications: a tight control of all incoming and outgoing
telephone calls. At the Big Thompson we had no central switchboard.
With 20-odd telephones at hand, many of the volunteers gave out
information they were neither qualified nor authorized to give.

4)

Psychological services. Families waiting for information about the
missing come in all emotional states. Many are in need of sympathetic handling. The clergy and the local county mental health office
played a most professional role at the Big Thompson. We learned from
experience that a duty roster of such personnel would have helped to
avoid "feast or famine" during the three months of operation.

Many other sections of a temporary morgue will fall into place and operate
without fuss, such as fingerprinting as handled by the local law enforcement agency.
or the storage and handling of the bodies, which was done magnificently by the
Loveland Police Reserve at the Big Thompson.
There have been dozens and dozens of conferences following the Big Thompson
disaster on just how to prepare for another such event. All sorts of people have
been invited to participate in these conferences, the majority of whom took no part
in the Big Thompson disaster and whose interests were often only tangential. I was
invited to only one and then as just an afterthought. Allen, the forensic pathologist of our team was similarly ignored. Surely, those who ran the only successful
identification of the dead of a mass disaster should have some input in conferences
dealing with mass disasters.
In the ten years since the Big Thompson disaster, steps have probably been
taken to answer some of the questions raised by such a cataclysmic event, but the
identification of the dead has seen no new light. I do not know of a single
conference, symposium, or talk that has addressed the problems such identifications
raise. The problem is not just Colorado's or Larimer County's alone, it is
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nationwide. In 1980 and earlier I called for a symposium to be held on this
subject. One such conference was held in 1967 at the Smithsonian Institution, but
it only addressed the scientific questions. A new symposium must also address the
administrative questions. Just who should make up the team of identifiers? To
continue to allow this decision to be made by the local coroner and/or medical
examiner is to perpetuate a disaster all its own.
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POLICY CHANGES AFFECTING THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS
FLOOD DAMAGE PREVENTION PROGRAM
Bory Steinberg
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Introduction
For the past 15 years, the rules under which the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
flood control projects have been formulated have changed significantly, resulting in
recommendations of solutions that are different from those proposed in the 1950s and
1960s.
The guidance the Corps operates under is based on federal law and major policy
statements promulgated by Executive Orders, OMB Circulars, Principles and Standards,
Principles and Guidelines and Engineer Regulations. As we celebrate the 50th
anniversary of the Flood Control Act of 1936, it is appropriate that we evaluate how
effective the federal flood control programs have been. We in the Corps are proud
of our record in flood control. Our projects have prevented over 5150 billion in
damage with an investment of about $23 billion. Aside from the untold suffering
that has been avoided, the payback rate is more than seven to one and, on average,
the ratio is increasing. Yet, the work is not complete. Floods continue to plague
certain areas of the country, but not necessarily the same areas as those now safe
from the ravaging floods of the 1930s, 40s & 50s.
In order to understand the changes that have occurred since enactment of NEPA
and mostly since the mid-1970s, a brief review of the federal involvement in flood
control helps set the stage for where we've been, where we are and where we're
going. Like many other current functions of the federal government that have been
in existence for a number of years, the importance given to a program goes through
peaks and valleys and takes on varying priorities in the budget process. The types
of solutions most commonly used may also go through periods of greater emphasis on
one type or another. The Corps flood control program certainly has seen substantial
changes and is in the process of an even more dramatic change as a result of new
cost sharing formulas.
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Policy Changes
] list as the changes having the greatest impact on the Corps flood control
program between ]970-1985 the following:
•

Enactment of the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA)

•

Use of higher discount rates

•

Projections of sounder decisions in the flood plain

•

Emphasis on non-structural solutions

•

Degree of protection: National Economic Development (NED) Plan vs.
Standard Project Flood (SPF) vs. Affordability

•

Higher cost-sharing

Enactment of the National Environmental Protection Act
An increased concern with the environment and the NEPA process were but two of
the reasons for the virtual halt in the formulation of multiple purpose reservoir
projects. Reservoir projects had been formulated, authorized and constructed for
over 30 years when NEPA was passed. Planning guidance in effect in 1970 urged the
Corps to maximize opportunities for comprehensive development. Nevertheless, the
number of new reservoir projects recommended and funded over the past decade has
been extremely limited and in most cases municipal water supply has been the driving
force behind the few new projects.
A review of new Corps construction projects funded by Congress between 1978 ana
1984 reveals that of the 54 projects funded, 26 were flood control and only one of
the 26 projects was a reservoir project. This compares with the more than 50 new
reservoir projects funded for construction between 1970-1977.* Very few new
reservoirs are included in pending authorizing legislation.

*]t is clear that other factors (such as higher discount rates, assumption of
sounder decisions in the flood plain, and deletion of certain benefits from the
economic analysis, as well as more vocal opposition from upstream land owners)
besides environmental concerns resulted in a lack of broad support for reservoir
projects. However, opposition on environmental grounds was a major factor in the
virtual elimination of major reservoirs as a solution to flooding.
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Use of Higher Discount Rates
The discount rate used in formulating new projects has risen from 3-1/4% in
1969 to 8-5/8% in 1986. The result has been that expensive projects that require
future growth have not been justified and projects providing modest protection to
agricultural or rural areas have been difficult to justify. Furthermore, the size
of projects producing the NED plan has generally been smaller than those formulated
on a 3-1/4% discount rate. Reservoir projects with major flood control benefits at
8-5/8% have been extremely rare.
An interesting phenomenon is that as the cost of government borrowing drops
below 8-5/8%, the drop in the discount rate can only be reduced .25% per year.
Thus, the discount rate will continue to be a significant and limiting factor in the
formulation of future Corps projects.
Projections of Sounder Decisions in the Flood Plain
Prior to 1973, benefits for protection of future development in an area being
considered for a flood damage prevention project were broadly calculated. Corps
planning guidance permitted inclusion of benefits attributable to:
1.

Prevention of damage to additional development anticipated during the
period of economic analysis even if flood protection were not
provided.

2.

Development potential created by the project, normally resulting fran
changes or intensification in land use made possible by the project.

In evaluating these benefits, the without-project conditions were left to the
di scret i on of the Corps planners. For examp1e, the assumed development of vaca~l:
land in the flood plain without the project may have been reasonable based upon
experience elsewhere or based upon market pressures for certain land uses.
However, the view grew that such development might actually be an unwise use Of
the flood plain. The recognition that annual losses from floods were increasing.
while at the same time the development of property with exposure to floed da,Ti?;€ 'll~-'
being financed to a degree by the federal government, led to enactl1llellt of the Fl,D'Q'()
Disaster Protection Act of 1973. One purpose of the act is to require states or
local communities, as a condition of future federal financial assistance, to
participate in the flood insurance program and to adopt flood plain ordinances .jt~
effective enforcement provisions consistent with federal standards. If local
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ordinances are not enacted and enforced, the flood plains will be more vulnerablein
the future than our projections postulate.
The Corps continued to allow the calculation of benefits based upon future
development until 1975. Engineering Regulation ER 1105-2-351, dated 13 June 1975,
superseded ER 1120-2-113 and, in effect, prohibited Corps planners from including
future flood control benefits in the flood plain when not consistent with strategies
for flood plain management and the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973. This
significant change occurred because it was assumed that there would be strategies
for flood plain management through the adoption and enforcement of land use regulations. The without-project condition is based upon the assumption that individuals
will undertake certain measures anyway to reduce flood hazards by floodproofing or
elevating new structures to at least the 100-year flood level. This means that
undeveloped land on the fringes of an urban area may be assumed to be developed in
the future as appropriate. However, by providing flood protection, the only benefit
that may be claimed within an area that formerly was within the 100-year flood plain
is the savings in floodproofing or elevating of structures which will no longer be
needed with a flood control project. The basic assumption is that any development
in vacant land within the 100-year flood plain with a Corps project would be
compatible with Executive Orders 11988 and 11990 and Public Law 93-234.
Emphasis on Nonstructural Solutions
Despite a concerted effort to develop non structural solutions, the results have
been minimal--although a higher grade for procedure is probably deserved. An
analysis the author made of more than 170 flood control new starts since enactment
of NEPA indicated that in only three were major nonstructural components included.
These measures included relocation from developed flood plains as well as acquisition of flood plain lands to prohibit future development or for overbank storage and
recreation in cases where the flood plain is sparsely developed.
There are many difficulties in justifying a non structural project and in
obtaining the necessary local support and financing. In response to the question
"What do you see as impediments to Corps implementation of non structural measures?"
posed to district offices, the most common problems cited were lack of local
cooperation or acceptance, and economic feasibility. Nonstructural solutions
involving relocation or floodproofing are very personal measures. It is difficult
to convince homeowners residing at higher elevations that their tax dollars should
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be used to help pay for the relocation of people who used poor judgment in residing
in the flood plain.
Experience has shown that some people are willing to accept the risk of
periodic flooding given the alternative of being asked to move. Several reasons are
given for this reaction. One has to do with the federal flood insurance program.
Where periodic flooding still leaves the home habitable, the owners can look forward
to periodic upgrading from insurance payments. Another reason is the tendency for
individuals to compare the benefits they derive from a non structural project with
those of their neighbors. People residing at slightly higher elevation may not be
included in the relocation plan yet may still be subject to flooding, since the
relocated structures may only involve those in the 10- to IS-year flood plain, or
floodproofing may only be to the 10-year storm elevation.
Degree of Protection: NED Plan vs. SPF vs. Affordabilitv
Several years ago it was common in urban areas, when the recommended solution
was a high floodwall or levee, to increase the level of protection above that which
would maximize net economic development benefits. The concept was to provide
protection against a standard project flood (SPF) storm. An SPF storm is defined as
the most severe flood-producing rainfall depth/area/duration relationship for any
storm that is considered reasonably characteristic of the region in which the
drainage basin is located, giving consideration to the runoff characteristics and
existence of water regulation structures in the basin. In effect, the floodwall
designed to provide an SPF level of protection was generally the 200- SOO-year flood
standard, while the National Economic Development (NED) plan might typically be at
the 100-year level of protection.
Current policy stresses proceeding with the NED plan unless justification for
an exception is approved at the Assistant Secretary of the Army level. Most
projects recommended are now NED plans; however, we are finding that the nonfederal
sponsor may well be considering a project providing less than the NED plan, for
economic reasons. There obviously is a greater risk when a sponsor desires a lesser
degree of protection and we carefully evaluate our design as well as the risk before
agreeing to proceed in each case. It is sometimes acceptable to build projects in
stages, based on the nonfederal sponsor's ability to finance its share, as long as
phased construction is practical from an engineering viewpoint. However, the level
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of protection considered acceptable for agricultural areas is not acceptable in
urban areas.
Higher Cost Sharing
Thus far, based on 41 new starts that were added by Congress in a fiscal year
1985 Supplemental Appropriation Act, we have observed a clear cut willingness of
sponsors to sign up for the higher cost-sharing but not necessarily for the project
recommended by the Corps under previous cost-sharing rules. In the case of flood
control, there are several instances of phasing construction based on affordability
and the timing of the non federal sponsor's financing plan.
The real test will come on "second generation" projects, where eXisting
conditions consist of a project providing 50- to 100-year protection and the Corps
proposes a much higher degree of protection. In these instances, the cost in cash
to the non federal sponsors is generally high. Since the requirement for additional
lands, easement, and rights-of-way is frequently low (generally less than 10%), the
requirement to reach 25% requires a higher level of cash. The test will come when
we are ready to undertake construction of such projects as Wyoming Valley,
Pennsylvania, where the existing project has been adequate for all storms except
one--the exception being Agnes in 1972, when the project was totally inadequate.
Another example is the Santa Ana River Project in California, which has been
protected by Prado Dam and downstream channels, but which would be inadequate in the
event of a major flood.
Future Emphasis
Greater Partnership Role
Cost-sharing of feasibility studies and project design and construction will
bring the Corps and the non federal sponsors closer to a partnership rather than an
expert-client relationship. The likelihood of studying flood problems for which the
Corps cannot justify an economically feasible solution early in the study will
diminish, as will the degree of effort on solutions which are not supported by the
nonfederal sponsors. Staging of construction and requests to construct less than
the NED plan can be expected to increase and in all likelihood will be honored where
the risk is acceptable to both the federal government and the non federal sponsor.
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Reallocation of Storage
The Corps has constructed over 300 major reservoir projects with flood contrastorage. As demands for municipal and industrial water supply increase, we can
expect significantly more requests for conversion of flood control storage to
municipal and industrial water supply storage. The concept of having vendable
products in Corps projects is attractive but needs to be evaluated against the
aspect of flood control benefits foregone. Generally, however, serious proposals t:
reallocate storage for water supply will be honored if the sponsor is willing to pal
the appropriate costs.
Flood Warning Systems
Heretofore the Corps has not recommended projects that consisted exclusively of
flood warning systems. Warning systems have been included as a non structural
element in more comprehensive structural and nonstructural projects. We are now on
the verge of a maj Dr breakthrough in th i s area. A recommend at i on for a fl ood
warning system in the Passaic River Basin, New Jersey is being given serious
consideration, with approval expected shortly. The importance of the stand-alone
flood warning system project is that it is responsive where, for a variety of
reasons, the Corps has failed to provide structural projects and nonstructura1
~easures despite years of study.
The Passaic River Basin has been studied by the
Corps for several decades with virtually no projects having been implemented,
despite the dense population and frequent flooding. Perhaps it is the multitude of
political jurisdictions within the basin that has complicated reaching a consensus
on solutions to the flood problems.
Greater State Participation
As federal programs provide a smaller percentage of overall costs, the nonfederal sponsor will be expected to bear a greater burden of responsibility. In t~e
case of flood control projects we can expect greater participation by the states to
~ake up the difference.
The implication is that the state and local sponsors also
wi 11 have a greater interest in the plan formul at i on process.
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PERSPECTIVES ON THE BIG THOMPSON DISASTER--THEN AND NOW
Jerome M. Olson
Natural and Technological Hazards Division
Federal Emergency Management Agency
I would like to comment on the mitigation strategies employed in 1976 in the
aftermath of the Big Thompson disaster, and quickly review the mitigation programs
which are in place in 1986 within the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
This chapter concludes with recommendations for the future.
Mitigation strategies during the weeks and months following the Big Thompson
disaster can be characterized in these terms:
•

Minimum guidance. There were no procedures on flood hazard mitigation, aside from minimal flood plain management regulations.

•

Strong leadership from Governor Lamm and the County Commissioners
immediately following the disaster.

•

Maximum collaboration. Various state agencies, the county, and the
federal agencies united in the Flood Hazard Risk Study and the land
acquisition program.

•

Sense of mission. Changes in land use patterns would not have
occurred without the understanding of county, state, and federal
officials that this tragedy must not be permitted to happen again.

In reviewing our files on Larimer County and the disaster, the three critical
activities that surface are: the Flood Plain Management Moratorium, the Flood
Hazard Risk Study, and the Land Acquisition Program. The changes in the land use
pattern in the canyon from residential and commercial to open space can be attributed to the successful interaction among these activities.
I believe it would be of interest to review some of the events and decisionmaking processes that occurred in the weeks and months immediately following the
disaster.
Background
When the flood occurred on July 31st, Larimer County was in the Emergency Phase
of the National Flood Insurance Program, meaning that a Flood Insurance Study had
not yet been conducted and the Flood Plain Management Regulations required by the
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Federal Insurance Administration (FIA) were minimal. In fact, the Big Thompson
Canyon was not mapped as a Special Flood Hazard Area on a Flood Hazard Boundary Map
issued by FIA in Emergency Program Communities. Fortunately, we had just signed a
contract with Gingery Associates in June to conduct a flood insurance study, so the
amendment process to include the canyon was simplified. We had not had the wisdom
to include the canyon in the original scope of study. Our rationale had been that
the canyon was already developed and too sparsely settled to conduct a cost-effective study.
believe the significance of this is that not all flood hazard areas
will be identified, even after 10 years of studies. Obviously, our oversight was to
be corrected quickly, particularly after a meeting with our sister federal agencies
on August 4th and a meeting with Governor Lamm in the canyon on August 6th.
The Big Thompson was declared a Federal Disaster Area the morning of August
2nd,and on August 4th I was invited to a federal coordination meeting sponsored by
the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration. At the meeting I suggested to the
agencies that they should require the purchase of flood insurance as a condition of
their financial assistance, pursuant to the intent of Executive Order 11296 on Flood
Plain Management and PL 93-234, the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973. The
reaction from the federal agencies was less than overwhelming. The agencies took
the position that since the Big Thompson had not been identified as a Special Flood
Hazard Area, they were under no obligation to require flood insurance. While their
interpretation may have been legally correct, it was not consistent with the intent
of the Executive Order. The immediate concern of the agencies was response and
recovery. My reaction was to initiate the issuance of a Flood Hazard Boundary Map
on the canyon to bring PL 93-234 into force. Since the issuance of the map did not
require a Flood Insurance Study, it could be produced by the FIA in a matter of
weeks. FIA was very responsive and issued the map in September.
On August 6th, a group of federal, state, and county officials was invited to
accompany Governor Lamm on a field reconnaissance of Big Thompson Canyon. Viewing
the devastation at Drake, the governor turned to me and asked, "What can we do to
prevent this from happening again?" 1 had no ready response, but I did not forget
the question.
Four days later, the Larimer County Commissioners asked the governor to use his
emergency powers to authorize Land Use Controls and a Building Permit Moratorium.
The moratorium was to apply to the areas within the high water mark for a period of
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six months. The purposes cited for the moratorium were: to permit completion of
the flood plain study, to comply with county flood plain regulations, and to protect
the health, safety and welfare of current and future inhabitants and users of
property along the Big Thompson River.
The Flood Hazard Study, conducted between August and December of 1976, represents a highly cooperative effort on the part of the Colorado Water Conservation
Board (eWCB), Larimer County, the Colorado Department of Highways, and the Federal
Insurance Administration. FIA provided the majority of the funding and participated
in 19.1 miles of flood hazard analysis. The county and the Department of Highways
provided funding to develop contour interval mapping beyond the scope of the
traditional Flood Insurance Study. Since the county and the state were participating in the cost of the study, it was also possible to be more flexible in the
technical approaches to the hydraulic analysis. For example, we included a floodway
based upon state depth criteria rather than FIA's surcharge, and we also considered
debris load in the analysis at bridge openings. An additional six miles of stream
were studied, using state and local resources.
The CWCB agreed to publish the Flood Hazard Report upon completion of the
engineering. This was necessary since federal regulations require appeal and
conversion procedures of approximately one year for Flood Insurance Studies.
Obviously, the recovery effort required the study much sooner. The first public
hearing on the flood plain delineations was held December 22, 1976. I believe that
the cooperation and flexibility demonstrated by the entities involved in the study
had a very positive effect upon the study process.
In late November the federal coordinating officer called my attention to a
(November 18, 1976) that
newspaper article in the Loveland Reporter-Herald
identified uncontrolled development occurring in the canyon. The article went on to
state that canyon residents were upset by the restrictions on building permits and
that two County Commissioners were having serious misgivings about the moratorium.
In an effort to determine the facts and to remind the commissioners of their
responsibility to control development within flood hazard areas, I wrote to the
commission chair, requesting information. Within days I was contacted by the
newspapers in Loveland and Ft. Collins to comment on my letter and the county's
responsibilities for flood plain management. Quoting Senator Hart and myself, the
Fort Collins Coloradoan reported on December 1st, on their front page, that
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suspension of the county from the National Flood Insurance Program for failure to
regulate development could have a serious effect upon the recovery effort. Senator
Hart expressed concern that the reported uncontrolled developments could jeopardize
federal funds for rebuilding the canyon. Ironically, Commissioner Michie was
scheduled to meet with me the same day. We had a very amicable meeting in which he
assured me that the county intended to regulate the flood plain. The Coloradoan
reported one week later in a much smaller article, on page 20, that an understanding
had been reached and the county was not in danger of suspension. It is my understanding that political relationships between the state and the county were also at
rock bottom at this point. Obviously, considerable pressure was brought to bear
against the county to maintain the moratorium which they had adopted so quickly
after the disaster.
A study published in 1979 by the Western Governors' Policy Office concluded
that flood insurance appeared to be the key to any program of loss reduction.
am
not convinced that the decision making is that straightforward. Rather, insurance
is one factor in complex interpersonal and intergovernmental relationships.
The Big Thompson Canyon Flood Study was completed on schedule in December, and
meetings were held with the County Commissioners and canyon residents beginning on
December 22, 1976. The CWCB designated the study in mid-January and the county
adopted it on January 31st. The impact of the study was to prohibit most reconstruction within the area devastated on July 31st. It is doubtful whether restrictions could have been maintained without a land acquisition program. At that point
in time, public officials were not certain where acquisition funds would be secured.
A newspaper article dated January 14, 1977, reported that Larimer County's
flood coordinator and the Interfaith Disaster Recovery Task Force were joining
together to prepare legislation for land acquisition to be presented to the Colorado
General Assembly. Given the shortfall in state revenues,the appropriation was an
uphill battle. In April, the U.S. House of Representatives approved Representative
James Johnson's amendment to the Federal Land and Water Conservation Act to permit
the purchase of Big Thompson land at preflood valuations. Justification for this
approach came from the floodway provisions prohibiting reconstruction. I would add
that the language of the amendment implied that the floodway prohibitions were based
on the National Flood Insurance Program requirements. Such was not the case.
Finally, on December 13, 1977, Senator Floyd Haskell's office reported the release
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of $747,600 by the Secretary of Interior to permit the acquisition of 156 acres in
the canyon. Total expected acquisition costs were in excess of $2,025,000. The
additional revenues were derived from the State of Colorado, Larimer County, the
U.S. Land and Water Conservation Fund (Colorado apportionment), and the Four Corners
Regional Commission. Two years after the disaster, the county was still engaged in
the recovery process and land acquisition was ongoing. Although many roadblocks
existed in the acquisition program, I believe that it can be demonstrated that it
was largely successful in changing the land use from residential and commercial to
open space, consistent with the flood hazard.
I believe that one additional characteristic we can ascribe to the decisionmaking process following the disaster is the willingness on the part of many public
officials to take a risk to improve canyon safety and prevent this tragedy from
happening again.
Current Approaches to Flood Hazard Mitigation
So much has been published since the Big Thompson disaster on technical
standards and procedures for nonstructural approaches to flood hazard mitigation
that it is difficult to do justice to the subject. Instead, I will briefly describe
some of the current activities within the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Federal Emergency Management Agency
FEMA was formed as an independent agency in 1979, combining programs administered by the Federal Insurance Administration, the U.S. Fire Administration, the
Federal Disaster Assistance Administration and the Civil Defense Programs. The
expressed purpose of the agency is to promote the emergency response and hazard
mitigation capabilities of the federal government in areas of natural hazards and
civil defense. The natural hazard mitigation responsibilities are divided in the
region between the Disaster Assistance Programs Division and the Natural and
Technological Hazards Division.
Disaster Assistance Programs--Mitigation
DAP has approached its responsibilities for hazard mitigation seriously with
the publication of proposed rules in April of 1986 to clarify implementation of its
406 responsibilities under PL 93-288 and the Interagency Hazard Mitigation Teams as
required by the Office Management and Budget. As defined in the regulations, a 406

40

PERSPECTIVES

Hazard Mitigation Plan is a systematic identification of policies, programs,
strategies and actions to be carried out by state and local governments to use the
legal authorities, financial capabilities, and political leadership available to
reduce or avoid long-term vulnerability to hazards. The Interagency Hazard Mitigation Teams are convened, immediately following a presidential flood disaster
declaration, with the expressed purpose of producing a report within 15 days that
identifies mitigation opportunities to be considered in the immediate recovery
process. As an aside, this team approach is a direct outgrowth of a National
Science Foundation study entitled "Land Use Planning After Earthquakes," which was
reviewed in Boulder in 1979 following the Natural Hazards Conference. DAP has also
liberalized its funding under the Public Assistance Program to permit funding up to
15% of the Damage Survey Report to promote disaster-proofing. in addition, DAP is
providing funds to the states under the Disaster Improvement Grant to promote hazard
mitigation. Currently, DAP administers Lhe 1362 Program funded by the NFIP, the
purpose of which is to acquire flood-insured structures subject to repetitive
damage. Region VIII DAP has taken a very aggressive approach in promoting their
hazard mitigation responsibilities.
Natural and Technological Hazards Division
Ten years and nearly $1 billion later in Flood Insurance Studies, the emergency
Phase of the National Flood Insurance Program is drawing to a close. The Federal
Insurance Administrator has made a commitment to Congress that all new Flood
Insurance Studies will have been started by September 30, 1988. Within Region VIII,
virtually all new studies have begun.
As a result we are entering a new phase in the program that concentrates less
upon the conversion of communities to the regular program and more upon the technical assistance aspects of hydrologic engineering and flood plain management.

THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND DIRECTIONS 1976-1986
Douglas Gore
Federal Emergency Management Agency
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was created in 1968 to identify flood
hazards, establish local flood plain management programs and provide affordable flood
insurance protection. Today, as a result of NFIP activities of the past decade
flood hazard data, local flood plain management programs, and flood insurance are
common-place in nearly every community in the nation. Significant lessons in hazard
mitigation can be learned from the experience of the NFIP in accompl ishing these
objectives. Understanding these 1essons involves a review of both the
accompl ishments and directions of the NFIP in the areas of 1) Flood Hazard
Identification, 2) Local Flood Plain Management Programs, and 3) Flood Insurance.
Flood Hazard Identification
The identification of flood hazard areas by the NFIP represents the largest
undertaking in the history of water resource management to develop and disseminate
flood hazard information. Since the program's beginnings in 1968 through 1984, the
NFIP developed flood hazard maps for 18,667 communities at a total cost of $654.2
mill ion.
Identifying flood hazard areas is essential to the operation of the NFIP for
(1) defining the nature and extent of flooding, (2) as the technical basis for local
flood plain management programs, (3) for determining where the purchase of flood
insurance is required and (4) for setting National Flood Insurance rates.
Importantly, the presence of such data alone creates an awareness, concern and
responsibil ity for flood issues at the local level. Further, the structure of the
NFIP makes the use of NFIP flood hazard data a matter of special interest to local
government officials, home-buyers, lenders, insurance agents, developers, engineers,
architects, real estate agents and others. This wide acceptance and use of NFIP
flood hazard data relates to a number of factors including the technical standards
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and methods for conducting flood insurance studies, the NFIP mandatory flood
insurance purchase requirements, and NFIP community coordination activities.

The technical standards for flood insurance studies are almost identical to what they
were ten years ago. The NFIP, for example, maintains the base (1% frequency or
100-year) flood event as the program's standard and consequently as the basis for
local flood plain managElTlent programs. Although this standard was widely a'ccepted by
federal and state water resource agencies prior to the NFIP; such was not the case at
the local level. Today, one seldom encounters arguments on whether or not the base
flood standard is appropriate, although many continue to misunderstand it and
incorrectly define it as the flood occurring only once everyone-hundred years. In
addition to the base flood, flood insurance studies also continue to define the 10,
50, and 500-year flood elevations and regulatory floodways not exceeding the one-foot
rise criteria. The standards for preparing flood insurance maps were changed slightly
only recently. The recent NFIP Map Initiatives Project resulted in modified map
styl es in response to opinions expressed by user groups for making flood hazard maps
more easily read and hopefully, as a result, more used. The new style includes
placing floodway data on Flood Insurance Rate Maps, making this data available to
insurance agents and lenders for the first time. An even greater application of
flood information may result however, from the newly-introduced County-wide (vs.
community-wide) mapping format. This latter innovation increases the potential for
addressing flood issues on a multi-jurisdictional basis.
Most of the scientific methods for conducting Flood Insurance Studies used at the
commenCElTlent of the last decade continue to represent the best methods available. The
HEC II methodology developed by the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, for example,
continues to be the dominant methodology for most studies. The use of recognized,
"state of the art" methods producing reasonably accurate results is critical to the
credibility and acceptance of the program. One only needs recall the laok of NFIP
acceptance in the mid-1970's following the mass publ ication of Flood Hazard Boundary
Maps (FHBMs) based on approximate methods to recognize the validity of this point.
Interestingly, the greatest frustrations most often expressed by users of flood
hazard information relates not to the validity of technical data but rather how
it is graphically presented on maps. Issues relating to whether or not an individual
property can be identified as in or out of the flood plain (map scale, base map
contour intervals, aerial photo base maps, etc.) often loom as larger concerns than
pure technical accuracy or methodology.
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The NFIP mandatory flood insurance purchase requirements enacted in 1973 contribute,
perhaps more than any other factor, to the adoption of NFIP flood hazard data. The
requirement to purchase flood insurance, as a condition for obtaining financial
assistance to buy real property located in flood hazard areas, actually created
interest in the program. Only when flood hazard information became related to
economic concerns was there any wide-spread interest in flood hazard data. The
enactment of mandatory flood insurance purchase requirements was coupl ed ~Iith
provisions for improved community coordination between NFIP representatives and local
community officials. This requires local officials be kept fully informed about the
NFIP and local flood insurance studies through public meetings and other contacts.
Most importantly, NFIP representatives directly assist local officials in developing
flood plain management ordinances for adopting and implementing flood insurance
studies. This follow-up assistance provided to every community entering the regular
phase of the NFIP exceeds that provided by other flood study programs and is in part
responsibl e for the high local adoption rate of flood insurance studies.
The greatest challenge in the area of flood hazard identification is maintaining the
accuracy of the flood hazard data developed to date. Without restudy and map revision
programs the technical basis for the NFIP would be obsolete in a few years. There is
a critical need to obtain revised flood hazard data whenever modifications to flood
plains occur. Frequently, channelization projects, bridges and flood control
structures, etc., significantly alter flooding characteristics represented by NFIP
data. Unfortunately, new data is not always submitted to initiate NFIP flood map
revisions. A greater effort is needed to assure local officials understand their
responsibility to review technical data reflecting floodplain modifications before
approving such developments.
A second chall enge in the area of flood hazard identification is responding to
requests for more specialized flood hazard data. The NFIP currently applies uniform
standards and methods to most all flood insurance studies developed. This was
essential in the early phases of the program in providing technical data for the
thousands of communities establishing flood plain management programs. Now, however,
as communities gain experience in using this data, limitations in the studies are
realized. Consequently, there is an increasing demand for more precise data as well
as information on unique hazards such as flash floods, rising lakes, allUVial fans,
mudflow hazards, dam break, etc. There is also a growing interest in obtaining
technical data on storm water run-off and local drainage problems where the NFIP pays
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claims but does not identify hazards. Further, there is an interest, once hazards are
identified, to seek studies on el iminating flood problems including flood control
studies and master drainage plans. While there is reluctance and possible
statuatory limitations to pursuing studies other than traditional flood insurance
studies such efforts provide opportunities for meeting NFIP objectives. They also may
be more cost effective in meeting NFIP objectives than paying for restudies and
repetitive claims. Lastly, as the computer information revolution intensifies, there
will be an increasing demand for computerized flood hazard data and graphics over
paper maps and studies. This new technology will also provide an opportunity to
facilitate flood hazard mapping and revisions.

Local Flood Plain Management Programs
Establishing local flood plain management programs is a critical component of the
NFIP. It was long recognized only throllgh the reduction of future property at risk
could a national flood insurance program be actuarially feasible. This is necessary
to avoid the costly situation of subsidizing, and thereby encouraging, additional
unwise flood plain development. Community eligibil ity for the sale of National Flood
Insurance depends upon adoption of local ordinances, consistent with NFIP critieria, to
protect future new construction from major flood damage. Nationally, the thousands of
flood plain management ordinances now in effect were either enacted or strongly
influenced because of NFIP requirements. Presently, 17,654 communities are qual ified
to participate in the NFIP because of their local flood plain management ordinances.
The flood plain management standards for community NFIP participation, as outl ined by
NFIP regulations (Titl e 44 CFR part 60.3), remain fundamentally unchanged during the
last ten years. In brief, these standards require: 1) a permit for all floodplain
development, (2) the elevation of the lowest floor of all residential construction and
manufactured housing to or above the base flood level, (3) the elevation or dry
floodproofing of all non-residential construction to the base flood level and (4)
prohibition of floodway development unless it is demonstrated there will be no increase in the base flood level.
There are many reasons for the large numbers of communities accepting these
standards and local floodplain regulation as the strategy for flood loss
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reduction and as a requir61lent for NFIP participation. First, NFIP standards
are administered locally, rather than by the federal government. Second, ordinance adoption is one of the few flood loss reduction strategies involving a
nominal pub1 ic cost. Third, the NFIP standards for managing future flood
plain development do not impact existing deve10p:nent. Fourth, NFIP standards
provide a balance between development and flood plain manag61lent interests.
Lastly, as previously discussed, local acceptance also relates to the quality
of NFIP flood hazard data, the NFIP mandatory flood insurance purchase
requir61lents providing an economic incentive and NFIP community coordination
activities.
The success of the NFIP, however, depends not only on local adoption of these
standards but a1 so, more importantly, on local enforc61lent. The effectiveness of local ordinance enforc61lent in achieving flood loss reduction however,
should not be measured totally by the presence or absence of ideal ized flood
plains where initial regulatory f100dways remain forever undeveloped and flood
plains are occupied only by elevated or f100dproofed building"s. The presence
of flood hazard data and flood plain manag61lent ordinances, if properly enforced, act as catalysts for stimulating alternative flood loss reduction
strategies including structural approaches such as channel ization and levee
projects. While on the surface it appears the ordinance was ignored when such
sol ut ions are imp161lented, it shou 1d be r61l61lbered the ordi nance's presence
created the need for the alternative strategy,
On-site reviews of local flood plain management programs were initiated in 1978
as Community Assistance and Program Evaluations (CAPEs) and are now referred to
as Community Assistance Visits (CAVs). A comparison of the results of these
reviews during the past nine years in FEMA Region VIII provide insights on
the progress in this area. The early reviews revealed a lack of awareness of
the NFIP and local responsibi1 ity for enforcing newly adopted flood plain management ordinances. Frequently, local officials charged with enforc61lent
responsibil ities did not have copies of flood insurance studies and maps and were
unfami1 iar with the community's ordinance and NFIP standards. More recent
reviews indicate fami1 iarity with these basic tools and an interface with the
local building permit process though administration is often not fully consistent
with NFIP standards and interpretations. This is most apparent when f100dway
encroachments and watercourse alterations are involved because of limited local
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understanding of the floodway review process and NFIP flood map revision
procedures.

This is understandable because of the lack of direction on these

processes contained in local flood plain management ordinances (including the
NFIP model ordinance) and the 1 imited guidance from other sources.

While pro-

gress in impl ementing NFIP flood pla in management standards improved during
the past decade, greater assistance is needed to strengthen local capabil ity
in this area.
The major challenge in the area of flood plain management is finding the best
approaches for increasing local capability to respond to the increasing sophistication
of local flood plain management issues.

Enhancing local flood plain management

capabil ity is a continuing chall enge because of the large number of participating
communities, the high turn-over rate at the local 1evel and 1 imited technical
assistance resources.

Currently, the NFIP relies upon Community Assistance Visits

(CAVs) and Community Assistance Del ivery Systems (State and federal technical
assistance agencies) for enhancing local flood plain management capabil ities.

In

theory, this approach rel ies upon community visits by agency representatives to
identify deficiencies in local regulatory programs and then del ivers any assistance
needed before the deficiencies become compliance issues jeopardizing community NFIP
participation.

The whole focus of this effort is on how well communities enforce

flood plain managsnent regulations.
The success of local flood plain regulatory programs however, represents only a part
of the flood plain management picture.

A second major challenge involves strengthening

the regulatory approach and promoting supplemental flood plain management strategies
at the local level.

First, communities concerned about the regulation of flood plain

development are finding NFIP flood plain management standards incomplete in addressing
their unique hazards or situations.

The number of communities seeking guidance in

developing local regulations exceeding NFIP minimum requirements tailored to meet
community needs, is increasing.

Second, the local regulation of new flood plain

development alone, even with proper enforcement, is insufficient to solve local or
national flood problems.

This is true because this strategy alone ignores the

problems associated with existing flood plain development, as well as the supplemental
flood plain management opportunities available.

It is also interesting to note, the

U. S. Army Corps of Engineers has demonstrated the cost effectiveness of elevating
buildings in flood plains (the primary NFIP regulatory technique) is dependent upon
flood depth frequency relationships and is not necessarily the optimal technique in
every community.
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Ideally, a community's flood plain management program would consist of the best
combination of multiple, cost-beneficial techniques for fully managing its flood
hazards. The publication, A Unified National Program for Flood Plain Management,
1ists sixteen major flood plain management strategies including flood plain
regulations, development and redevelopment policies (including master planning and
land acquisition), disaster preparedness and assistance, floodproofing, flood
forecasting, warning systems and emergency plans, dams and reservoirs, dikes, levees
and floodwall s, channel alterations, high flow diversions, land treatment measures,
on-site detention measures, information and education, and flood insurance.
The need for strengthening the regulatory approach and promoting supplemental
strategies has long been recognized by the NFIP. During the past decade the NFIP
initiated and supported several strategies for achieving increased flood loss
reduction. Some of these initiatives resulted in spin-off programs no longer
directly managed by the NFIP. The most notable examples include: Presidential
Executive Order 11988, the Inter-Agency Agreement on Post-Disaster Flood Hazard
Mitigation Planning, the Floodplain Property Acquisition Program (section 1362),
the State Assistance Program, the FEMA Dam Safety Program and the publ ication of
technical documents on various flood loss reduction techniques.
The NFIP must continually evaluate the proper balance between promoting supplemental
flood plain management strategies with its traditional mission of identifying
flood hazards and establ ishing local regulatory programs. In any event, the NFIP
will need to provide more complex technical assistance as the program continues
to mature. NFIP efforts in pursuit of optimal flood plain management will require
greater expertise on the part of agency representatives and enhanced teamwork in
applying engineering and planning skills in solving flood plain management problems.
Lastly, this effort will require increased abil ities in working with local officials
in demonstrating cost-effectiveness, and in funding and implementing flood loss
reduction strategies.
Flood Insurance
The availability of affordable flood insurance is a major accomplishment of the
NFIP. The NFIP, in fact, was created with this as its foremost objective. Currently, there are nearly two-mill ion insured properties for over $139.3 bill ion
in coverage. In addition, since the program's inception in 1968, over $2.4 billion
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were paid in flood insurance claims representing a significant savings in disaster
assistance payments.
The basic concepts of National Flood Insurance remain unchanged during the past
decade. El igibil Hy for the sal e of flood insurance and the NFIP mandatory flood
insurance requirements are still the primary incentives for local government NFIP
participation and enactment of local flood plain management ordinances. A statuatory change (known as the Eagleton Admendment) to section 202(b) of the NFIP to
allow conventional financing in the flood plains of communities not participating
in the NFIP had relatively little effect on the program.
While the fundamentals remain unchanged, there were significant changes relating
primarily to the marketing of National Flood Insurance. In the past ten years
these include: a doubling of the pol icy base, insurance rate increases, basement
coverage exclusion, multiple deductibles, a national marketing contractor, Flood
Insurance Claim Offices (FICOs) at the sites of major disasters, out-reach training
workshop for agents and lenders, a stream-lined rate structure, an improved agent's
manual and the Write Your Own (WYO) program.
The major challenges are in making the NFIP self-supporting without government
subsidies and increasing private sector involvement. Secondarily, insurance incentives could be used to a greater degree to accomplish the NFIP flood plain management objectives. There may be opportunities, for example, to reward communities
implementing supplementary flood loss reduction strategies through reduced flood
insurance rates.
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THE DAM FAILURE HAZARD; AWARENESS AND PREPAREDNESS IN COLORADO
By Jack Truby
Colorado Division of Disaster Emergency Services
Dam safety, now being developed through both structural and nonstructural
means, is a vital program in Colorado. It is particularly important to residents of
Larimer County and the Big Thompson Canyon. The integrity of several dams was of
great concern during the heavy rains which brought on the Big Thompson flood and
during the Lawn Lake Dam failure. This dam failure occurred in nearby Rocky
Mountain National Park and threatened the Olympus Dam at Estes Park as well as
canyon residents.
In theory, if all necessary structural measures to reduce the vulnerability of
Coloradans are taken, few if any nonstructural steps would be necessary. Since it
is unlikely that we can achieve perfect dam safety through structural means alone, a
variety of nonstructural means can be employed to lessen potential impacts on the
many Coloradans who currently reside in dam inundation zones.
Awareness of the potential for floods from heavy rainfall, dam failure or both
is essential to risk reduction. Innovations in insurance systems (particularly
National Flood Insurance) and zoning methods will certainly reduce future risk
levels. But in view of the existing probabilities that dams will fail and that very
high losses are inevitable, there is an urgent need for non structural steps to
stimulate threat awareness and the development of warning and evacuation plans for
those who reside in potential dam failure inundation zones. Until this has been
accomplished, risk levels will remain unacceptably high.
The purpose of this chapter is to:
1.

Better define the nonstructural aspects of the dam failure hazard in
Colorado,

2.

Analyze and promote public awareness of this hazard, and

3.

Promote the development of effective warning and evacuation plans for
threatened elements of Colorado's population.

Awareness stimulation and planning can best be developed locally with state
assistance. Both should be closely identified with hazard and capability conditions
that are locally existent. Centralized state effort can develop many features of
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the program but, in the end, products must be based on local conditions, flow
through local systems, and be sponsored locally. Progress can best be realized
through a publicity program directed at those threatened and those responsible for
governmental reaction. If the former can be motivated, the latter will follow.
State assistance should be channeled through local preparedness officials. Then
publicity and planning elements can be developed and coordinated so that they mature
in tandem and so that public and governmental cooperation have the best opportunity
to develop in concert.
Local radio stations, newspapers, and brochures are the best media to reach and
influence elements of the population most concerned with the dam safety issue.
Public Service Announcement tapes, brochures and articles for local newspapers can
be developed by state staffs to be modified by local officials and presented by them
to the media. Important awareness targets are: residents of inundation zones, the
emergency management community, educators and students, the handicapped, lending and
insurance agencies, past victims, volunteer relief agencies, businesses and many
others. Also, state assistance to local governments can encourage joint interjurisdictional and interagency participation. Progress in some localities across the
state can be used to influence slower moving entities.
Within Larimer County, the town of Estes Park, and the Big Thompson Canyon,
awareness of dam failure high; the Lawn Lake Dam failure is still in mind. However.
the rest of Colorado is not moving at an acceptable pace. Until considerably more
progress is made in both structural and non structural means for improved dam safety.
dam failure flooding will remain one of Colorado's very high risk hazards.
In summary, the following nonstructural measures should be undertaken thnmghout the state as soon as possible:
•

Local entities (towns, cities, counties) in potential inundation
zones should stimulate awareness and complete local warning and
evacuation planning; dam inundation zone management programs should
evolve.

•

The state's program to assist these entities should be expedited
significantly through the Division of Disaster Emergency Services
(DODES), in coordination with the state engineer, when additional
funding is obtained.

•

A hazard mitigation program, such as buying up open space, should be
considered by the legislature; such a program should operate through
and support the initiatives of local entities.

CHANGES IN OUR UNDERSTANDING OF MITIGATION
William P. Stanton
Colorado Water Conservation Board
What Mitigation Was
Mitigation is the noun form of "mitigate." The word mitigate came into use
during Middle English (1150-1475). It is derived from the Latin word "mitigutus,"
which is the past participle of "mitigare," meaning to soften. Webster provides two
definitions: 1) to cause to become less harsh or hostile, and 2) to make less
severe or painful (Webster, 1974).
The history of the application of measures to mitigate flood losses is alive
with examples. It begins with The Deluge, about 2957 B.C., when Noah built an ark.
The Chinese have been building levees by hand to control the flood waters of the
Yellow River for centuries.
In March, 1543, DeSoto's expedition in search of gold and silver had to wait
near the mouth of the Arkansas River for about a month before they could proceed
beyond the Mississippi River. DeSoto's party noted that
On account of these inundations of the river the people built their houses
on the high land, and where there is none, they raise mounds by hand,
especially for the houses of the chiefs . . . (Hoyt and Langbein, 1955).
After the January, 1762 flood on the Ohio River, the engineer at Fort Pitt in
Pennsylvania recommended elevation of the fort to protect the powder magazine.
Following the 1785 flood on the Mississippi River which inundated the town of St.
Genevieve, Missouri (founded 50 years earlier), a decision was made to move the
entire town to high ground. In April, 1795, after a flood on Cove Creek and the
Nolichucky River in Tennessee, the father of Davy Crockett (who was eight years old
at the time) decided not to rebuild his cabin and mill at the same site.
Not to leave my Australian friends out of this picture, in March, 1817,
following floods on the Nepean and Hawkesbury Rivers in New South Wales, Governor
Lachlan Macquarie issued "Government and General Orders" which encouraged the
settlers to remove their residences from the floodmarks to the townships.
I first heard of the term "flood mitigation" when my bosses told me to run up
to Estes Park following the Lawn Lake dam failure of July 15, 1982. My assignment
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had something to do with being the state representative on the federal postdisaster
interagency intergovernmental hazard mitigation team. I was told that my role as
the state's first mitigation person would be to make judgments on insurance claims
and to "be tough."
In the days that followed, I carefully read FEMA's Handbook of Common
Procedures and found "hazard mitigation" defined as
a management strategy in which current action and expenditures to reduce
the occurrence or severity of potential flood disasters are balanced with
potential losses from future floods (Wright Water Engineers, 1981).
This sounded amazingly close to a term I had previously learned as "floodplain
management":
to reduce the damaging effects of floods, preserve and enhance natural
values and provide for optimal use of land and water resources within the
floodplain. Its goal is to strike a balance between the values obtainable
from the use of floodplains and the potential losses to individuals and
society arising from such use (U.S. Water Resources Council, 1981).
What Mitigation is Now
FEMA describes mitigation as one of four elements of a whole spectrum of
governmental activities associated with natural hazards that FEMA has labeled
"comprehensive emergency management." The other three elements are preparedness,
response, and recovery. "Mitigation refers to actions to reduce or eliminate the
adverse effects of future hazard events," and it is being touted as able to break
the cycle of repeated destruction.
Mitigation has more recently been defined by FEMA as:
any action taken to permanently eliminate or reduce the long-term risk to
life and property from natural and technological hazards (Ralph M. Field
Associates, 1985).
Obviously mitigation activities may be undertaken before or after a hazard
event occurs. While FEMA establishes postflood hazard mitigation teams, there is no
reason why preflood mitigation teams or plans could not be created.
The Flood Hazard Mitigation Plan for Colorado is statewide in scope and
addresses federal, state and local programs that deal with flood hazard mitigation.
Preflood hazard mitigation plans have been prepared for DeBeque, Silver Plume, and
Manitou Springs.
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Organization of Mitigation Strategies
In the 1930s, the term "flood control" meant an SCS or Corps of Engineers dam.
In the progress of water resource development in this country, "flood control
benefits" were and are still identified as part of most water projects. In the
1960s, the Corps of Engineers began talking about "flood loss reduction" and flood
plain management. Still, confusion exists about the scope of flood plain management
even at the Water Conservation Board where I work in the Flood Control and Floodplain Management Section.
Various schemes to sort out the wide range of mitigation measures have been
devised. The most common are:
•

preventive vs. corrective measures, or

•

structural vs. non structural measures.

The basic underlying principal, however, is to use a combination of measures that
attempt to control water or reduce the vulnerability of people in its path.
The literature abounds with charts and diagrams that attempt to categorize the
elements of these two basic strategies into some logical order. Some of the best
examples are from the U.S. Water Resources Council, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Army Corps of Engineers, the
State of Victoria, Australia, the New Zealand National Water and Soil Conservation
Authority, the American Institute of Architects, and the Colorado Water Conservation
Board.
Current Federal Emphasis on Mitigation
Federal and state governments must deal with the cumulative economic impacts of
damages. The concept of mitigation begins with the federal government, which is in
a position to keep track of the increasing rise in damages. The idea of mitigating
these damages filters down to local government and citizens, whose concept of
mitigation is primarily influenced by the federal government's most current emphasis
on softening the losses to make them less severe or painful.
Although a change in leadership and recently proposed amendments to the rules
and regulations appear to put money behind a new mitigation initiative on a national
level, FEMA's current organizational chart shows a disturbing emphasis on insurance
and places mitigation in a subordinate role. The Hazard Mitigation Branch is but
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one of two branches of the Public Assistance Division, which is one of three
divisions of the Office of Disaster Assistance Programs, which is one of three
offices within the State and Local Programs Support Directorate, which is one of the
four directorates and two administrations which compose FEMA (see Figure 1).
Unless FEMA can make some internal improvements in the way mitigation efforts
are structured, it is uncertain how effective our renewed awareness and understanding of mitigation will be.
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CHANGES AT THE STATE LEVEL SINCE 1976
Ruth M. Wright
House of Representatives, State of Colorado
Introduction
I wish I could tell you that Colorado has made great strides since the Big
Thompson flood in 1976. There have been some gains, but there have also been some
losses, and some lost opportunities. In speaking of the "state level" we need to
differentiate between the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch. As a member
oi the Legislative Branch, I believe I can speak frankly of some of its shortcomings. As a whole, the Executive Branch gets higher grades on this issue than the
Legislative Branch.
Division of Disaster Emergency Sprvices
Originally a Division of Civil Defense in the Department of Military Affairs,
the Division of Disaster Emergency Services (DODES) was created by the legislature
in 1973 with additional responsibilities, but no additional resources (money). It
did not even have its own division head. When the Big Thompson flood hit on May 31,
1976, DODES was woefully inadequate to respond. It was Governor Lamm, in fact, who
provided the leadership and the recovery effort was managed directly out of his
office. Thereafter, the governor appointed a Management Efficiency Committee with
expertise in emergency preparedness and also staged a surprise simulated flood
exercise to test state agencies, particularly DODES. The test clearly showed up the
inadequacies of the state's emergency response capabilities. The governor, together
with the legislature, worked together to solve this problem. DODES was given clear
direction that its prime purpose was emergency preparedness for the state. The
division then got its own experienced director, Pat Byrne. It now has 26 full-tim!:
and three temporary employees. It has some state-of-the-art COl1lllJlln1 cat ion syste,lIs,
provides expertise and training to support local governments in their emergency
response activities prior to an event, responds when em,ergencies occur, condllcts the
recovery programs, and coordinates with the federal agencies to get a~l of the
recovery assistance which may be available.
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Clearly, real progress has been made since 1976 in disaster preparedness and
response.
On the negative side, however, state funding for DODES has been tenuous. In
Colorado, funding is totally in the hands of the legislature. For DODES there is
heavy reliance on federal funds. Of the $1.5 million annual budget, only $300,000
comes from state funds. While a Disaster Emergency Fund was also established in the
1973 act, it has never been funded. So when a disaster occurs, there is a scramble
for funds. (Prior to 1980, the state did not even have a policy to allow the state
to match funds for repair of damage to the public property of local governments.) If
the legislature is in session and has surplus dollars, a supplemental appropriation
can be made. Perhaps there are some funds left over from other agencies at the end
of the fiscal year and the governor can transfer these for disaster recovery. The
legislature formerly appropriated $200,000 to a Governor's Emergency Fund which the
governor could use for anything from grasshopper control to natural disaster relief.
This has also been cut to $100,000.
Just a few statistics to put the need in perspective. In the past five years
the experience has been that of the 100 emergency calls per year, about one-fourth
request state assistance to local governments, of which about a dozen activate the
state emergency center. Six of these are serious enough to be declared a "disaster
emergency" by the governor. Every other year there will be a request for a federal
declaration. Of all of the emergencies, three-fourths are water related (including
two dam breaks each year) and one-fourth of the state's 63 counties will be involved
in a disaster each year.
Colorado Water Conservation Board
Another key agency in this arena is the Colorado Water Conservation Board
(CWCB). The CWCB is charged with making the official delineation of all of the
floodplains in Colorado, to provide expertise to local governments on flood control
projects, and to help communities participate in the national flood insurance program--that is, to focus on the preventive aspects of flood control. Here the
legislature has become exceedingly niggardly and short-sighted. From 1973 to 1980,
$150,000 was budgeted annually to the Flood Hazard Delineation Fund, matched by
another $150,000 from local governments. Real progress was being made in delineating the state's floodplains. Then in 1981 this was cut to $100,000 and reduced to
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zero in 1982, where it has been ever since. Two of the six staff members of the
CWCB's technical experts were first required to be cash-funded (that is, the CVCB
had to charge local governments for their services) and then cut altogether. One
person has since been reinstated because of the dire need to provide some state
competency so that nonparticipating communities can enter the federal program.
Also, there is still review of project feasibility for small communities on flood
and drainage projects when these are funded by other agencies such as the Corps of
Engineers, the Soil Conservation Service, FEMA, community block grants, or energy
impact dollars. So, in this-vital area of flood damage prevention, the legislature
is giving minimal support.
Urban Drainage and Flood Control District
The Urban Drainage and Flood Control District (UD&FCD) is one of the success
stories. Created by state statute seven years before the Big Thompson flood, this
special district operates in the six-county Denver metropolitan area for master
planning in the South Platte drainage basin. It is authorized to impose a mill levy
to finance its operations and has done a masterful job in reducing flood losses in
the metro area. In authorizing an additional four-tenths of a mill (in addition to
the basic five-tenths of a mill already authorized) for maintenance and preservation
of floodways and floodplains in 1979, the legislature specifically recognized the
Big Thompson flood experience which illustrated "the need for Colorado's floodplains
to be continually kept clear of debris and debris collecting structures."
Dam Safety
Dam failures are another cause of flood disasters, the worst in Colorado being
the Lawn Lake Dam failure which killed several people and wreaked havoc on the City
of Estes Park. There are over 2,000 dams in Colorado over ten feet in height, which
puts them under the jurisdiction of the State Engineers Office (SEO). The SEO is
charged with dam safety inspections and is authorized to require dam owners to lower
the water level in their reservoirs to prevent dam failure. By state statute
neither the state, nor state employees, nor contract inspectors can be held liable
for dam failure. The ultimate responsibility for dam safety or failure lies with
the owner. Until recently, owners of dams were strictly liable for damages caused
by dam failure, a concept adopted from the English common law on the theory that a
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dam, like explosives, was inherently hazardous, and if it failed, negligence need
not be proved.
After the Lawn Lake disaster, the legislature reviewed dam safety
and liability. Its solution was not to ensure greater dam safety but to lower the
liability for dam owners! It passed a statute which required proof of negligence if
the property damaged (or lives lost) were in the 100-year floodplain of the
watercourse, thereby moving away from strict liability.
Most of the dams in Colorado are agricultural reservoirs, owned by associations
whose only assets are the dam and reservoir site, not the water or land irrigated by
the water. This results in the dam owner often being judgment-proof, that is,
without assets to pay for any damages caused by the failure. To alleviate this
situation, a statute was passed in 1981 which stated that the board of directors of
such an owner association could not be held liable if the association bought a
minimum of $1 million in insurance. With the recent crisis in insurance
availability and affordability, the 1986 amendments to that statute reduced the
minimum to $500,000.
The legislature's response to dam safety, then, is to make it more difficult to
sue dam owners by requiring proof of negligence, and by reducing the amount to
$500,000 that can probably be recovered for all of the damages or loss of life
caused by the failure.
State Geologic Survey
The State Geologist's Office is another key agency in hazard control. In 1983
the legislature cut the staff from 16 to three (the State Geologist, his deputy and
a secretary) in an unwarranted punitive move--at the same time that the
responsibilities of that office were being increased in the hazardous waste area.
At the eleventh hour some of us managed to get a bill passed which at least
permitted the State Geologist to charge directly for his services--another cash
funding "solution." This meant that local government now would have to pay for such
services a review of subdivision plats for vulnerability to natural hazards. Basic
geological survey work for which there was no direct client to pay the bill could
simply no longer be accomplished.
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Governor's Executive Orders
The governor took his role in prevention of flood hazards very seriously and
used all of the executive powers available to him. He issued Executive Orders on
August 1, 1977 and October 1, 1977; directed all state agencies to evaluate flood
hazards when planning state facilities and preclude the uneconomic, hazardous or
unnecessary use of floodplains; directed state boards and agencies to proceed with
identification of floodplains, and prepare flood disaster preparedness plans; and
took many other preventive steps. They also were oriented towards making it
possible for Colorado communities to participate in the federal flood insurance
program.
In summary, changes at the state level have been mixed. The Executive Branch
has done an outstanding job within the budget constraints imposed by the Legislative
Branch. The legislature in most areas has been penny-wise and pound-foolish,
resulting in a minimal state role in preventive measures and tenuous funding for
disaster relief.
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EXECUTIVE
RICHARD O. LA....

CHAMBERS

DENVER

Aug. 1, 1977

Gl'WflmfH

EXECUTIVE

ORDER

EVALUATION OF FLOOD HAZARD IN LOCATING STATE BUILDINGS, ROADS,
AND OTHER FACILITIES, AND IN REVIEWING AND APPROVING SEWAGE
AND WATER FACILITIES, AND SUBDIVISIONS
WHEREAS, hazardous uses of Colorado flood plains are occurring and potential
flood losses and loss of life are increasidS despite substantial
efforts to control floods; and
WHEREAS, economic losses due to floods in Colorado during the last twelve
years place Colorado near the top of the Nation'B list for per
capita loases; and
WHEREAS, past inadequate land use policy and controls led to the major
disaster in the Big Thompson Canyon on July 31, 1976; and
WHEREAS, minimum flood plain and floodway regulation criteria have been
promulgated by the Colorado Water Conservation Board and the Colorado Land Use Commission on the premise that wise use of our State's
flood plains is the key to controlling and minimizing future
economic losses and auffering of our citizens; and
WHEREAS, wise use of our flood plains will promote public health, safety
and welfare, reduce future public costs for relief and rehabilitation and contribute to the State's economy; and
WHEREAS, the State of Colorado has extensive and continuing programs for
the construction of buildings, roads, and other facilities and
further, State Agencies are involved in the review and approval
of water and sewer treatment plants, subdivisions, trailer parks,
campgrounds, and many other facilities throughout the State of
Colorado; and
WHEREAS, both Federal and State Agencies have compiled significant data and
studies concerning the frequency of floods snd the location of
flood plains and are expert at estimating flood hazards;
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as Governor of
Colorado, it is hereby ordered as follows:
1.

The heads of itate agencies shall provide leadership in encouraging
a broad and unified effort to prevent uneconomic uses and development
of Colorado flood plains and in particular, to promote the public
health, safety and welfare and to reduce the risk of flood losses
in connection with Colorado lands and instalLations and State financed
or 8upported improvements.

2.

All State agencies directly responsible for the construction of State
buildings, structures, roads, overnight campgrounds, or other facilities
shall evaluate flood hazards when planning the location for new facilities and as far as practicable shall preclude the uneconomic, hazardous,
or unnecessary uae of flood plains in connection with such facilities.

3.

Whenever practical and economically feasible, flood proofing measures
ahall be applied to existing facilities to reduce flood damage potential.

4.

The Colorado Water Conservation Board and the Land Use Commission in
cooperation with the appropriate state and federal agende s shall continue
to undertake the evaluation of hazardous flood plain uses in the State
of Colorado, proceed with the identification of flood olains. and oreoare suitable flood disaster preparedness plans in cooperation with
affected cities dnd counties, including an effective flood insurance
information program, early warning system, and related steps to protect
against future loss of life and unnecesaary economic losses. Priority
shall be given to the numerous hazardous csnyons in the State of Colorado.

5.

All State agencies responsible for the review and/or approval of sewage
treatment plants, vater treatment plants, interceptor sewers, subdivisions,
trailer parks, and other facilities within the State of Colorado shall
evaluate flood hazards in writing in connection with such review and
approval of facilties and take measures to minimize the exposure of
facilities, and development which they may induce, to potential flood
damage and the need for future State expenditures for flood protection
and flood disaster relief.

6.

All State agencies responsible for programs which entail land use
planning shall take flood hazards into account when evaluating applications for planning grants, when reviewing water and wastewater
facility plans, and area-wide wastewater management plans.

7.

Requeats for flood hazard information and hazard asseSBment msy be
addressed to the Colorado Water Conservation Board or the Land Use
Commission.

8.

Any requests for appropriations for State construction of new buildings,
structures, roads, or other facilities by State agencies shall be
accompanied by a statement on the findings of the agency'a evaluation
and consideration of flood hazards in development of such requests.

9.

As used in thia Order, the term "State agency" includes any department,
commission, division; or other organizational entity of the executive
branch of State Government.

10.

The State aRencies shall proceed immediately to develop such procedures,
regulations, and information as are provided for in, or may be necessary
to carry out, the provisions of this Executive Order.

GIVEN under my hand and the
Executive Seal of the State
of Colorado, this first day
August, A.D., 1977.

Ridf!1rd D. Lamm
Gov,rnor

EXECUTIVE
RICHA~O

O. LA.MM

CHAMBERS

DE~'VEn

OeLl, 1977

Governor

E X E CUT I V E 0 R D E R
REQUIRH1EiHS AND CRITERIA
FOR STATE PARTICIPATION
IN THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSU~ANCE PROSRAM
WHEREAS, on August 1, 1977, Executive Order Number 8491, entitled "Evaluation
of Flood Hazard in Locating State Buildings, Roads, and Other Facjjities, and in Reviewing and Approving Sewage and Water Facilities,
and Subdivisions," was issued regarding State policy on the occupation and modification of Colorado floodplains by State agencies; and
WHEREAS, additional State procedures are to be established to meet the requirements of the National Flood Insurance Program; and
WHEREAS, the availabil ity of prograJ'ls for Federal loans and mortgage insurance,
State financial assistance, and land use planning are determining
factors in the utilization of lands; and
WHEREAS, the availability of flood insurance under the National Flood Insurance
Program for state-owned properties as provided by the National Flood
Insurance Act of 1968, as amended, and the Flood Disaster Protection
Act of 1973 is dependent upon State coordination of Federal, State,
and local aspects of floodplain, muds1ide (i.e., mudlfow) area, and
flood-related erosion area manageJ'lent activities in the State; and
WHEREAS, the Colorado Water Conservation Board is the State agency responsible
for state-wide programs for flood prevention, flood control, flood
protection, and flood hazard study criteria, as provided by Section
37-60-106(1), Colorado revi~e~ StQtutes 1973, and Sectir~ ?~-65. 1-403,
Colorado Revised Statutes 1973, as amended, (S.B. 126) L. 77.; and
WHEREAS, the Colorado Water Conservation Board is the State agency designated
to coordinate the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, as amended,
and the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973; and
WHEREAS, the Division of Disaster Emergency Services is the agency responsible
for the c0ordination of Federal, State, and local disaster activities,
and
WHEREAS, the primary concerns of the Colorado Land Use Commission are the
protection, utility, value, and future of lands within the State; and

WHEREAS, the availability of flood insurance for stateowned properties is
conditioned upon the State's compliance with minimum floodplain
management criteria of the National Flood Insurance Program regulations (24 CFR 1909, et. seg.);
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as the Governor of
Colorado. it is hereby ordered as follows:
1. The Colorado Land Use Commission is hereby designated as the
State agency to provide implementation of Section 1910.12, Rules
and Regulations of the Federal Insurance Administration.
2. Each State agency has a responsibility to evaluate the potential
effects of any actions it may take in a floodplain, to ensure that
its planning programs and budget requests reflect consideration of
flood hazards and floodplain management.
3. Before taking action, each State agency shall deter~ine ~I;=ther
the proposed action will occur in a floodplain. This determination
shall be based on a Department of Housing and Urban Development flood
hazard boundary map (FHBM) or, if available, on more detailed floodplain delineation maps of the area on file with the Colorado Water
Conservation Board. If flood hazard information and data are not
available, the Colorado Water Conservation Board shall assist in the
determination and the evaluation of any flood hazard to the proposed
facilities or structures.
4. For state-owned properties in Federal Insurance Administration
designated "Special Hazard Areas," the State shall, as a minimum,
comply with the floodplain management criteria set forth in Sections
1910.3, 1910.4, and 1910.5 of the National Flood Insurance Regulations.
5. If a State agency has determined that no feasible alternative
exists to avoid siting a proposed structure or facility within a
floodplain, the agency shall (a) prepare and transmit to the
Colorado Land Use Commission a notice containing an explanation of
wh¥ the development is proposed to be located in the floodplain;
(b) require the structure to be designed (or modified) and adequately anchored to prevent flotation, collapse, or lateral movement; (c) require the structure to be constructed with materials
and utility equipment resistant to flood damage; (d) site the
lowest floor of any structure not less than one foot above the base
flood, unless such structure has been adequately flood-proofed to
one foot above said base water elevation; and (e) elevate residential dwellings to not less than one foot above the maximum water
elevation of the computed base flood.
6. The Colorado Land Use Commission and the Colorado Water Conservation Board shall assist State agencies in carrying out the floodplain management criteria set forth in Sections 1910.3, 1910.4, and
1910.5 of the National Flood Insurance Regulations with the following provisions:

a. Subdivision proposals shall be consistent with the
criteria established by Title 3D, Article 28, Colorado
Revised Statutes 1973, as amended.
b. Policy on floodplain management shall follow the
directives of Executive Order 8491 of August 1, 1977.
c. Disaster Preparedness Activities shall be consistent with the criteria establ ish~d by Title 28, Article
2, Colorado Disaster Emergency Act, Colorado Revised
Statutes 1973, as amended, within the scope of their
applicability to the Executive Order and to Executive
Order 8491, dated August 1, 1977, and as administered
by the Colorado Division of Disaster Emergency Services.
Provided further, noting in this order on in Executive
Order 8491 shall apply to assistance provided for
emergency work to save lives, protect property, and
public health and safety, perforffiEd pursuant to the
Colorado Disaster Emergency Act.
d. The floodway (high-hazard zone) limits shall be
consistent with the criteria estabiisned by the Colorado
Water Conservation Board's Model Floudplain Regulation,
dated February 26, 1975, which was prepared under the
authority of Title 24, Article 65.1, Colorado Revised
Statutes 1973, as amended.
7. All State agencies responsible for the disposal of lands or
properties shall evaluate flood hazards in connection with lands
or propertiss which are proposed for disposal to other public
instrumentalities or private interests and, in order to minimize
future State expenditures for flood protection and flood disaster
relief, shall attach appropriate restrictions with respect to
uses of the lands or properties from disposal.
b.
i"llo:i St~ce pl-operty in iiuud~lains is pl'opused for lease,
easement, right-of-way, or disposal to non-state public or
private parties, the State agency shall (a) reference in the
conveyance those uses that are restricted under identified
Federal, State or local floodplain regulations; and (b)
attach other appropriate restrictions to the uses of properties
by the grantee or purchaser and any successors, except where
prohibited by law; or (c) withhold such pro;Jt=r:ies from
conveyance.

9.

As used in this Order:
a. "State agency" means any department, board, commission,
or division; however, the directives as contained in this
Order are meant to apply to those agencies which perform or
regulate activities that are located in, or affect, floodplains.

b. "base fl ood" means the fl ood that has a one percent
chance of being equalled or exceeded in any given year.
c. "floodplain" means an area in, and adjacent to, a
stream, which area is subject to being inundated by the
base flood in any given year.
d. "Flood-proofing" means a combinatiDn Df structural
provisiDns, changes, or adjustments to lands, prDperties,
and structures subject tD f1DDding, primarily for the
reductiDn or e1iminatiDn Df f1DDd damages tD lands,
properties, structures, and cDntents Df buildings in a
f10Dd-hazard area.
10. As may be permitted by law, the head Df each State agency
shall issue apprDpriate rules and regulations tD gDvern the
carrying out Df the prDvisiDns Df this order in cDnsu1tatiDn
with the CD10radD Land Use CDmmission.
11.

This Order shall take effect Dn OctDber 1, 1977.

GIVEN under my hand and the Executive Seal of the State of Co1DradD, this
1st day of OctDber, A.D., 1977.

Richard D. Lamm
GDvernDr

SUCCESSFUL FLOOD MANAGEMENT ON A REGIONAL BASIS
William G. DeGroot and L. Scott Tucker
Urban Drainage and Flood Control District, Denver, CO
Introduction
The Urban Drainage and Flood Control District was established by the Colorado
Legislature in 1969 to assist local governments in the Denver Metropolitan area with
multi-jurisdictional drainage and flood control problems. Starting with a staff of
two and a budget of approximately $400,000 the District has grown, in a carefully
planned and well justified manner, to a staff of fifteen with an annual budget of
approximately $8,000,000. The history of that growth and a discussion of the key
policy decisions which facilitated that gl'owth are given below.
Board of Directors
The District is an independent agency with its own Board of Directors. If
there is a single key to the success of the District, it is the Board of Directors.
The make-up of the fifteen member Board is unique, in that it is composed mainly of
locally elected officials who are appointed to the Board. Membership includes the
Mayor, or Deputy Mayor, of Denver; three Denver City Council members; one
commissioner from each of Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder, Douglas, and Jefferson Counties;
and one mayor from each of Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder, and Jefferson Counties. These
thirteen locally elected officials select two registered professional engineers to
complete the Board membership.
Area
The District includes the City and County of Denver and the urban or urbanizing
portions of the five surrounding counties. There are presently 35 cities and
counties within the District. The District covers an area of approximately 1,200
square miles. There are approximately 1,200 miles of major drainageways having
tributary areas of at least 1,000 acres. The present population of the District is
approximately 1.8 million people.
Funding
The District's primary source of funds is a property tax. The District is
currently authorized to levy up to one mill. Although Federal and State funds have
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been granted to the District in the past, the District does not rely on any other
source of funding at this time.
Responsible Growth
The 1969 legislation which established the Urban Drainage and Flood Control
District gave it fairly broad powers but very little money to implement those
powers. Initially, the District was authorized to levy 0.1 mill for planning and
operations, which amounted to approximately $400,000.
The first major activity of the District was to inventory drainage basins and
sub-basins to determine the extent of problems and to develop a plan to attack those
problems. The initial study indicated that approximately 25% of the major
drainageway miles within the District were developed, with the remaining 75%
undeveloped and amenable to preventive approaches. It was logical that, if
effective preventive measures could be undertaken on the undeveloped drainageways,
significant savings in future remedial needs could be realized. The District Board
therefore made a commitment to preventive activities and developed a comprehensive
floodplain management program to prevent new problems from being created. The
District also realized that the South Platte River, the backbone of the drainage
system for the entire Denver metropolitan area, was so large and had so many
problems that it could absorb all of the District's time, effort, and money.
Therefore the Board decided to emphasize work on the tributaries to the South Platte
River.
In 1973 the District requested authority to levy an additional 0.4 mill for a
design and construction program, and the legislature granted that request, beginning
in 1974. Also in 1974, the Board established a floodplain management program.
In 1979, the Board requested a 0.4 mill increase for maintenance and
preservation of floodplains and floodways from the legislature. The legislation
passed, although it was limited to taxable years 1980 to 1983. In 1983 the time
frame was extended indefinitely. So, by 1980, the District had been authorized to
levy up to 0.9 mill for the following purposes: planning and operations (0.1 mill),
design and construction (0.4 mill) and maintenance and preservation (0.4 mill).
With several years of experience, and many master plans and construction and
maintenance projects completed or underway, the District has tackled the South
Platte River (SPR). A master planning study for the SPR was completed in late 1985.
Using the master plan as the basis for its request, the District sought an
additional 0.1 mill authorization with funds to be earmarked for the SPR, and the
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1986 legislature approved that request. The District now has a comprehensive
program addressing all aspects of flood management, a set of tried and proven
policies and procedures, and a reasonable and reliable level of funding. Details of
the individual District programs are provided in greater detail below.
Master Planning Program
The master planning program is funded out of the original 0.1 mill
authorization for the District. Key policy decisions which guide the program
implementation are as follows: (1) Each master planning effort must be requested
by the local governments and must be multi-jurisdictional; (2) Master plans are
completed by consultants acceptable to all affected local governments and the
District; (3) The District will provide necessary mapping and will pay 50% of the
consulting costs, with the local governments sharing the other 50% of the consulting
costs; and (4) The master plan must be acceptable to all the affected local
governments.
After many years of concentrating almost solely on major drainageway master
planning, the program has now evolved into four major areas of interest: (1) Major
drainageway master planning; (2) Outfall systems planning; (3) Drainage criteria
manuals for local governments; and (4) Special projects, such as criteria for
channels and structures on sandy soils, benefit-cost analysis, and wetland issues.
Master plans have provided an important tool upon which to identify projects
for construction. The master plans provide valuable input to the District's Five
Year Capital Improvement Program. They have also been used on numerous occasions to
prevent projects which would have invalidated the master plans or made them much
more expensive to implement; and to identify and acquire right-of-way needed for
future improvements.
The program staff consists of one registered professional engineer (PE) and one
student intern. There are 46 major drainageway and 15 outfall systems master plans
completed or in progress.
Design and Construction Program
Prior to the initiation of the design and construction program in 1974, the
Board adopted policies for the use of those funds. The Board established policies
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that would distribute the funds in such a way that local governments would not be
concerned that one portion of the District would be subsidizing construction in
another portion. The key policy decisions were as follows: (1) Proposed
improvements must be requested by local governments; (2) Proposed improvements must
have been master planned; (3) District funds must be matched by local governments;
(4) Local governments must agree to own completed facilities and must accept
primary responsibility for their maintenance; (5) District tax revenue received
from each county will be spent for improvements benefitting that county over a
period from 1974 to five years into the future; and (6) The District will not
develop a public works department but will rely on existing local governments'
public works departments.
The District's approach to design and construction is intended to minimize the
need for a large staff. Generally the District coordinates final designs prepared
by consulting engineers. The local entities are involved in all aspects of the
design process. The local entities generally acquire the necessary rights-of-way
(ROW) and serve as the construction contracting agency. The District is, however,
sometimes the lead agency for ROW acquisition and construction contracting. All
costs associated with design, right-of-way acquisition, and construction are shared
on a 50/50 basis between the District and the local governments.
Each year the Board adopts a Five Year Capital Improvement Program which lists
projects and District participation by county from 1974 to five years into the
future. This plan then forms the basis for District participation in the design and
construction program.
The program staff consists of two PE's and one student intern. The program has
been involved in $71 million of construction projects, including $31 million in
District funds.
Floodplain Management Program
The Floodplain Management Program was created in 1974 to establish a preventive
program to keep new problems from being created and to consolidate several
activities which had received random attention on an available time basis. The
major activities included in the program are: (1) The National Flood Insurance
Program, (2) Floodplain regulation, (3) Flood hazard area delineation, (4) Flood
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warning, (5) Flood damage surveys, (6) Reviews of proposed developments in or near
floodplains, and (7) Public information.
The District's Board of Directors has authority to regulate floodplains but has
chosen not to do so as long as the local governments are implementing their own
floodplain regulations. At the same time, the District has assisted many local
governments with their floodplain regulations, including assistance with
requirements of the National Flood Insurance Program. The District has worked with
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) not only to assist the local
governments, but also to attempt to ensure compatibility between floodplains defined
by the District and floodplains defined in flood insurance studies. An early and
continuing conflict has been the use of hydrology based on projected future
development of the drainage basins (the District approach) versus FEMA's insistence
on using existing development to define the hydrology. This conflict continues.
The District continues to identify and publish, through its flood hazard area
delineation program, 100-year floodplains in undeveloped or sparsely developed areas
so that a defined floodplain will be available for floodplain regulation when
development reaches those areas.
The District has been active in assisting local governments in the development
of flood warning plans using both spotter and instrumented detection alternatives.
In addition, the District retains a private meteorological service to provide
forecasts of potential flood producing events to all the local governments within
the District, as well as to provide support services in specific flash flood warning
plans established for individual drainageways.
In 1976 the Board of Directors decided to make a special effort to notify
occupants of floodplains of the flood potential they face. The result was a program
in which an informational brochure is mailed to each address located in or adjacent
to each identified 100-year floodplain. In 1986 22,000 brochures were mailed under
this program.
In 1980, after approval of the maintenance mill levy, the Board established a
policy which stated that all projects constructed by, or approved for construction
by, local governments after March 1, 1980 would have to meet the following
conditions in order to be eligible for District maintenance assistance: (1) The
projects would have to be designed in accordance with the Urban Storm Drainage
Criteria Manual, (2) The plans and specifications must be approved by the District,
(3) The project must be built in accordance with the approved plans, and (4)
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Maintenance access, both legal and physical, must be provided. These requirements
have been a very effective tool in upgrading the quality of flood control facilities
built by developers.
The key policy decisions for the Floodplain Management Program include: (1)
Active support of the National Flood Insurance Program, (2) A decision not to
implement the District floodplain regulation when local governments are doing an
adequate job with their own, (3) Annual notification of floodplain occupants of the
flood hazard potential, (4) Requiring District approval of facilities built by
others before they will be considered eligible for District maintenance assistance.
The program staff consists of two PE's. Over 700 miles of 100-year floodplains
have been defined by the Floodplain Management and Master Planning Programs.
Maintenance Program
Key policy decisions for the Maintenance Program include the following: (1)
Maintenance of facilities funded by the District shall be the primary responsibility
of the local governments; (2) To the extent the funds are available, the District
will assist local governments with maintenance and preservation of floodplains and
floodways; (3) The order of priority for expenditure of District maintenance funds
is District owned projects, District funded projects, projects funded by others,
unimproved urban drainageways, and unimproved rural drainageways; (4) Funds derived
from the maintenance mill levy are returned to each county in the same proportion as
they are received on an annual basis; (5) Local governments are not required to
match District maintenance funds; and (6) The policy of not creating a public works
department was reaffirmed.
The program staff consists of three PE's, two field maintenance supervisors,
and two student interns. The annual budget is approximately $3.6 million. All
maintenance activities, including any design work required, are done by private
contractors.
South Platte River Program
As noted earlier, a 0.1 mill levy has been authorized for the South Platte
River beginning in 1987. As this is written, preliminary steps are being taken to
develop a program. Some issues which must be faced include: (1) The amount of
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money to be used for capital construction, (2) The amount to be used for
maintenance, (3) The need for local matching requirements, and (4) The need for an
allocation formula to the various reaches of the river. A set of policies will be
adopted later in 1986.

The Urban Drainage and Flood Control District has established a successful
regional approach to flood management. The approach is based upon the philosophy of
correcting problems created in the past, while preventing new problems from being
created.

NOTE: This paper was initially presented at the Tenth Annual Conference of the
Association of State Floodplain Managers, June 15-20, 1986.

HOW THE BIG THOMPSON FLOOO HAS AFFECTED
LOCAL FLOOD PREVENTION EFFORTS
by Spenser W. Havlick
College of Environmental Design
University of Colorado-Boulder
and Boulder City Councilmember
On this tenth anniversary of the Big Thompson flood there are at least three
rather distinct postures that public officials seem to take in regards to the
appropriate prevention efforts needed to avoid another calamity like the Big
Thompson event. One position could be characterized as avoidance of action. We
could not afford to protect ourselves adequately against this unlikely event
recurring. The second would be general neutrality, laissez-faire, and "we will
abide by federal guidelines" attitude. Over time we will do what is convenient to
try to prevent floodway encroachment. The third local attitude shows a strong
commitment to evacuate the 100 year floodway over time, prevent new construction
there and generally take an aggressive stance to prevent a reenactment of another
Big Thompson even if it changes zoning and development patterns from residential or
commercial to agricultural, open space recreational use or to a high hazard overlay
zone.
There is a stong temptation to use the policies of Boulder, Colorado before and
after the Big Thompson Canyon disaster as a case study. This presentation succumbs
to that temptation but only after mention is made that recent research has shown
that in fact, a major event like the Big Thompson has had specific policy and
planning impacts not only along the Front Range of Colorado (at the local level) but
also impacts have rippled out to several other cities situated in close proximity to
potential canyon discharges of perilous consequences.
In a 1984-85 study of both private and public sector response to potential
flood and other natural hazards, the fact that the research team was from Colorado
usually initiated a question about our familiarity with the Big Thompson Flood of
1976 or the more recent Lawn Lake dam break which flooded part of Estes Park,
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Colorado. It was of some surprise that flood managers, planners, architects,
engineers and other pUblic officials in cities such as Albuquerque, Phoenix, Salt
Lake City and Seattle asked what impacts the Big Thompson had on current flood
management strategies and what the potential was today for a recurrence. Generally
speaking, the impact of the Big Thompson on local flood prevention efforts beyond
the state of Colorado seemed to serve more as a nagging and rather unpleasant
reminder that disasters of this magnitude happen to contempories and that mitigation
means should be taken to the degree that economic conditions warrant -- especially
if state or federal funding is available.
The central dilemma is how does a local community with a long term vision of
providing flood prevention strategies get developers who are eager to capture short
term profits to bear the upfront and often major costs of flood damage prevention.
Boulder, Colorado, located about 25 miles south of the Big Thompson Canyon continues

Boulder, Colorado, June, 1894
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to struggle with this same dilemma despite the close geographic proximity,
reasonably clear memeory of the loss of lives and devastating damage, and almost
identical watershed, canyon and physiologic setting coupled with a dense urban
concentration of 85,000 nestled at the mouth of a canyon not dissimilar to the Big
Thompson, plus eleven tributary streams and floodways with absolutely no workable
warning system available.
The capture of short-term benefits are not always in the form of dollars nor are
the developers always from the private sector. Some of the benefits of locating on
the 100 year floodway in Boulder are the so-called intangibles which include close
proximity to downtown, governmental buildings already being there, and the
aesthetics of a riparian location. Examples of public sector encroachment, new
construction, and proposals for multimillion dollar city or county owned buildings
include the city-county jail, municipal buildings including city hall and the
majority of the city government administrative offices including parks and
recreation, planning and public works plus the main library and recent proposals for
a cultural center and library expansion.
Perhaps the central question is "Did the Big Thompson have any impact on local
flood prevention efforts?" This observer would emphatically say yes but with
varying degrees of enthusiasm depending on a multitude of factors. But overall
documentation can be presented to show what the ordinances in the City of Boulder
had to say about flood plain regulations before and after 1976. Flood regulations
from the Boulder Revised Code of 1969* were markedly changed in 1977 and 1978.
Interviews with staff in the Public Works, Planning and Parks and Recreation
departments as well as with City Council members and City Attorney's office all
reveal that the Big Thompson has had a direct influence on them in making the
floodplain regulations more strict with special attention to life safety issues
including detailed flood warning systems, evacuation simulations and post-disaster
preparations. However, we now have 850 new residential units and 160 new commercial
structures in the flood plan.

* Ordinance 3505 B.R.C.
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Over the last five or six years there have been incremental improvements in the
basic regulations of the 1978 ordinance. In addition to the Big Thompson
event FEMA maps and revised federal guidelines were available. The federal
government may have been prompted to complete flood plain mapping by the disaster
west of Loveland, Colorado and the Rapid City, South Dakota flood of 1972. But even
with a very progressive Urban Flood Control District Staff, enlightened city staff
in the public works and planning departments and/or supportive professionals at the
state level, one will not see local ordinances enacted to prevent flood plain
encroachment or development. To truly accomplish appropriate long-term flood plain
zoning a city must have elected officials who are willing to remain diligent,
persistant and vigilant against the continual stream of applications for flood plain
or floodway development. The pressures on a council member, commissioner or other
elected official who serves on a local legislative assembly are tremendous. Even
the appointment of a Blue Ribbon Task Force on Tributaries did not get the city of
Boulder into an action plan.
Arguments are made by developers that try to show that no development in a
floodway is discriminatory, antibusiness, uneconomic and insensitive to the
technology available for floodproofing or early warning systems. But those who cry
antiprogress are seldom present when a subdivision is underwater several years
later. The residential or commercial property has severely reduced resale value
immediately after the flood. Those who asked for lowering of standards or inserting
variances in the flood plain regulations do not seem to come forth in a post
disaster to restore the lives and property that have been destroyed.
Armed with a slight majority of councilmembers (and sometimes even on a
unanimous vote) the Boulder City Council has outlawed new residential construction
on the Boulder Creek floodway since December 1975. In 1983 and 1984 increased
precautions were added, over the objection of several local developers, to raise
life support systems in commercial buildings above the 100 year flood elevation
along with other regulations including auditory warning devices and special signals
in building lobbies. Surprisingly the City of Boulder has yet to prohibit the
construction of hotels, boarding houses and motels in the floodways of Boulder
despite a prohibition on all other residential structures. One might speculate that
overnight guests and hotel visitors might be much more vulnerable to loss of life

Havlick

79

and deprivation not knowing the idiosyncrasies, probable direction or duration of
flood waters in Boulder compared to permanent Boulder residents. Yet up until this
writing there has not been a majority of the City Council voting to ban hotels in
the 100 year floodway. Perhaps if the Big Thompson had had more motels and hotels
present and damaged in 1976 the City of Boulder would have banned floodway hotels by
now.

Perhaps one of the shining achievements in reducing level of vulnerability is
the flood warning system cooperatively established by the City and County of
Boulder. A network of 33 monitoring stations located throughout the watershed
region and linked to a central data receiving control center feed flood warning data
on a twenty-four hour basis. Annual flood warning alerts and mobilization keep
equipment and personnel in readiness. A mobil emergency communication facility has
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been devised inasmuch as the present emergency communication facility is itself
located in the Boulder Creek floodway. However a protective floodproofing wall has
just been completed around the Boulder County Justice Center wherein the disaster
communication center is located.

In summary, it is believed by this author that the perception of magnitude of
risk and vulnerability has been tremendously heightened in Boulder by the Big
Thompson Canyon Flood only 10 years and 25 miles away. Other factors which have
mobilized the community support and the political inclination to do more than the
federal requirements include other nearby flood tragedies such as those in Cheyenne,
Estes Park, Rapid City and Boulder's own floods of 1894, 1916 and 1969. Certainly
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another strong element is a city's staff* and management which keeps in touch with
flood hazard research and appropriate long-term mitigation measures and supplies
that information to elected officials who have the courage to take an aggressive
stand in behalf of primarily nonstructural, long enduring measures of flood loss
reduction.

*Individuals such as Jim Piper, Jane Greenfield, Joe de Raismes, Ed Gawf, Barbara
Evans, Terry Ware, Dave Rhodes, Roger Hartmann, Jerry Olsen and Scott Tucker to name
a few.

POSTFLOOD HAZARD MITIGATION:

A LEGACY OF BIG THOMPSON

Rutherford H. Platt
University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Introduction
In 1979, the U.S. Water Resources Council invited me to conduct a study of
federal policy regarding postflood recovery and hazard mitigation. The study
involved two components: (1) a review of existing federal policies and programs
relating to postdisaster recovery and (2) a series of case studies of recent flood
disaster recovery experience. The Big Thompson Flood of July 1976 figured prominently among the latter. This paper will briefly review the findings of the 1979
study, with particular reference to Big Thompson Canyon, and will then summarize
some issues facing hazard mitigation assessment as conducted by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency today.
Between July 1, 1973 and June 20, 1979, the United States experienced 193
"major disasters" and 77 "emergencies" declared by the president; about 80% involved
floods. Major disaster declarations applied to 2,164 counties (not corrected for
counties declared more than once),involved 455,343 applicants for disaster assistance, and 68,284 families relocated to temporary housing. Outlays from the
Presidential Disaster Fund during this period amount to about $1.5 billion. Total
federal costs associated with recovery from floods during that period exceeded $4
bill ion (Platt, 1979, p. 1).
Mitigation of future flood losses through appropriate pre- and postdisaster
actions had been established as a national goal in several congressional and
executive enactments. The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, as subsequently
amended, required local communities to adopt floodplain management measures to
mitigate future losses in order to qualify for flood insurance available through the
program. The Flood Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (PL 93-288) revised the Federal
Disaster Assistance Program and included in Section 406 a requirement that localities and states prepare long-term hazard mitigation plans as a condition to
receiving federal disaster aid. Executive Order 11988, issued by President Carter
in 1977, similarly charged federal agencies with reducing flood hazards through
their actions and policies. Despite these and other federal statements of intent
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regarding postdisaster mitigation, the concept of reducing future losses in the
process of recovery from floods was honored more in the breach than in the
observance.
It is well known that communities stricken by floods and other disasters seek
to restore the status quo ante as quickly as possible. Due to their physical
nature, floods tend to be viewed as once-in-a-lifetime events, or "acts of God,"
which are unlikely to recur in the same location. Such a viewpoint is contradicted
by actual history. Hurricane Agnes was viewed as a once-in-500-years event for the
region it devastated, yet many of the same victims were flooded again by Hurricane
Eloise in 1975. The Pearl River at Jackson, Mississippi, displaced 6,000 people in
December of 1961. Despite a massive Corps of Engineers levee, completed in 1967,
the Pearl surpassed its 1961 crest by five feet in April of 1979, displacing 17,000
people and causing an estimated $500 million in damage to the City of Jackson
(Platt, 1982). The City of Houston, Texas, experienced three "100-year floods" in
1979 alone.
National data on repetitive losses to the same structure, neighborhood, or
community are difficult to assemble. Records of the Federal Disaster Assistance
Administration, however, indicate that between January 1, 1972 and August 31, 1979,
some 2,000 communities experienced "major flood disasters" declared by the president
on two or more occasions. Three or more major floods were declared in 351 communities (Federal Emergency Management Agency, unpublished data).
The decade of the 1970s witnessed a significant shift in national flood policy,
away from reliance upon structural measures and toward nonstructural efforts,
including: floodplain regulations, floodproofing, acquisition and relocation,
improved warning systems and emergency planning. Ironically, this shift involved a
subtle downgrading of public recognition of the recurrent nature of floods.
Proponents of federal structural flood control projects tended to emphasize and even
exaggerate the propensity for floods to recur in the same location. Conversely, the
nonstructural measures listed above, which involve unpopular political and fiscal
action by local governments, may have led to a tendency to underestimate the
probability of recurrence. In any event, reduction of future losses through flood
plain management, while environmentally and fiscally sound in many cases, requires
action by countless discrete units of local government in contrast to the centralized authority of the federal government with respect to flood control projects.
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Thus the shift to non structural measures involved a decentralization of public
decision making and a concomitant tendency to deny the recurrent nature of floods.
Findings of the Case Studies, Including Big Thompson
An assessment of the state of the art of postflood recovery was conducted
through a series of case studies, These included:
Rapid City, South Dakota Flash Flood of 1972
Big Thompson Canyon Flash Flood of 1976
Soldiers Grove, Wisconsin
Charles River Watershed in Massachusetts
Prairie du Chien, Wisconsin
Littleton, Colorado
Baytown, Texas
Snohomish Basin, Washington
Clinchport, Virginia
Massachusetts Coastal Flood of 1978
Jackson, Mississippi Flood of 1979
Baltimore County, Maryland
Salt Creek Basin, Illinois
Among the above, the most detailed attention was given to Rapid City, Big
Thompson, the Charles River Watershed, Soldiers Grove, and Prairie du Chien.
(Subsequent research on the Massachusetts Coastal Flood of 1978 and Jackson,
Mississippi Flood of 1979 was published in 1980 and 1982, respectively.) The loss
and damage statistics of Big Thompson Canyon are adequately described in other
papers in this conference. I will therefore turn directly to the postdisaster
recovery experience of that catastrophe.
Aside from Rapid City in 1972, few if any U.S. flood disasters prompted such a
comprehensive and searching investigation of their causes or plans of remedial
action. In particular, a task force established by Governor Richard Lamm within
hours of the July 31, 1976 flood, conducted a thorough investigation of causes and
actions for recovery. The task force initially recommended public purchase of the
entire canyon to preempt any private rebuilding. This would have been a demonstration project in nonstructural postflood mitigation, comparable to the Rapid City
approach. Total acquisition, however, did not happen in Big Thompson Canyon.
Instead, a more limited acquisition program, involving 123 parcels of land interspersed with private inholdings was eventually begun by Larimer County with assistance from the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Department of the
Interior. The county adopted flood plain zoning to guide rebuilding in the canyon,
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but as is well known, reconstruction was widespread and involved high-value investments which remain at risk.
According to data available in 1979, the total federal outlay for nonstructural
measures to promote acquisition, relocation, and rehabilitation comprised a small
fraction of total federal recovery assistance in Big Thompson: $1.6 million out of
the $45.6 million total. Including allocations of state and county funds, a total
nonstructural budget for Big Thompson Canyon amounted to $2.2 million (Figure 1).
Even this paltry amount had to be painstakingly assembled from diverse federal
sources. The major contributions were obtained from the sources listed in Table 1.
Each of these required extensive negotiations and political string pulling.
The tangible outcome obtained with this $2.2 million involved the acquisition
of 123 parcels of land from 97 owners, totaling about 50 acres. This was accomplished over a period of many years, with considerable unhappiness and uncertainty
for the property owners, many of whom were flood victims. Dozens of other parcels
remained in private ownership and were rebuilt, often at considerably greater value
than before the flood. This created a checkerboard pattern of private and public
holdings.
Viewing Big Thompson in conjunction with the other case studies, the following
findings were made:
•

Nonstructural outlays for postflood mitigation were trivial in
comparison with federal investment in restoration of infrastructure.

•

In the absence of a federal policy or fund to promote non structural
postflood mitigation, such efforts tended to be ad hoc and fragmented, depending greatly upon the initiative and political sophistication of state and local public officials.

•

Delay in achieving any nonstructural mitigation element was pervasive, thus adding to the emotional and economic burden to victims and
complicating the workload of recovery officials.

•

In the absence of a single source of federal nonstructural assistance, "packaging" of diverse sources was generally required. (See,
e.g., an excellent case study of Soldiers Grove, Wisconsin prepared
by David and Mayer, 1984.)

•

Federal agencies that assisted non structural mitigation generally
were inconsistent as to procedures and cost-sharing requirements.
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•

Cash flow problems were common, resulting from delay in federal
reimbursement of state and local outlays.

•

"Checkerboarding," as in Big Thompson Canyon, is a frequent outcome
of piecemeal public acquisition efforts leading to difficult issues
arising from the juxtaposition of public and private holdings.

Recommendations and Outcome of the 1979 Study
Several recommendations to improve federal policy regarding postflood hazard
mitigation were presented in the report to the U.S. Water Resources Council (Platt,
1979). A series of inter-related adjustments and actions were suggested.
First, it is imperative for a hazard mitigation coordinator to be appointed for
each disaster once a presidential disaster declaration has been issued. The
coordinator would be authorized to serve as a "one-stop shopping" agent on behalf of
all relevant federal programs to facilitate the flow of mitigation assistance Lo the
disaster area.
Second, a prompt assessment of options for postdisaster mitigation must be
undertaken following a disaster declaration. Ideally, a preliminary report on
opportunities for mitigating future losses should be prepared within seven to 15
days following the disaster declaration. This would serve as a guide to federal,
state, and local recovery actions and policies.
Third, to conduct this assessment and to advise the coordinator, a postdisaster
hazard mitigation team should be established in each federal region. The lead
agency for such teams should be the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The
teams should include representatives from other relevant federal agencies, as well
as the state and local governments, and perhaps private interests in the disaster
area. Team members should receive prior training in procedures and objectives.
They should be available to report on the scene of a flood disaster within hours of
a disaster declaration.
Fourth, to facilitate the organization of such postdisaster teams, 12 federal
agencies involved in postflood recovery should enter into a formal, interagency
agreement to cooperate in establishing such teams.
These recommendations were acted upon promptly. Dr. Frank Thomas of the U.S.
Water REsources Council relayed the recommendations to the Office of Management and
Budget, which issued a directive on July 1, 1980, to the 12 federal agencies to
execute an interagency agreement as called for in the report. The agreement was
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signed on December 8, 1980, and went into effect immediately. FEMA, as lead agency,
initiated the designation and training of posthazard mitigation teams in each of its
regions. It also contracted with Wright Water Engineering, Inc., in Denver, to
prepare a manual of procedures for use by the teams. Since 1980, postflood hazard
mitigation reports have been prepared for approximately 75 declared flood disasters.
The reports provide a unique record of data concerning each flood, as well as
recommendations for recovery actions.
Current Status and Issues
Has the hazard mitigation team process made any difference in the way we
recover from floods? An answer to this question would require a thorough review of
experience in a cross-section of the 75+ floods that have occurred since the
procedures was initiated in 1980. Such a review has not yet been undertaken,
although a small survey of four disasters was conducted by Wright Water Engineers in
1983. This chapter can only list certain issues that hopefully will prompt subsequent inqulrles. First, how effectively do hazard mitigation teams (HMTs) perform?
The 1983 Wright Water Engineers report found a conflict between team members'
loyalty to their own agency versus a more comprehensive vision of postdisaster
mitigation. The latter is a desirable objective, one that is rare in the experience
of the federal bureaucracy. Pursuit of narrow agency missions would undermine the
usefulness of the HMT process. Second, a closely related issue concerns how teams
resolve differences among members. Do HMT reports strive for consensus through
agreement upon the least common denominator,or do they present more challenging
options, perhaps with minority views included?
Third, how is data assembled and presented in HMT reports? Shortage of both
time and funds severely constrains the ability of teams to acquire necessary
physical, demographic, and economic data upon which to base their recommendations.
It would be useful to establish regional resource centers (perhaps in university
departments of geography) which could develop computerized databases and mapping
programs to be available to hazard mitigation teams on short notice.
Fourth, how have HMT reports been publicized,and what has been the public
reception? If the process is to bear fruit, there must be opportunity for public
discussion and revision of recommendations. This presumably requires presentations
to established bodies, such as city councils, as well as general public hearings.
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Of course, a conflict of objectives exists between preparing a timely report
detailing specific options versus providing opportunity for full, open discussion
prior to completion of the report.
Fifth, there appears to have been little progress towards designating a hazard
mitigation coordinator. The Disaster Coordinating Officer (DCO) appointed by FEMA
for each disaster is only incidentally concerned with mitigation. The HMT itself
generally meets only a few times, and its members quickly return to their other
duties. In some cases, the team leader--typically a FEMA regional staffperson--may
continue to function for some time as an ad hoc hazard mitigation coordinator. The
extent to which this occurs and its results should be documented.
Sixth, the use of moratoria by state and local governments to delay the start
of rebuilding pending recommendations of the HMT is unclear. Even under ideal
circumstances, publication and discussion of the HMT report would require at least a
month after the disaster. It is politically difficult, although legally possible,
to hold the victims of the flood in limbo while such discussions proceed. Obviously, alternative arrangements must be made for housing and compensating the
victims so that governmental procedures do not add to the burden inflicted by the
disaster itself. Without any delay for consideration of rebuilding options,even the
most sensible postflood mitigation options will be unachievable.
Seventh, to what extent can postdisaster mitigation planning be accomplished
before a flood disaster occurs? The success of the Rapid City recovery process
resulted from the existence of an urban renewal plan which anticipated the acquisition and relocation of all flood plain occupants. Other flood-prone communities
should be encouraged to prepare contingency plans of greater or less detail to be
implemented in the event of a disaster. The extent to which this is now occurring
is unknown.
Finally, availability of federal funding for postflood mitigation apparently
remains modest in comparison with overall disaster assistance. There is still no
fund earmarked for flood mitigation recovery. Efforts to acquire properties through
Section 1362 of the National Flood Insurance Program have been minuscule, amounting
to about $5 million per year. The need to reduce future federal disaster costs
strongly indicates the need for a reasonable investment in making communities safer
when floods occur.
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Conclusion
The 1979 Water Resources Council study of postdisaster mitigation yielded a
significant change in federal policy. Within months after its completion,all of the
12 federal agencies had agreed (as directed by the Office of Management and Budget)
to cooperate in the establishment of postflood hazard mitigation teams. The flow of
preliminary and followup reports from these teams concerning some 75 floods since
1980 now occupies about three feet of linear shelf space. The effects in terms of
actions taken or not taken to reduce future vulnerability are not clear. Research
should be undertaken to ascertain the impact,if any, of the HMT process and to
recommend appropriate refinements to its procedures.
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INNOVATIONS IN THE PRIVATE HANDLING OF FLOOD INSURANCE
William M. Dye
Insurance Consultant
Introduction
Flood insurance is too frequently overlooked as one of the most important
mitigation measures for flood-related property damage; it has yet to reach its full
potential. This chapter will describe some of the major problems faced by the
private insurance companies in providing coverage for properties located in floodprone areas. Of necessity, the federal government was forced to step in and provide
the coverage. Now, many private insurance companies are participating in a program
sponsored by the Federal Insurance Administration to provide flood insurance. Only
a few private companies offer a catastrophe insurance program that includes coverage
for floods.
In spite of the progress made in the availability and the affordability of
flood insurance, about three out of four properties located in identified flood
hazard areas are still without flood insurance. Uninsured victims will continue to
be a financial burden on the rest of society. Soon, pressure will build to require
all property insurance policies to include coverage for flood damage. In the
meantime and as a first step, the author recommends that private insurance companies
include flood coverage in all homeowners policies for properties located in areas
where the flood hazard has been designated as minimal (Zone C).
Flood Insurance
Flood insurance has been classified as a mitigation measure. Mitigation is
moderation in the force, violence, or intensity of something painful. Relief is a
synonym for mitigation and suggests the lifting of enough of a burden to make it
endurable. Flood insurance fits the definition of a mitigation measure. Its
primary effect is after the fact, when the survivors return to their flood-damaged
property and try to put everything back together again.
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Unavoidable Risk and Unaffordable Loss
If you build your dream house along the banks of a running stream, you could be
faced with the unavoidable risk of future flooding. It is only a matter of time
until a heavy downpour causes the water level to rise and overflow the banks of the
stream. And if you are of modest financial means, you could be faced with the
unaffordable loss to your property from flooding. For the unavoidable risk and the
unaffordable loss, society's usual response is some form of insurance. In this
particular case, it is flood insurance.
Purpose and Function
The basic purpose of flood insurance is to provide protection from the financial consequences of damage to your property caused by flooding.
The basic function of flood insurance is the transfer of risk (chance of loss)
from the individual property owner to the insurance company. In return for payment
of a set premium, the insurance company agrees to be financially responsible for any
future damage to the property caused by the peril of flood.
Flood insurance can reduce the uncertainty of future losses by making the unavoidable risk and the unaffordable loss from flooding manageable. That is, the unknown
risk and loss of the future is replaced with a known premium payment.
If you have coverage for a flood loss to your property, the insurance company
is financially responsible for indemnification. It is their responsibility to put
you back in the position that you were in before the loss occurred--no better and no
worse.
Flood Insurance and Catastrophes
One reason private insurance companies avoid writing flood insurance is the
possibility of a major catastrophe. All properties concentrated in a particular
area could be subject to a total loss--for example, the properties located along the
banks of the Big Thompson River on July 31, 1976.
Usually, the only people who will voluntarily buy flood insurance are the ones
most likely to suffer a loss. The coverage would appeal to the homeowner in a flood
hazard area but not to the homeowner who lives up on a hill.
For the insurance mechanism to work, you need a reasonable spread of risk.
Many people could be exposed to the peril, but only a very few are expected to
suffer a loss (for example, a total loss by fire). This concept doesn't work too
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well with flood insurance. From an insurance company's standpoint, you don't want
to put too many eggs in one basket.
Social Responsibility vs. Self Interest
With the transfer of risk, reduction in uncertainty, and the provision of
indemnification, flood insurance appears to be the simple answer for people owning
property exposed to the peril of flood. People with this exposure need flood
insurance. You would think private insurance companies would have a social responsibility to provide it. Then again, faced with major catastrophes, adverse selection, and no spread of risk, private insurance companies have their own selfinterest and survival to consider. Just one catastrophic flood could wipe out most
of a company's assets.
Disaster Relief vs. Flood Insurance
Without flood insurance, the uninsured victims of a flood could look to the Red
Cross for emergency food, clothing, and shelter. The local city, county, and state
governments could provide relief and welfare support. The federal government could
provide special grants, low interest loans, and even an income tax write-off. The
financial burden of a flood disaster would shift from the uninsured victims to
society. With population growth and marginal land in flood -prone areas put to use,
more people are exposed to flood loss.
The option for Congress to consider was to either continue funding disaster
relief programs or provide a government-sponsored and subsidized flood insurance
program. Then, people with this exposure could buy flood insurance and take care of
most of their future losses to property.
National Flood Insurance Program
The National Flood Insurance Program was enacted by Congress in 1968 as an
alternative to disaster relief. In return for providing flood insurance at subsidized rates, communities participating in the program are required to implement
flood plain management measures and minimize future development in flood-prone
areas.
Flood Disaster Protection Act
The Flood Disaster Protection Act was enacted by Congress in 1973. This act
requires the purchase of flood insurance for federally insured loans secured for the
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acquisition or improvement of structures located in identified special flood hazard
areas. This requirement would include loans insured by such federal agencies as the
Federal Housing Administration (FHA), Veterans Administration (VA), and the Small
Business Administration (SBA). About 90% of the new applications received for flood
insurance are submitted to satisfy this requirement.
Write Your Own Program
As of October, 1983, private property and casualty insurance companies can sign
an agreement with the Federal Insurance Administration to sell and service flood
insurance policies. As of July 1, 1986, 260 private insurance companies have signed
this agreement, and joined the Write Your Own Program. Private companies collect
the premiums, pay their agents a commission, and adjust flood losses. The participating companies use the National Flood Insurance Program's policies, forms, rates,
and underwriting rules. If private companies payout more in expenses and claims
than they received from premiums and investment income, the federal government will
make up the difference. However, if the private companies take in more from
premiums and investments than they payout for expenses and claims, the difference
or net profit is refunded to the U.S. Treasury.
Private Catastrophe Insurance Plans
The Colorado Catastrophe Plan is an example of a private insurance plan to
protect a homeowner from losses caused by certain perils that are usually excluded
under a homeowners policy. Protection provided would include coverage for flood and
earthquake. The policy is limited to owner-occupied residential dwellings.
Licensed agents in Colorado can write this policy through the Western Insurance
Markets of Denver.
The Homeowners Catastrophe Insurance Trust is another example of a private
insurance plan to provide coverage for flood and earthquake. This policy is also
limited to owner-occupied residential dwellings. Members of the Independent
Insurance Agents of Colorado can write this policy through Trustco, Inc. of Salt
Lake City, Utah.
Homeowners Policy Coveraoe/Exclusions
The Homeowners Special Form (HO-3) is the most popular homeowners policy. The
dwelling is protected against risks of direct physical loss (all risks). However,
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damage caused by flood is excluded unless fire or explosion ensues, and then only
the ensuing loss from fire or explosion would be covered. The Special Personal
Property Coverage (HO-I5) is an endorsement that can be attached to a Homeowners
Special Form Policy. The endorsement covers personal property located away from the
residence premises damaged by flood.
The Scheduled Personal Property Endorsement (HO-6I) can also be attached to a
Homeowners policy. This endorsement provides coverage for risks of direct physical
loss to items of personal property that have been specifically identified and
described. This endorsement could be used for insuring such items as jewelry, furs,
musical instruments, coin collections, etc. Flood is not excluded in this
endorsement. Therefore, items of personal property described in the endorsement
would be covered for loss due to flood.
Coverage Options--Concurrent Causation/Litigation
Many people who purchase so-called "all risk" coverage under a homeowners
policy are disappointed to discover that flood damage is excluded. Creative lawyers
have turned to the legal doctrine of concurrent causation. This means if a loss to
property can be attributed to two causes--one covered and one excluded, the policy
must pay the loss. For example, vandals cause a breach in a dam (vandalism is
covered) and the valley below is flooded (excluded). The doctrine of concurrent
causation, if applied, would recommend payment.
When you discovered your homeowners policy excluded flood damage, did your
agent so advise you? If so, did your agent also advise you of the availability of
flood insurance through the National Flood Insurance Program? If not, an option to
consider is a lawsuit against your agent. When you built your new home in a special
flood hazard area, did the city/county building department advise you of possible
flooding? Does the city or county have an ordinance to prohibit new construction in
flood-prone areas? If not, an option to consider is a lawsuit against your city or
county government.
Innovations To Consider
The consensus among most people concerned with the problems described above is
that there must be a better way to compensate the victims of a flood disaster.
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Compulsion
Even now, about three out of four people who knowingly live in a flood hazard
area still do not have flood insurance. For people with this exposure, there has to
be an element of compulsion to require them to have flood insurance. And to avoid
adverse selection and provide for the spread of risk, it should be mandatory that
all property insurance policies include coverage for the peril of flood.
Homeowners Catastrophe Coverage
The most popular plan proposed for catastrophe insurance is to include coverage
for the perils of flood and earthquake in all homeowners policies. The policies
would be sold and serviced by private insurance companies but with some financial
back-up from the federal government. Pressure is building for such a catastrophe
insurance policy. However, change will not come voluntarily from the insurance
industry. Rather than appeal to their social responsibility, you need to develop a
program that would appeal to their self-interest. At the moment, the insurance
industry is plagued with more pressing matters for survival, and catastrophe
insurance for the average homeowner is not high on their list of priorities.
Innovative First Step
An innovative first step would be to include coverage for the peril of flood in
all homeowners policies for properties located in areas where the flood hazard is
designated as minimal (Zone C). Usually, there is no requirement for properties
located in Zone C to have flood insurancej however, there is some possibility of
flooding. The National Flood Insurance Program and the Write your Own Program would
continue to insure properties in flood hazard areas designated as special and
moderate (Zones A & B). Such an innovative first step is worthy of consideration by
the insurance industry.
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THE NWS FLASH FLOOD PROGRAM:

THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE

James D. Belville and Richard A. Wagoner
Office of Meteorology
National Weather Service
Introduction
In order to look at the present National Weather Service (NWS) Flash Flood
Program, a look at past events which influenced the program is necessary. In the
decade of the 60s and 70s, disastrous flash floods struck Rapid City (NOAA, 1972);
Kansas City (NOAA, 1977); Big Thompson Canyon (NOAA, 1976); and Johnstown (NOAA,
1977). These tragic events and others provided the impetus for improving the
prediction and detection of heavy rainfall events and subsequent flash floods.
It has been shown that flash flood events are relatively small scale (Maddox et
a1., 1979) and present one of the most difficult tasks facing the NWS forecaster
today. The meteorological and hydrological data generally available were designed
for larger-scale events. Thus, it is not uncommon for a heavy rainfall event to
occur unexpectedly. Making a rather crude assessment of verification of the N~S
Flash Flood Program, it was found that one-half of the known flash floods occurred
without the benefit of a flash flood watch or warning. However, a comparison of the
flash flood program of the early 70s to that of the mid-80s shows that vast impro,ements have been made.
NWS Present Day Flash Flood Operations
The present day NWS Flash Flood Program is multifaceted in scope (Barrett,
1983) and each aspect will be discussed briefly in this section. Program areas
included are radar, satellite, Local Flood Warning Systems (LFWS), and fore,cast
techniques. It should be remembered that all of these are designed to function as a
means, not an end.
Radar Program
The radar program has been the backbone of flash flood operations for l11iil!1y
years. Over the past two decades, advances have been made which have impro,e,!! :"e
flash flood detection capabilities of radar. In 1972, Smith and Koore (]979J
developed the concept of manually digitizing radar (I~DR) data. This tedmi!;ue gale
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forecasters the capability of determining the persistence of heavy rainfall in an
area and provided the means for making a gross estimate of the amount of precipitation occurring. MDR data is presently being prepared by all NWS radar facilities
and has been used successfully during numerous heavy rainfall events.
In the early 1970s, computers were linked with five NWS radars and used to
process the radar reflectivity data for use in estimating rainfall amounts. The
Digitized Radar Experiment (D/RADEX) converted radar reflectivities to rainfall
rates. The average rainfall is then accumulated over a specified time period.
These data are in turn displayed on a map with a three- by five-mile grid. In the
early 80s, the Radar Data Processor (RADAP) was expanded to include ten NWS radar
sites. In 1983, an Interactive Color Display (ICRAD) was integrated with the
existing RADAP. This made a more usable analysis tool for the NWS forecasters at
these ten sites.
An important discovery that occurred in 1985 was the Quasi-stationary Rainfall
Signature (QRS) (Maddox and Grice, 1985). This enabled forecasters to access the
potential for flash flood-producing rains by identifying a radar signature, characteristic of a heavy rainfall-producing storm, as is done in the NWS Severe Weather
Warning Program.
Satellite Analysis Program
The inception of frequent, high quality satellite imagery in the early 70s
provided a new dimension to the NWS Flash Flood Program. Techniques have since been
developed to estimate rainfall amounts from satellite imagery (Scofield and Oliver,
1977). Digitized enhancements showing black body temperatures of cloud tops are
used on a half-hourly basis to assess rainfall rates. Also, certain storm characteristics, such as overshooting tops, merging cells, cloud line mergers, as well as
environmental characteristics, are used to inflate the initial rainfall estimates.
In the early 1980s, the Scofield-Oliver technique was adapted to an Interactive
Flash Flood Analyzer (IFFA). This computer interface allows forecasters in the
Synoptic Analysis Branch (SAB) at the National Meteorological Center (NMC) to
provide real-time, satellite-generated rainfall estimates to NWS field offices. The
estimates are not only important to the Flash Flood Program, but have given the NWS
hydrological forecast program quantitative rainfall data in areas where none existed
before.
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Local Flood Warning Systems
The LFWS vary in sophistication from manual self-help to state of the art
automated systems (Hydrology Subcommittee, 1985). However, all of these systems
serve the same purpose. They allow local emergency management officials to assess
flash flood potential in a timely manner during an ongoing event.
Initially, LFWSs were self-help systems consisting of rain gauges, staff river
gauges, and flash flood forecast tables. When considering the low cost of such #
system, the returns for the investment in terms of life and property saved are
great. Drawbacks to this type of system are that the needed data may be difficult
to obtain during heavy rainfall if phone service is disrupted, or in areas where
observers cannot be found.
In the mid to late 70s, the Automatic Local Evaluation in Real-Time (ALERT)
System (Burnash and Twedt, 1978) and the Integrated Flood Observing and Warning
System (IFLOWS) were developed. The state of the art technology incorporated in
these systems allows sensors (both river and rainfall) to be placed in remote areas.
The sensors transmit the data by radio to a computer facility located in an Emergency Operation Center (EOC) or NWS office. The computer evaluates the data in
real-time using a river forecast model. Forecasts can be updated every 15 minutes
if needed. This type of technology allows emergency management officials to make
critical decisions in a timely manner.
LFWSs have worked well in the areas where they exist. However, a major probleis that the local NWS office cannot access the ALERT data easily, and it is the NWS
that has the resources to disseminate critical flash flood warning information.
Another drawback is that the cost of such a system may prevent an area from obtairing this type of technology.
NWS Forecast Techniques
The NWS, along with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's
(NOAA) Environmental Research Laboratory (ERL) have made strides in developing
techniques for forecasting heavy rainfall events during the past 10 years. The
meteorological patterns, both surface and upper air, that produce the vast lIajorit}
of flash floods have been identified (Maddox and Chappel, 1979). In addition,
variations in the basic patterns from one part of the United States to another hi~e
been noted (Grice and Ward, 1983; Giordano and Fritch, 1983; Belvine and Ste,.,arL
1983; and Goodman et al., 1983).
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The concept of issuing localized Quantitative Precipitation Forecasts (QPF) was
developed at the NWS office in Lubbock, Texas, in 1975 (Belville et al., 1978).
This concept was updated and improved in the late 70s (Mortimer et al., 1980). The
techniques used in Texas were successful enough that similar studies are now
underway in several sections of the country.
Another stride has been made in identification and study of mesoscale convective complexes (MCC) (Maddox, 1980; Fritch and Maddox, 1981; and Maddox et al.,
1981). MCCs are midlatitude systems which most often occur at night and are
generally accompanied by very heavy rainfall. Hence, flash floods often accompany
MCCs.
Since most heavy rainfall systems are mesoscale in nature, it is important for
NWS forecasters to use mesoscale analysis techniques for detecting such events.
Yet, almost all NWS standard analysis and numerical forecast models are on a much
larger (synoptic) scale. The large scale analyses and models seldom detect or
forecast a flash flood. A recently developed objective analysis technique
(Bothwell, 1986) has proved valuable for mesoscale systems. The analysis is run on
the NWS Automation of Field Operations and Services (AFOS) computer, to which all
NWS offices have access. The mesoanalysis program provides fields of various
meteorological parameters (i.e., moisture and atmospheric stability) which are
important for the development of deep convection.
NWS Future Flash Flood Operations
The NWS is slated to undergo a vast modernization and restructuring program
during the next decade. The overall benefit will be to streamline operations and
increase the efficiency and accuracy of the forecast and warning program. This is
expected to be accomplished with a combination of new technology and reallocation of
present day resources. When reading this section, it should be kept in mind that a
few of the items discussed have been funded, while others are concepts which have
not been translated into funded programs.
Radar Program
The NWS radar program of the future will continue to be extremely important to
the Flash Flood Program. However, Next Generation Weather Radar (NEXRAD) will be
deployed around the nation, beginning in the late 1980s and continuing through the
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mid-1990s. NEXRAD is designed to be an entire system with the capability of
suppressing ground clutter, precipitation mapping, detection of wind shear, computing vertical integrated liquid water in the atmosphere, and displaying cloud
particle velocities.
The most important aspect of NEXRAD for the Flash Flood Program is precipitation processing. Rainfall maps estimated from radar will be generated by the systerr
at intervals specified by the forecaster. In addition, the precipitation estimation
program will be continuously calibrated by comparing the radar reflectivities to
actual rainfall rates received from automated rain gauges. NEXRAD will provide the
NWS forecaster with the high resolution quantitative rainfall data needed for flash
flood prediction.
Satellite Analysis Program
An advanced system of Geostationary Weather Satellites (GOES) will provide
another major step in moving the nation's weather warning and forecast service into
the 21st century. The new GOES system will provide increased reliability, higher
resolution images, more precise location of low level features such as clouds, and
the capability of viewing and sounding the atmosphere simultaneously.
In the realm of improving the NWS Flash Flood Program, the new GOES system,
along with NEXRAD, will allow the forecaster to construct a three-dimensional image
of a heavy rainfall system. The satellite system will also provide a high resolution picture of atmospheric moisture and temperature fields. This will in turn
provide better predictive capability for flash floods.
Local Flood Warning Systems
The number of Local Flood Warning Systems is expected to increase rather
dramatically over the next decade. The NWS new Automated Weather Information and
Processing System (AWIPS) that will be implemented in the 1990s is being designed tc
handle the large volume of data generated by LFWS now in existence and those
expected to be created into the 21st century. It is expected that in some areas
technology will be available that will link the LFWS directly to dissemination
systems, providing vast improvement in timeliness and accuracy of flash flood
warnings.
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NWS Meteorological Techniques
Improved understanding of the physical processes in the atmosphere that
contribute to heavy rainfall will result due to the efforts of the NWS and the
research community. However, the improved concepts will lead to better precipitation forecasts only if included in the context of a mesoscale numerical forecast
model. It is hoped that such a model will be available for use by NWS forecasters
within the next decade or two.
The introduction of the AWIPS system will provide the forecaster with the means
for assimilating and analyzing the ever increasing amount of weather information
produced by the new technology. This interactive computer system will integrate the
NEXRAD, satellite, and conventional data into a form that is readily usable. This
will enable the forecaster to scan large quantities of data in a time frame that
will lead to more accurate forecasts. AWIPS will likely include the use of
knowledge-based expert systems for assisting the forecaster in the decision-making
process during periods of high flash flood potential.
The AWIPS system will also provide the means for disseminating critical weather
information to both public and private users. The coordination function with local
emergency management officials will also be greatly improved. AWIPS will allow
locally generated graphics to be sent to EOCs and others for use by officials in
making decisions during periods of critical weather. This could range from a radar
map showing the position and projected path of a tornado, to a model-generated
hydrograph during a flash flood event. It is planned for AWIPS to be the nucleus of
the NWS of the future.
Concluding Remarks
What has been presented is an overview of the National Weather Service today
and that which should exist in the future. As stated previously, not all that was
discussed has been funded, and it is likely that modifications will be made as a
result of changing resources. However, the NWS is faced with an exciting future
that will enable the forecaster to respond quickly and positively to flash flood
threats.
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HYDROLOGIC MODELING USING RADAR-RAINFALL IMAGERY
Lynn E. Johnson
Department of Civil Engineering
University of Colorado at Denver

A flash flood forecasting system is being developed which has three main
elements: 1) high-resolution estimation of rainfall in time and space using radar
and ground-based gauges; 2) computer models of hydrologic response; and 3) an
interactive computer graphic (ICG) system for data management, analysis and display.
Linkage of radar rainfall digital imagery with an ICG watershed data management
package has been accomplished on a desktop workstation. This chapter presents an
overview of the flash flood forecasting system and results of efforts to link
spatial data sets defining rainfall distribution and watershed area.
Introduction
Short-term forecasts of intense rainfall events can aid hydrologists and
community emergency preparedness personnel in minimizing damages and social disruption associated with flash flood events. Early warning can provide time for
evacuating people and their valuables. Optimum use can be made of flood control
systems in allocation of hydraulic control resources (e.g., storage and flow capacities). Such real-time responses and control strategies require that forecasts be
made of the spatial and temporal characteristics of rainfall distribution over the
watershed, and that the hydrologic response of the watershed and flow control
components are forecast.
Aspects of the flash flood forecasting problem were recently identified as
high-priority research needs for flood mitigation (Changnon, et al., 1983).
Included in that report are recommendations for improved remote sensing and flood
warning networks, flood flow and stage prediction techniques, and techniques for
warning people at risk. Improvement of local weather service is expected to result
in significant reduction in deaths and economic losses from hazardous weather events
such as flash floods, tornadoes and high winds. These phenomena often occur in
short time frames and over small areas, conditions which make detection and warning
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difficult. Flash floods of this type are a particular threat in the rapidly
urbanizing Colorado Front Range.
Due to technological advances in several areas, the feasibility has increased
for further development of an effective and efficient capability for intense
rainfall event detection; prediction of watershed runoff rates, volumes, and flood
depths; and warning of community flood preparedness authorities. A new generation
flash flood forecasting system is possible which has four main elements:
•

Community-based networks of rainfall and streamflow gauges capable of
real-time reporting;

•

High-resolution estimation of rainfall in time and space using
advanced technology radar and analysis techniques;

•

Computer models of watershed hydrologic response and hYdrologic
database management techniques;

•

Interactive computing systems for data storage, retrieval, analysis
and graphic display.
Community Flash Flood Forecasting Systems

The programs of the National Weather Service River Forecast System (NWSRFS)
strive to provide timely flood forecasts and early warnings to community authorities
and the general public. Twelve River Forecast Centers (RFCs) coordinate collection
of hydrometeorologic data and prepare and transmit forecasts and warnings for
approximately 2,500 communities nationwide. However, this centralized system is
primarily directed to the major river systems of the nation, so the RFC's capabilities for detecting and reacting to intense rainfall events over small watersheds
(less than 500 sq. km) is limited. For example, storm events which led to the
extensive floods in Johnstown, PA; Rapid City, SD; and Big Thompson Canyon, CO,
could not be reliably detected by a coarse network of reporting stations and
forecast centers.
Recently, a number of communities and entities, including Boulder, Colorado,
and the Denver Urban Drainage and Flood Control District, have been implementing new
systems for flash flood detection and warning. The systems consist of networks of
low-cost, microprocessor-based radio telemetry rain and stream gauges linked to a
community-based microcomputer. The gauges transmit rainfall/streamflow data to the
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central microcomputer, which automatically archives the data. If the data magnitudes or rates of change exceed a predetermined threshold, an alarm is enabled.
The Boulder County flash flood forecast system is the most comprehensive of any
along the Front Range of Colorado. The system consists of 37 rain gauges and 12
stream gauges, all linked by radio telemetry to the Boulder County Communications
Center (Johnson, 1984). An inherent limitation of the ground-based systems is the
lack of forecasting capability before rainfall occurs. The network reports rainfall
and runoff data as it occurs, which limits the available time for downstream flood
warnings to the flood wave propagation time.
Radar Estimation of Rainfall
Flash floods are most often the result of intense thunderstorms producing large
rainfall amounts (often 20 cm or more) in time periods of a few hours. The area
encompassed by the heaviest rainfall is usually less than 100 to 200 sq. km. For
example, the 12 September 1977 Brush Creek flash flood near Kansas City, Missouri,
where 25 people were killed, arose from a drainage area of only 27.8 sq. km (Hales,
1978).
Rainfall estimation can be accomplished using data from a rain gauge network, a
radar and/or a meteorologic satellite. Only the rain gauge is a direct sensor of
rainfall and as such is perceived to provide the best estimates at a specific
location. However, as noted above, a ground-based system has limited capability for
sensing the spatial variability of rainfall as well as a limited response time for
flood prediction and warning. Also, deployment and maintenance of a telemetered
rain gauge network with the required resolution (1 gauge per 25-100 sq. km) can be
prohibitive except in areas of critical recurring flood damage.
Radar, coupled with the rain gauge network, can provide an improved basis for
sensing intense rainfall events of the type which cause flash floods (Battan, 1973;
Doviak and Zrnic, 1984). A single, high-resolution radar is capable of monitoring
precipitation events on a routine basis for a 200,000 sq. km area with resolution of
less than 5 sq. km and a temporal resolution of 5 minutes, if desired. For comparison, it would take 8,000 rain gauges to cover the same area with the same
resolution.
Accuracy of the radar reflectivity rainfall amount correlations can be significantly improved using ground data for calibration. For example, Wilson and Brandes
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(1979) estimated that in some instances, use of 9round-based rain gauge data could
reduce radar reflectivity-rainfall estimate error from 100% to 20%.
Currently, with few exceptions, radar data are available only in photographic
form for most NWS radars and these have limited resolution. However, new generation
Doppler radars provide higher resolution (1 sq. km). and with the Next Generation
Radar program (Wilk, 1979; NEXRAD, 1984), there is promise for high-quality, digital
radar coverage throughout the United States in the coming decade.
Watershed Hydrologic Response
A variety of mathematical models have been developed and successfully utilized
to represent the hydrologic response of a watershed to rainfall. These models
represent the physical processes inherent in the rainfall-runoff and streamflow
hydraulic system so that the amount and depth of flow can be predicted. Examples of
such hydrologic modeling codes include the Soil Conservation Service TR-20 models
(SCS, 1976,1984), INTERHYD (Johnson, 1984b,c), SWMM (Roesner, et al., 1981), and the
Generalized Streamflow Model of the NWS (Burnash, 1978). A library of subroutines
extracted from many of the above codes has been compiled by Koontz (1982).
Definition of rainfall distribution over time is considered one of the major
sources of uncertainty in watershed modeling for flood forecasting (Flueck, 1981;
Johnson, 1981c). This problem is particularly significant in mountainous terrain.
Although there are several methods to perform spatial interpolation of rainfall
amounts and estimate mean areal rainfall based on gauge measurements, no method
accurately represents spatial evolution of rainfall over a given time period (Singh
and Chowdhury, 1986). Other error sources include the degree of spatial resolution
used to define the drainage system geometry, and factors relating to hydrologic
response of the land surface (e.g., topography, soil type and vegetation, antecedent
soil moisture).
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Exploratory Development
Facility (NOAA-EDF), located in Boulder, Colorado, has the ability to receive and
process a variety of real-time hydrologic data. Among these are data from the CP-2
10 cm experimental Doppler radar, which provides high-resolution reflectivity data
not normally available in operation nor routinely available in real time. NOAA-EDF
research activities include radar sensing of rainfall, and calibration using groundbased rain gauges (Lebel, 1984). Analysis algorithms have been implemented for
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interfacing the radar and rain gauge data sets, with promising results obtained.
The Boulder County flash flood warning system provides higher density reporting of
ground data and thus an improved basis for radar reflectivity-rainfall calibration.
Availability of more accurate rainfall data from the radar-rain gauge networks
can be expected to provide better data for hydrologic models. In addition, there is
a need for increased lead time so that flood damage reduction steps can be taken.
The ability to compute areal rainfall in real time and to forecast its movement can
increase warning time and reduce flood damage.
Data Management and Interactive Computer Graphics
Interactive computer graphics (ICG) techniques have been shown to be a significant aid for analysis of water resource systems (Loucks, et al., 1985; French, et
al.,1979); including flood runoff (Johnson, 1981a), system operations (Johnson and
Loucks, 1978), and land use attribute data management (Loucks, et al., 1983). lCG
techniques can be used in a human-engineered environment to reduce the time and
effort required for input and analysis of spatial data bases, to guide analyses
through interactive human-machine communication in near real-time, and to review
results of analyses in a readily understandable graphic form. Graphic displays of
hazardous weather phenomena can also provide an understandable medium for warning
(Johnson, 1981b).
Efforts directed to development of interactive data management and modeling
have been motivated by three factors: 1) to facilitate data input and editing, 2)
to provide an effective interface between models and modelers, and 3) to improve tne
comprehension of space- and time-variable information. A primary goal has been to
develop models and computer-aided planning systems that are user friendly and
economical. The economy objective has been facilitated by implementation on a PCbased workstation at a cost of less than $10,000.
An ICG work station equipped with high-resolution graphics display and digitizing tablet permits display and manipulation of video-digitized map images in ways
appropriate for hydrologic modeling. Use of a "menu page" format and modular
software allows operator control of data manipulations and analyses. The tablet cor
be used to "draw" watershed drainage systems into computer memory, whereupon these
data form the basis for subsequent computations of flood runoff and streamflows.
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Video digitizing technology is used to capture color-coded pictorial data bases,
such as maps and map overlays.
Flash Flood Forecasting System
Research activities are directed to linking the components of a flash flood
forecasting system into a unified ICG data management, computational, and graphics
display system appropriate for system testing, sensitivity analysis and eventual
near-real-time application (Figure 1).

Rainfall
Estimation and
Prediction

Watershed
Characteristics
Fil es

Watershed
Hydrologic
Response
Predictor

Stream Stage
Reporting
Gauges

Flash Flood
Forecast
Dissemination

FIGURE I
Flash flood forecasting system includes linked modules for rainfall
estimation and watershed characteristics
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rCG map manipulation is an essential aspect of the flash flood forecasting
system being developed. Watershed runoff parameter estimates, merging of geographic
data sets (watersheds, rain cells), and storage and retrieval of data are all
functions aided by the rCG data management capability.
A recent version of the Computer-Aided Planning (CAP) software (French and
Taylor, 1986) is used to initiate the watershed data development process. Base maps
of topography, drainage systems, soils, land use and vegetation types are videodigitized or entered by tablet digitizing. These input maps can then be overlapped,
edited, and overlaid to form composite maps with all elements necessary to compute
important watershed characteristics such as drainage areas, stream reach lengths,
and other "plan-view" attributes. For analysis purposes, a specific color represents an attribute (soil type, rainfall intensity).
rCG capabilities have been extended to incorporate other spatial data, such as
radar-rainfall images. The radar image can be accessed and archived on the local
computer, and the image array can be processed to obtain an estimate of the rainfall .
Linkage of radar rainfall digital imagery with an rCG watershed data management
package has been accomplished. rCG techniques are used to overlay the radar
reflectivity image onto the watershed as a color transparency. Only reflectivity
values that lie within the delineated watershed are included, defining the common
intersecting area of storm and catchment. The graphic overlay of the reflectivity
image is then read from the screen and converted to a rainfall rate. Losses are
subtracted and the translation time to the basin outlet computed.
Translation of precipitation excess into a runoff hydrograph involves a timearea or isochronal approach first introduced by Clark (1945). Clark developed an
algorithm which derives the instantaneous unit hydrograph from a time-area diagram.
The instantaneous unit hydrograph is then routed by the fundamental storage equation
to account for storage effects in the watershed. Others (Chow, 1964) have described
the technique. For our purposes, the isochronal approach has advantages in that it
avoids the need to obtain a basin average rainfall and is readily integrated into
the database structure established for the watershed and radar rainfall data sets.
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Conclusions
Use of radar rainfall imagery for flood runoff forecasting is facilitated using
interactive computer graphics data management software and hardware. The ICG
system, implemented on a low cost desktop microcomputer, provides capability for
preprocessing mapped data bases to define watershed characteristics, integration of
radar rainfall imagery, and computation of flood runoff. Ultimately, the
software/hardware system could provide an improved basis for forecasting flash
floods.
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OROGRAPHIC PRECIPITATION MODEL FORECAST OF THE BIG THOMPSON FLOOD
Donna F. Tucker
E1mar R. Reiter
Department of Atmospheric Science
Colorado State University

Introduction
The Big Thompson flood is a classic example of the extreme spatial variations
in precipitation amounts which frequently occur in areas with complex topography.
Meteorological conditions leading to flash flood events in the western United States
have been described by Maddox et a1. (1980) but orographic effects are frequently
an important contributing factor.
Model forecasting of such events is difficult and would also be expensive in
terms of computer time since a small grid spacing would be needed to resolve relevant
features. We believe the expense of including more horizontal details in a model
used in complex terrain areas could be reduced. We assume that as the horizontal
scale decreases the differences in the wind field from the large scale flow which
are important for controlling the distribution of precipitation are predominantly due
to surface elevation variations. This control is due not only to upslope motions but
also to the moisture convergence patterns (Barker and Banta, 1985; Cai and Li, 1983).
Thus it is possible to solve for these differences using a diaqnostic model with a
grid spacing much smaller than that of the forecasting model. By using the winds
revised by the diagnostic model in a precipitation parameterization it is possible to
develop a precipitation forecast that is both more detailed and more accurate than
that of the forecasting model alone.
The Model
The model consists of two parts. The first is a mesoscale forecasting model
similar to the one described by Shen et a1. (1985). This model has a grid spacing of
about 96 km and six vertical levels. It uses the primitive equations in sigma coordinates and has a domain consisting of virtually the entire United States. It
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including a bulk parameterization of the planetary boundary layer with surface heat
and moisture fluxes. On a smaller domain, which includes the states of Colorado
and Utah with parts of Wyoming, Nebraska, Kansas, New Mexico, and Arizona, a diagnostic model with about a 24 km grid spacing is also used. This diagnostic model,
modified from Fosberg et al. (1976), finds only the orographically induced winds.
The way in which the two parts of this model interact can be seen in the flow
diagram shown in Fig. 1. At each time step variables from the forecasting model
are interpolated on to the 24 km grid and
used as first guess fields for the diagnostic
model. The diagnostic model then uses the
first guess fields to find the terrain induced
divergence and vorticity on the two lowest
model levels. In computing these quantities
it uses a frictional term based on the standard deviation of the topography and the
static stability. The winds derived from
the terrain induced divergence and vorticity
fields are added to the first guess wind
field to produce a horizontal velocity field
on the 24 km grid. A new vertical velocity
is then found on this grid which is continous
with the new horizontal velocity field. These
new terrain-modified winds are used to find
both the grid scale and subgrid scale precipiFig. 1 Abbreviated model flow diatation on the 24 km grid. Areal averages of
gram. "A" stands for advection and
these
winds (U T and VT) are also used in the
alpha symbolizes any variable.
advective scheme of the forecasting model.
Application of the Model to the Big Thompson Flood
The Big Thompson flood is a natural choice for a case study for this model since
topography played a key role in its production and since the precipitation variations
present on that day were very great. The synoptic and mesoscale features accociated
with this event have been described by Caracena et al. (1978) and are summarized
elsewhere in these proceedings so they will not be discussed here.
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The large scale model forecast of geopotential height and wind fields at 700 mb
together with observed fields with analysis taken from Maddox et al. (1977) for
00 GMT August 1, 1976, are shown in Fig. 2. Forecast height fields at this level
are generally too low in the
northern and central plains. Since
the forecast model has fixed boundaries one might initially think
that the problem is a result of
this condition. This explanation
does not appear to be valid since
with the Limited Fine Mesh model
forecast (not shown) of the National
Meteorological Center the same
errors occurred. Since this problem
does not appear at 300 mb (not shown)
Fig. 2 (a) 12 hour model forecast 700 mb geoit could be the result of an interpotential heights and wind valid 00 GMT
polation error from the sigma surfaces
1 August 1976. Heights are in decameters and
contours are drawn for every 20 m. Wind
to the pressure surfaces rather than
vectors are normalized with the longest vector an error in the model forecast itself.
being 14.1 m/sec.
Due to its fixed boundaries the model cannot see the trough moving onto the west coast.
Model winds in eastern Colorado are strong and from the southeast. These winds were
vital in creating the upslope condition which formed the Big Thompson storm as well as
bringing moist air into the area (Caracena et al., 1978). Although the forecasting
model obtains input from the diagnostic model on the smaller grid the forecast of
geopotential heights is largely unaffected.
The streamlines of the winds found by the diagnostic model on the 24 km grid at
the lowest model level at 00 GMT 1 August 1976 are shown in Fig. 3. There is a
strong convergence zone along the Front Range. The winds in eastern Colorado have
more of an easterly component than those on the larger grid. These winds generate
more upslope flow than the winds on the 96 km grid.
Figure 4 contains the 24 hour total forecast precipitation and the actual precipitation which fell during that period. Almost all the precipitation in the Estes
Park area was forecast to fall between a GMT and six GMT on August 1 which was approximately the same time at which the actual storm persisted. Although there were
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Fig. 2 (b) 700 mb analysis for 00 GMT
1 August 1976. Height contours are drawn
every 20 m and isotherms are at two
degree Celsius intervals. Regions where
the dewpoint is less than six degrees
Celsius are shaded [From Maddox et al.,
1977].

Fig. 3 Streamlines of winds found by the
diagnostic model at the lowest model level
valid at 00 GMT 1 August 1976.
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reports of up to 12 inches of rain
in the Big Thompson Canyon the magnitude of the precipitation forecast is probably Somewhat excessive.
Sensitivity studies with the model
indicate that this error is most
likely caused by the small number
of vertical levels in the model and
by initial vertical interpolation
errors. The predicted location of
this maximum, however, is very good.
Even though there were few official
reports of rainfall in southern
Wyoming there were reports of flash
flooding in the Wheatland area.
Thus a considerable amount of rain
appears to have fallen there also.
There is also good qualitative
agreement between the observations
and the forecast in Utah, central
Wyoming, and the eastern plains of
Colorado.
A precipitation forecast done
by the forecasting model alone (without the enhanced topography, designated FO) on the 96 km grid can be
seen in Fig. 5. From a qualitative
comparison of the two forecasts it
can be seen that the forecasting
model alone gives a much poorer representation of the amount of rainfall
in the Colorado-Utah-Wyoming area
than the model with the input of the
terrain induced winds on the nested
grid. The improvement in the pre-
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cipitation forecast is caused by adding the orographica11y induced winds On the 24 km
grid, even though the geopotentia1 height forecasts of the two models on the 96 km
9rid are quite similar.

Fig. 4 (a) 24 hour model forecast cumulative
precipitation in mm on the nested grid ending
12 GMT 1 August 1976. Contours are at 5, 35,
65, 95, 125, 155, 185, and 215 11111 •
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Fig. 5 24 hour cumulative precipitation forecast made by the forecast model alone (FO)
(Shen et a1., 1985) for the period ending 12
GMT 1 August 1976. Contours are drawn from 1 mm
to 46 mm at an interval of 5 mm.
Discussion and Conclusions
In addition to the case presented here, three other cases have been used to
date to test this model. They are the Cheyenne flood on August 1, 1985, a case
on July 28, 1976 which had only moderate precipitation, and the Surry Ridge case
of July 19, 1985 which was accompanied by heavy rains in the Denver and Colorado
Springs areas. To verify the precipitation forecasts produced by this model
multivariate randomized block permutation procedures (MRBP) developed by Mielke
(1984, 1986) were used to compare the forecasts with all available observations.
The forecasts were significant at the 0.05 level which is as low as could be
expected with this small a sample. The precipitation forecasts produced by the
FO model were not significant. However, it is possible to say with a confidence
level on the order of 10- 7 that the geopotential height forecasts of the FO model
and the complete model did not differ significantly from the observed fields or
from each other.
These results offer hope that it may be possible to improve precipitation
forecasts by mesoscale models in areas with complex topography through a better
treatment of the small scale topography. Anthes and Haagenson (1983) found
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precipitation forecasts in mesoscale models to be better with a more detailed
topography than with a smoothed one. But results here indicate that in at least
some cases it may not be necessary to explicitly decrease the grid size of the
forecasting model to resolve the features important for attaining this improvement.
All the processes represented in the forecasting model are not necessary
to produce an improved forecast using a nested grid because the winds controlling
the small scale convective precipitation distribution are primarily forced by the
topography in situations of which the case studies are representative.
Finally, the addition of these topographically induced winds to the model
resulted in significant changes of the precipitation- forecast but in only small
changes of the large scale geopotential height forecast indicating that the key
to predicting precipitation in regions with complex terrain may be a better
representation of the orographic effects rather than an improvement in the
simulation of the geopotential heights.
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OPERATIONAL, SATELLITE-DERIVED
PRECIPITATION ESTIMATES AND FORECASTS
Roderick Scofield
NOAA/NESDIS
Precipitation information is a primary requirement of hydrologists and agriculturalists around the world.

Also of utmost importance is the need to make estimates

of areas of heavy precipitation prior to issuance of flash flood or winter storm warnings and special weather statements.

Hydrologists, meteorologists, and river fore-

casters use precipitation estimates as an aid in their evaluation or prediction of
flood potential.
Visible (VIS) and geostationary infrared (IR) satellite imagery are currently
being used operationally for analyzing and forecasting heavy precipitation events.
Satellite-derived precipitation estimates and 3-hour precipitation trends for convective systems (Scofield and Oliver, 1977; Scofield, 1984; Spayd and Scofield, 1984a),
extratropical cyclones (Scofield and Spayd, 1984), and tropical cyclones (Spayd and
Scofield, 1984b) are computed on the NESDIS Interactive Flash Flood Analyzer (IFFA) and
transmitted via AFOS to NWS Foreccast offices, NWS offices, and River Forecast Centers.
The National Hurricane Center uses a method developed by Jarvinen and Griffith (1981)
for forecasting tropical cyclone rainfall at landfall.

Milestones and Future Techniques
The operational NESDIS Convective Storm Technique gives half-hourly or hourly
rainfall estimates for convective systems by using GOES IR and high resolution VIS images.

The technique is designed for deep convective systems that occur in tropical air

masses with high tropopauses and it is applied using IR images (Fig. 1) displayed
according to digital ehancement curve (Mb curve) designed to help estimate convective
storm intensity.

The convective system in Fig. 1 is a mesoscale convective complex

which produced flash floods over Kansas City, MO.

MCC's are easy to identify in the
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satellite imagery; satellite precipitation estimates for these types of systems are
normally quite accurate.

Estimates of convective rainfall are commputed by comparing

changes in cloud character between two consecutive images.

The technique is divided

into three main parts:
(a)

The active portion of the convective system is identified.

This is the area

of strong updrafts and coincides with the heavy rain portion of the cumulonimbus.

For

thunderstorm systems embedded in a moderate to strong vertical wind shear environment,
the heaviest rainfall most often falls along the upwind edge of the anvil (between A
and A' in Fig. 1).
(Fig. 1).

The inactive downwind portion of the anvil is between Band B'

For thunderstorm systems embedded in a weak vertical wind shear environment,

the heaviest rainfall most often falls near the center of the anvil.
(b)

The computation of the half-hourly convective rainfall estimate is computed

for the active portion using five meteorological factors:
Factor 1:

Cloud-top temperature and cloud growth OR divergence aloft.

Factor 2:

Overshooting top; in VIS images overshooting tops are quite

bright and textured.
Factor 3:

Thunderstorm cluster OR convective cloud line merger.

Factor 4:

Saturated environment; the saturated environment factor refers to

those thunderstorms that are long-lived, cover large areas, and are stationary.

These

storms possess strong, relatively steady-state updrafts and outflows, a large area
saturated to great heights, and a lack of dry air entrainment.
Factor 5:

Moisture correction; a mositure correction factor has been deve-

loped for adjusting estimates when the air is unusually dry or quite moist.
(c)
factor.

The summation of the factors and multiplication by the moisture correction
A more detailed explanation of the convective technique is presented in

Scofield (1984).
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As mentioned above, the convective technique using the IR enhancement curve (Mb)
was designed for estimating rainfall from deep convective systems with a high tropical
tropopause.

However, the strength of the convection is often best estimated by a com-

parison of the temperature of the convective tops with the computations from the soundings (called the equilibrium level).

On these occasions, the anvil spreads out at the

stable layer at the top of the area of free convection, not at the tropopause.
this occurs, temperatures warmer than -62°C occur in the anvil.

When

The Mb curve does not

show the details at these temperatures clearly.
The Convective Precipitation Estimation Technique has been modified so that the
temperature of the convection computed from a sounding is compared with the observed
cloud-top temperature.

This computed temperature is the best measure of the expected

anvil temperature and should be used for examining the anvil growth rates.

Cloud top

temperatures equal to or colder than the computed temperature would indicate heavier
rainfall rates than warmer ones.

As a result of the above, a modification to the tech-

nique for warm tops has been developed (see Scofield, 1984).
An example of a subtle warm top devastating flash flood is shown (at 5) in Fig. 2.
This flood occurred in Eastern Kentucky and produced much property damage; several
people were also killed.

Warm top flash flood producing thunderstorms such as the one

in Fig. 2 are often hard to identify in the satellite imagery.
The IFFA, which became operational in August 1983, represents a transfer of technology and techniques from NOAA research facilities to operational forecasters and
meteorologists.

The overall philosophy of IFFA is to convert digital satellite data,

which are low in information and high in volume to a satellite product which is high in
information and low in volume.

The goal of IFFA ;s to improve the accuracy and timeli-

ness of satellite precipitation estimates.

The satellite meteorologist interacts with

the computer, each performing tasks which they are best suited for.

The meteorologists
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provide the intelligence and analysis functions while the computer provides the speed
and accuracy of computing precipitation products in the required map formats.
GOES digital data are received in real-time through the Digital Interface
Electronics, processed with a Harris/6 minicomputer, and stored on two 80 megabyte
removable disks.
dant systems.

The IFFA operational configuration consists of two complete, redun-

In case of hardware failure, the removable disks can be transferred to

the back-up system and operational work resumed.

The IFFA system also includes opera-

tor consoles, 1600 BPI g-track tape drives, a card reader, line printer and two applications terminals.
Each terminal consists of an Intel 8080 command processor connected to a color
monitor and an alpha-numerical CRT screen with a keyboard.

A joystick and a data

tablet are used to position the cursor on the screen to view enlarged areas and draw
isohyets.

A Versatec hard copy output device is used to produce a permanent image of

the rainfall estimates.

The meteorologist can annotate the county names and the posi-

tion of maximum and minimum rainfall values in tenths of an inch.
The estimates are disseminated in realtime using the AFOS PIL-header "SPENES" and
are generally available to the NWS 20 to 30 minutes after the latest image time used.
These messages provide valuable guidance for NWS Forecast Offices responsible for flash
flood watches and warnings.

As a pilot experiment, selective rainfall estimates in

Texas are digitized at predetermined grid points and entered into the IBM-360 NOAA computer.

The West Gulf River Forecast Center has been evaluating and using these estimate

experimentally the past two years.
The verification results show the average error of the rainfall estimates for a
storm total precipitation event is about thirty percent.

The absolute and average

error both increase as the magnitude of the event increases.

For relatively small

events (3.9 inches or less) there is a tendency to overestimate the event and as the
magnitude of the event increases there is a distinct trend of underestimating the
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Operational users of this product should feel very confident that if a rainfall

estimate of four inches or more is received, there is an excellent probability that at
least four inches will be observed.
Future improvements to the technique have not been exhausted and will more than
likely become a reality when GOES VAS data becomes available.
VIS and IR spin scan radiometer Atmospheric Sounder.

VAS is an acronym for

The inclusion of VAS data will

allow for a better moisture correction and a low level moisture inflow factor.

In

addition, a short range forecasting algorithm (see Moses, 1981) which uses GOES VAS
data to predict thunderstorm trends and precipitation is expected to be developed.
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Fig. 1 Enhanced infrared imagery (Mb curve), 0900 GMT, AU9ust 13, 1982.

Fig. 2 Enhanced infrared imagery (Mb curve),
0930 GMT, July 15, 1979.

TABLE 1
MILESTONES IN OPERATIONAL SATELLITE-DERIVED HEAVY PRECIPITATION ESTIMATION

AND FORECASTING TECHNIQUES

Date

5-10 YEARS BEFORE BIG THOMPSON (BBT)

a FIRST POLAR ORBITER PRECIPITATION ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE WAS

OEVELOPED (BARRETT, 1970)

a FIRST GOES PRECIPITATION ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE WAS OEVELOPEO
IWOODLY/GRIFFITH, 1972, 1976)

I 31 JULY 1976

BIG THOMPSON flASH flOOD I

APRIL 1977

A TECHNIQUE FOR ESTIMATING CONVECTIVE RAINFALL FROM GOES IMAGERY WAS
DEVELOPED (SCOF IELO/OLI VER, 1977)

SUHMER 1978

IMPLEMENTED FIRST OPERATIONAL/MANUAL PRECIPITATION ESTIMATION
TECHNIQUE [SYNOPTIC ANALYSIS BRANCH (SABI, NESDISl

HARCH 1980

IMPROVEMENTS TO THE OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUE WERE DEVELOPED
(SCOFIELO/OLIVER, 1960)

SUHMER 1980

NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER IMPLEMENTS TECHNIQUE FOR FORECASTING
RAINFALL FROM TROPICAL CYCLONES (JARVINEN/GRIFFITH, 1981)

JUNE 1980

PROBLEMS IN ESTIMATING RAINFALL FROM WARM TOPPED THUNDERSTORMS IN
THE INFRARED IMAGERY WERE 10ENTlFIEO, OOCUMENTEO, AND PUBLISHEO
(SCOFIELO/OLIVER/SPAYO, 1960)

OCTOBER 1981

A TECHNIQUE TO ESTIMATE RAINFAll FROM WARM TOrPED THUNDERSTORMS WAS

DEVELOPED (SCOFIELD/SPAYO, 1961, 1963)

AUGUST 1963

IMPLEMENTED THE INTERACTI VE FLASH FLOOD ANALYZER (lFFA) FOR
ESTIMATING RAINFALL (SA8, NESDIS, CLARK AND 6ORNEMAN, 1984)

JULY 1984

A TECHNIQUE FOR ESTIMATING ANO FORECASTING RAINFALL FROM TROPICAL
CYCLONES WAS OEVELOPED ANO IMPLEMENTED (SPAYO/SCOFIELO, 1984)

NOVEM8ER 1984

A TECHNIQUE FOR ESTIMATING ANO FORECASTING PRECIPITATION FROM
EXTRATROPICAL CYCLONES WAS DEVELOPEO AND IMPLEMENTED
(SCOFIELO/SPAYD, 1984)

1966

DOCUMENTED SATELLITE CHARACTERISTICS OF FLASH FLOODS IN EASTERN AND
WESTERN REGIONS (SPAYD/FLEMING, 1984, 1986)

1987

WILL OEVELOP:

1. A RAIN GUSH FACTOR
2. A 3 HOUR CONVECTIVE PRECIPITATION ESTIMATION OUTLOOK TECHNIQUE
3. A CONVECTIVE FLASH FLooO POTENTIAL INDEX
4. AN AUTOMATED PRECIPITATION ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE
12-14 YEARS AFTER BIG THOMPSON (ABT)

1. USE GOES VAS FOR IMPROVING PRECIPITATION ESTIMATES BY DEVELOPING A
LOW LEVEL MOISTURE INFLOW FACTOR, A SPEEO OF CONVECTIVE STORM FACTOR
AND A 8ETTER MOISTURE CORRECTION FACTOR
2. COM81NE PASSIVE MICROWAVE WITH VIS AND IR METHODOLOGIES FOR
IMPROVING PRECIPITATION ESTIMATES
3. CONTINUE TO DEVELOP AND IMPROVE FLASH FLOOD INDEX
4. CONTINUE TO DEVELOP AND IHPROVE THE AUTOMATED PRECIPITATION
ESTIMATION AND TRACKING TECHNIQUE

15-20 YEARS AFTER 81G THOMPSON IA8T)

INTEGRATE TOGETHER INFORMATION FROM GOES-NEXT, NEXRAO, VERTICAL
PROFILERS, RAIN GAUGES (INCLUDING HIGH RESOLUTION OPERATIONAL
NETWORKS). ETC. FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BEST PRECIPITATION
ANALYSIS AND FORECASTING TECHNIQUES.

TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN FLASH FLOOD FORECASTING
WITHIN THE NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE
Edward J. VanBlargan
Hydrologic Research Laboratory
National Weather Service, NOAA
Introduction
Average annual flood losses increase 5 ~ercent per year primarily because of
human encroachment on flood plains. These losses may be partially reduced by
forecasts alone if the lead time and accuracy are reliable (Oay, 1970). The
National Weather Service (NWS) has been mandated by the Organic Act of 1B90 to
provide flood forecasts nationwide, including forecasts of flash floods which are
loosely defined as rapidly occurring floods that crest within 12 hours of the
causative rainfall (Barrett, 1983). To accomplish this mission, the NWS has
developed and is investigating various techniques for flash-flood forecasting.
The purpose of this paper is to describe existing and future capabilities for
flash-flood forecasting within the NWS. An evolution of techniques will be shown
in sections dealing with traditional, recent, and future methods. The most effective forecasting combines meteorological and hydrological techniques (Hall, 1981)
with components for rainfall forecasting, areal rainfall estimation, and hydrologic modeling. Discussion will focus on these components and associated
characteristics of timeliness, accuracy, and information content of the forecast.
Traditional Methods
Flash-flood forecasting procedures as described by Mogil et al. (1978)
remained relatively unchanged for many years. These traditional methods are
described in two groups, NWS warnings and local flood warning systems. Unfortunately, there is little archived information that can be used to quantitatively
assess the performance of these procedures, the magnitude of losses actually
reduced by forecasts, or the amount of improvement gained with new procedures.
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NWS Warnings
The NWS generally produces area-wide warnings that are issued when rainfall
exceeds the "guidance value." These warnings indicate general geographic areas
(e.g., a county) where flooding is likely to occur without designating the
magnitude of flooding expected or the specific streams affected. Occasionally,
stage forecasts for specific streams are issued using "headwater tables." The
guidance value and headwater tables are predetermined (i .e., calculated prior to
any event) at River Forecast Centers (RFC's), but are used at Weather Service
Forecast Offices (WSFO's) because the rainfall data is collected there and
significant delays occur before RFC's receive the data. The rainfall input is
manually assimilated using a variety of sources including automated and telephoned
gage reports, manually digitized radar (MDR), satellite estimates, and
quantitative precipitation forecasts (QPF) from the Notional Meteorological Center
(NMC). The forecaster subjectively estimates areal rainfall amounts for areas
affected by severe weather.
Guidance values indicate the amount of rainfall required to initiate flash
flooding for specific counties and durations (see Table 1). The determination of
guidance values is somewhat subjective and varies among RFC's. Typically, an
Antecedent Precipitation Index (API) relationship (Linsley et al., 1958) is used
to determine the rainfall required to yield some "critical" runoff value (e.g.,
1 inch) for a given duration (e.g., 3 hours), which is then converted to other
durations with "conversion factors." The critical runoff value and conversion
factors are subjectively chosen based on experience of the RFC. Guidance values
are recomputed daily to reflect changing soil moisture conditions and represent an
average index for an area with no reflection of variations of soil moisture or
hydrologic response on individual basins. Headwater tables are compiled for
individual basins and contain predetermined stage forecasts for various combinations of rainfall amount, rainfall duration, and guidance value (see Table 2).
The tables are typically compiled using an API relationship, rating curve, and
unit hydrograph which may be synthetically derived (Sheridan, 1953).
The guidance value and headwater tables were designed to be easy manual lookup methods appropriate for use with the sparse gaged data and limited computer
resources at the WSFO. The accuracy can be relatively sufficient, especially if

Average Rainfall (i nches) Needed to Begin Flooding
12-hour
24-hour
3-hour

State and County
Kentucky:
Floyd
Mart in
Pike
Virginia:
Buchanan
Di ckenson
West Virginia:
Logan
Mingo
Table 1.

Guidance
Value
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0

1.8
2.1
1.5

3.0
3.4
2.6

3.5
3.8
3.1

2.2
2.2

3.4
3.5

3.9
3.9

1.4
1.4

2.5
2.4

2.9
2.8

Example of flash-flood guidance values

Inches of Rain in 3 Hours
3.0
4.0
5.0
1.0
2.0
For e cas t e d
S t a g e s (f e e t)
12.6
15.3
17.2
18.5
19.4
9.9
12.6
15.2
17.1
18.5
12.5
16.6
3.5
10.1
14.6
3.5
3.5
10.1
12.6
15.1
12.83.5
3.5
3.5
10.7
Table 2.

Example of a headwater table
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the rainfall is gaged and occurs in a single event conforming to one of the
predetermined durations. However, four general problems hinder these procedures
and thus reduce the credibility of NWS warnings among some users (Wright, 1985).
First, the procedures are manual and require subjective decisions which can create
time delays. Second, forecast accuracy is reduced because the QPF, MDR, and
satellite estimates are not consistently reliable for small areas and the gaged
observations are sparse in many areas. Third, using predetermined rainfall
sequences is not as flexible as using a hydrologic model, which can analyze actual
rainfall sequences as they occur including multiple rainfall bursts. Finally,
because of limited data and time, general area-wide warnings are typically
issued. These warnings lack specific information needed for public action such as
the magnitude and location of flooding (Carter and Clark, 1983).
Local Flood Warning Systems
The NWS cooperates with communities to establish local flood warning systems
that allow the community to monitor rainfall and make forecasts. Two types of
systems have traditionally been established, self-help and alarm-gage (Barrett,
1983). The self-help are manual systems comprised of volunteer rainfall
observers, a headwater table provided by NWS, a community flash-flood coordinator,
and an emergency response plan. Some of the key features of the self-help systems
are good spatial coverage of rainfall gages, site-specific stage forecasts, and
low cost. However, timeliness is still limited due to the manual nature and the
lack of forecast rainfall information. The alarm-gage consists of an upstream
river gage that triggers a community alarm when the river stage exceeds preset
threshold levels. The alarm concept is simple and quite accurate since it does
not rely on rainfall measurement and runoff conversion. However, to gain
sufficient lead time the levels must be set fairly low, and there is no
information to indicate if the river will continue to increase. Some communities
combine an alarm gage with a self-help system to help overcome this problem.
Recent Methods
Several systems have evolved over the last ten years that address some
deficiencies of the traditional methods. These systems (ALERT, IFLOWS, ADVIS) are
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computerized local flood warning systems that use automated event-reporting rain
gages. These have been implemented operationally, but only in specific locations.
ALERT
The ALERT system (Automated Local Evaluation in Real Time) was developed at
the NWS California-Nevada RFC and consists of automated, event-reporting river and
rain gages (Burnash and Bartfeld, 1980). Data are stored and analyzed with the
Sacramento model to output a streamflow hydrograph (Burnash et al., 1973). ALERT
also analyzes the impact of various future rainfall amounts but does not actually
make rainfall forecasts. It was designed to be owned and used by a community.
Derivatives of the original system are now marketed by the private sector.
ALERT was thoughtfully designed to overcome some of the major obstacles of
flash-flood forecasting and with the foresight to take advantage of microcomputer
technology. It minimizes much of the time delay inherent in the traditional
methods because it is automated, based on event reports, and locally operated with
no real-time interaction with NWS offices. Also, it provides good spatial
coverage of rainfall gages and utilizes a flexible hydrologic model to give
specific streamflow information. Two drawbacks are the subjective model
calibration required (which can stymy inexperienced users) and the necessity of
utilizing external information to determine how much future rainfall may occur.
Although the initial cost may be prohibitive for some communities, ALERT has been
shown to be a cost effective system (Burnash and Bartfeld, 1980).
IFLOWS
IFLOWS (Integrated Flood Observing and Warning System) is a government funded
project in the Appalachia region (Carnahan and Monro, 1980). It contains a vast
network of automated event reporting rain 9ages and a mini-computer based
communication system which transmits and displays the rainfall data-to various
state emergency centers and NWS offices. The main value of IFLOWS is providing
automated, relatively dense rainfall data for time periods as small as 15 minutes
over a large geographic region. IFLOWS does not currently contain any river
gages, rainfall estimation procedures, or hydrometeorological forecast techniques.
ADVIS
ADVIS (Automated Flood Advisory Procedure) was developed by the NWS Ohio RFC
to provide a hydrologic forecast and preparedness component for IFLOWS (Sweeney,
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1985). It is an interactive modeling system that utilizes an API with unit hydrograph to display forecasted hydrographs, preparedness plans, and past flood
crests. ADVIS provides one of the missing components of IFLOWS, an automated
hydrologic model with the ability to yield accurate forecasts for any rainfall
sequence. However, the user must still manually estimate and input observed and
forecasted areal rainfall which can create time delays.
The Future
Several significant obstacles for flash-flood forecasting methods remain.
Many areas are not covered by IFLOWS or ALERT and suffer from the problems of the
traditional methods. Even in areas covered, no effective method for rainfall
forecasting is utilized, and IFLOWS suffers from a manual interface between the
rainfall data and hydrologic model. The NWS has long-term plans (i .e., ten years)
for new technology, primarily NEXRAD and AWIPS, with features designed to overcome
many of the flash-flood forecasting problems and improve forecasts.
NEXRAD (Next Generation Weather Radar) is automated radar that is expected to
begin nationwide implementation in 1988 and provide high quality spatial rainfall
estimates. Also, it will contain a component to compute area wide flash-flood
potentials based on the guidance values (Walton et al., 1985). AWIPS (Advanced
Weather and Interactive Processing System) will provide advanced computer
processing and communication capabilities at NWS field offices in the 1990's. One
subsystem of AWIPS, the Forecasting and Local Analysis System for Hydrometeorology
(FLASH), will generate both area-wide and site-specific flash-flood forecasts
(VanBlargan, 1985). The system aims to provide improved forecasts by assembling
high quality rainfall data and combining it with improved techniques for QPF,
areal rainfall estimation, and hydrologic modeling.
Various investigations are underway within NWS in several areas. Current
QPF's are not adequate for small flash-flood areas, but improvements are expected
for a variety of lead times such as I-hour projections from NEXRAD, local analysis
(Belville et al., 1978), basin specific QPF (Georgakakos and Hudlow, 1985), and
6-hour QPF from NMC. Procedures will need to be developed to weight and merge
these QPF's. Multi-sensor rainfall estimation techniques for objectively merging
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radar, satellite, and gaged rainfall are being developed and tested (Krajewski,
1986). Development of a probabilistic area-wide forecasting technique is underway
(Zevin, 1985), as is development of a probabilistic site-specific hydrologic
modeling system (Georgakakos and Hudlow, 1985). Other hydrologic modeling
research deals with automatic model calibration and application in ungaged areas
(Hydrologic Research Lab, 1985). "Expert" decision systems are being explored
which decide on the optimum time to issue forecasts based on preset decision rules
(Krzysztofowicz, 1985). Although none of these developments have been implemented
or verified operationally, they are expected to yield improved techniques in the
future.
Even though improvement of techniques is being emphasized, some effort is
still needed on establishing what output information is most useful to which users
and how users need to be educated in and respond to the forecasts. Also, the
roles of IFLOWS and ALERT in the AWIPS era needs to be established. It seems that
in addition to providing data, these systems will continue to have a place in many
areas where radar coverage is poor or response time is critical, such as urban
locations.
Conclusions
The present direction of technological development indicates that flash-flood
forecasting within NWS is in transition, moving from traditional methods that have
changed little over time to a sophisticated system that utilizes advances in data
acquisition, hydrometeorological prediction models, and computer technology. At
the end of this transition period (i .e., about 10 years) more timely, accurate,
and informative forecasts, both area-wide and site-specific, will be available to
a wide variety of users. In the interim, improvements in forecasts will be gained
primarily from expanding local flood warning systems. Areas without such systems
will continue to rely on the general warnings produced with traditional methods.
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FLASH FLOOD WARNING EFFECTIVENESS
Wayne Graham
Bureau of Reclamation
Engineering and Research Center

Flash floods have killed more than 35D people within the Front Range corridor extending from Fort Collins to Pueblo.

Some of the more significant

flash floods, in terms of loss of life, include the 1921 flooding along the
Arkansas River at Pueblo; the 1933, 34 and 38 flooding along Bear Creek;
and the 1976 flooding in the Big Thompson Canyon.

Some floods, including

the 1965 flooding along the South Platte at Denver, have caused much property damage with comparatively little loss of life.

This report will

explore the issue of why some floods are more costly in terms of loss of
life than others.
Factors influencing flooding loss of life
Case studies indicate that the single most important factor related to loss
of life is the warning time for the population at risk.

Simply stated,

little or no public warning has the potential to result in significant loss
of life.

Adequate public warning of just a few hours nearly always results

in very few fatalities.

Case studies from actual flash floods will be

discussed later in the report.
Other factors that influence flooding loss of life include:
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Flood lethality -- Flood lethality is the potential of a given flood to
cause deaths and injuries for those within its boundaries.

This varies as

a function of water depth, velocity, temperature, and amount of debris
carried.
Population at risk characteristics -- Important characteristics of the
population that affect their response to warning include the age of the
population at risk, infirmity, prior knowledge and understanding of the
flood potential and appropriate responses, previous experience with
flooding, knowledge of local terrain and landmarks, community social structure (including the extent of informal networks in the community and
whether families are together or separated when warned), and attitudes
toward the warning, including experience with prior false alarms or misinformation.
Environmental conditions -- These are the environmental conditions that
occur both prior to and during the evacuation process that can affect its
success.

For example, long periods of rain may serve as an environmental

cue that flooding is likely, thus reinforcing the warning message.
Conversely, local flooding prior to a flash flood can make evacuation difficult, if not impossible.

Conditions associated with flash flooding can

damage power and communication networks.

Also, heavy rain, severe cold,

lightning, and other storm events can make leaving the shelter of a home or
automobile very unattractive to the population at risk, further delaying or
preventing evacuation.
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Flash floods that occur at night, especially during hours when most people
are normally asleep, present many difficult problems.

Events may be more

difficult to detect, warning decision-making and dissemination of warning
messages can be delayed, evacuation in darkness is more difficult and
visual confirmation of an approaching flood, which often prompts evacuation, may be totally absent.
Convergence -- Convergence is the movement of individuals into the danger
zone, whether to retrieve possessions, assist family members and other
victims, or just watch.
operations.

This includes safety officials engaged in rescue

Convergence deaths results from individuals entering or

returning to the danger zone to retrieve possessions or help others, from
attempting to drive, walk, or swim through flooded areas, or from sightseeing too close to the flood.

Deaths due to convergence are usually few

in number, but are a common feature of major floods.
Warning in Nine Historic Cases
Pueblo, Arkansas River, June 3, 1921
Floodin9 prior to 1921 prompted the establishment of levees designed to
protect against a flood of 40,000 ft 3/s.

This was slightly 9reater than

the maximum discharge of the flood of 1894.

Heavy rains fell in the region

west of Pueblo on June 2 and 3 with intense rain falling on the afternoon of
June 3.

The river at Pueblo started to rise rapidly at 5 p.m.

The first warning of the approaching flood reached the city about 6 p.m. on
the 3d, stating that a wall of water was rushing down the river.
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Messengers were sent out at once to warn the people living in the lowlands
called Peppersauce Flats.

Hundreds of people rushed to the levees to

witness the approach of the great wall of water, not thinking that the city
could be inundated, as the levees were believed high enough to protect it.
The sudden breaking of the levees at about 8:45 p.m. cut off the people
from the higher land, and in endeavoring to escape many were drowned, as
were many others in the houses in the lowlands who had refused to heed the
flood warning.

The maximum stage occurred at midnight.

then overtopped by more than 6 feet.

The levees were

The peak discharge was 103,000 ft 3/s.

Fatality estimates for this flood range from between 78 to 500.

Possibly a

better understanding of the magnitude of the flood approaching Pueblo, or a
better warning message would have resulted in a reduced fatality count.
Denver, Failure of Castlewood Dam, August 3, 1933
Castlewood Dam was located on Cherry Creek about 35 miles upstream from
Denver.

The integrity of the dam had been questioned in the local media

for years prior to the failure.

Thus, the people of Denver were probably

aware of the dams existence.
Heavy rains during the night of August 2-3 caused water to flow through the
spillway and over the top of the dam.

Shortly after midnight the dam's

caretaker heard the rumbling of the flood and he seized a lantern and ran
down to look at the dam.

He realized that the dam was breaking, but was

unable to use the telephone to initiate the warning process because wires
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The caretaker then drove 12 miles to Castle Rock and at

about 2:30 a.m. made telephone calls which started the warning process.
This flood occurred before the days of dial and push-button phones.
Telephone operators in Parker and Sullivan "sent out the danger flash" to
their subscribers.

Today's "improved" telephone technology prevents a

repeat of this type of warning dissemination technology.

Police and fire

vehicles were, within minutes of the initial telephone call, cruising
through the threatened area within nenver with sirens screaming.
Flooding began at Colorado Boulevard at about 5:40 a.m.
Denver were damaged but very few were destroyed.
attributed, at the time, to the flood.
after the start of inundation.

Structures in

Two fatalities were

A woman died at Parker 12 hours

She was curious to view the flood damage

and was riding by horseback when the animal threw her into the water.
Another person, living near the mouth of Cherry Creek, stepped into a deep
hole while wading toward higher ground.

He had apparently been warned and

had spent considerable time in packing his possessions.

Newspaper accounts

indicate that many people, following the warning, wanted to view the
approachi ng fl ood.

These "con vergers " drove near the banks of Cherry Creek

and at least one very close call with disaster was described in the many
articles published on the flood and its resultant losses.
Bear Creek and Mt Vernon Canyons, 1930's
Bear Creek experienced three major floods in the 1930's.
July 7, 1933, claimed the lives of seven people.

Floodin9 on

The following year
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six people died on August 9.

On September 2, 1938, eight more people died.

These floods, like many other rain-induced events along the Front Range,
occurred in the afternoon and evening.

Only sketchy information is

available concerning the warning associated with these three floods.
Some warning of residents did occur in the 1938 flood.

A rancher in Mount

Vernon Canyon phoned a Golden operator with the message that a cloudburst
flood was rolling down the gulch and that it would be in Bear Creek Canyon,
above Morrison, in half an hour.

This message was phoned to two telephone

operators in Morrison who in turn called all of the hundred stations in the
Canyon served by the switchboard.

Only two buildings in the entire resort

town of Morrison were left standing.
Denver Metropolitan Area, South Platte River, June 16, 1965
The Denver Metropolitan Area was hit by an outstanding flood the night of
June 16.
Colorado.

It was the largest flood on the South Platte in the history of
The total damage, adjusted to 1986 dollars, exceeded $1 billion.

Only one fatality was recorded in the South Platte Valley through the
Denver Metropolitan Area.

This favorable fatality count, considering the

massive destruction and devastation, can be directly attributed to the
type, number and quality of warnings that were issued throughout the flood
plain areas.
Extreme rainfall amounts fell in the Plum Creek Basin.

Officials in

upstream communities radioed or telephoned officials in the downstream com-
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munities of Littleton, Englewood and Denver.
men, police, radio and television.

Warnings were issued by fire-

National news media was carrying

information on the flood, some of which was erroneous.

Flood plain occu-

pants in the upper reaches were told they had 10 to 15 minutes to evacuate.
It actually took up to two hours for the water to arrive.

Warning preceded

the flooding by up to 4 hours in the lower reaches (portions of Denver).
It is interesting to note that heavy rain did not fall along the South
Platte River through Denver.
flooding was imminent.

This seemed to refute the idea that major

Many people refused to believe that the South

Platte River could flood.
Spectators became a significant problem to deal with during the evacuation.
Littleton officials made the following comment "We probably had 5,000 extra
people in Littleton wanting to see what was going on and darn near everyone
of them drove their own car.

A good part of this was brought on by the

radio stations announcing where (the flood) was and what was going on--how
bad it was."

(Worth, page 23)

One person died of a heart attack while walking to high ground.
earlier evacuated but returned to his house.

He had

His fatal walk to high ground

began when water was 4 feet deep in the house.
Rocky Mountain National Park and Estes Park. Failure of Lawn Lake Dam,
July 15, 1982
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Lawn Lake Dam was 26 feet high.

Less than 700 acre-feet of water was

released when the dam failed at about 5:30 a.m. on Thursday, July 15 1982.
Lawn Lake Dam was located in Rocky Mountain National Park, 4 air miles from
the nearest road or telephone.

There were as many as 25 hikers camped in

the roadless area immediately downstream from the dam.

The campers

received no official warning but environmental warnings, such as seeing
trees breaking and hearing the roar of the river, described by many as like
continuous thunder, enable most of these campers to escape.

Nonetheless,

one camper in this area was swept to his death.
A garbage collector, while making pickups on the road nearest the dam,
thought a jet was crashing and then saw mud and debris on the road.

He

then drove a short distance and used a National Park Service emergency
telephone to report his observation to the National Park Service dispatch
center.

This telephone call set off a series of actions which resulted in

thousands of people evacuating or not entering flood-threatened areas.

The

National Park Service warned and evacuated people occupying the most
threatened portions of the Aspenglen Campground where 275 people were
camped.

Law enforcement and other Government officials warned and eva-

cuated people in Larimer County and Estes Park.

Estes Park's only radio

station learned about the dam failure on a police scanner and the -station
was instrumental in spreading the message of the dam failure.

Two fatali-

ties occurred at Aspenglen Campground when campers left an area of safety
and tried to walk into island campsites.

Both deceased campers had been
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informed of the impending flood (but not of a dam failure) by other campers.
Case Studies Outside of Colorado
Additional insight regarding the value of an adequate warning process can
be gained by looking at the warning experience associated with flash flood
events outside of Colorado.
warning processes.

Much of my work has focused on dam failure

It is for this reason that the events chosen for

discussion are all dam failures.
discussed are:

The four dam failures that will be

Buffalo Creek Coal Waste Dam, West Virginia; Teton Dam,

Idaho; Kelly Barnps Oam, Georgia; and D.M.A.D. Dam, Utah.

Each case study

has an important story associated with it.
Buffalo Creek Coal Waste Dam, West Virginia, February 26, 1972
Buffalo Creek, West Virginia, is far from Colorado, but it is relevant to
any discussion of warnings associated with flash flooding.

At the time of

failure, the water was about 46 feet above the streambed and the impoundment contained about 400 acre-feet of water.

The dam failed at 8:00 a.m.

on a Saturday, during a flood with a 2-year frequency of recurrence.
Representatives (the dam was owned by a subsidiary of Pittson Coal Company)
were at the dam the morning of the failure.

These individuals realized

that there were some problems and were taking some action to prevent dam
failure.

The warning process failed because company officials did not make
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the decisions to warn the public at risk.

In fact, the senior dam owner

representative official on the site dismissed two deputy sheriffs who had
been sent to the area to aid in the evacuation.

Response to the meager

warnings disseminated was inadequate because false alarms had occurred on
at least four earlier occasions.

The leading edge of the floodwater tra-

veled the IS-mile length of the Buffalo Creek Valley in about 3 hours,
killing 125 people.

About 500 homes were destroyed and about 4,000 people

were left homeless.
Teton Dam, Idaho, June 5, 1976
Teton Dam was located northeast of Idaho Falls, Idaho.

The dam failed at

11:57 a.m. on a Saturday, during its initial filling.

The reservoir con-

tained about 252,000 acre-feet of water at the time of failure, and the
reservoir water surface elevation was about 275 feet above the original
valley floor.
On Thursday, 2 days before the failure, construction personnel found two
small seeps at the downstream toe of the dam.
totaled about 100 gallons per minute.

The water was clear and

On Friday, 1 day before the failure,

a smaller seep was observed in a different location.

Clear water was also

flowing out of this seep and it was not considered a problem.

A

Reclamation employee remained at the damsite until 12:30 a.m. on June 5,
the day of the failure.

The dam was then unattended until about 7:00 a.m.

Between 7:00 and 8:00 a.m. of the day of the failure, a survey crew disco-
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vered slightly turbid leakage.

As early at 9:30 a.m., the Project

Construction Engineer considered alerting area residents but he decided
that an emergency situation was not yet imminent.

Concern about causing

panic was one factor considered in the decision not to alert area residents.

Researchers have found that panic almost never occurs on a large

scale in disaster situations although the electronic and print media often
perpetuates the panic myth. At about 10:00 a.m., a larger leak, flowing
turbid water, was discovered.

Between 10:30 and 10:45 a.m., less than

1-1/2 hours before failure, the Project Construction Engineer notified the
sheriff's offices in Madison and Fremont Counties to begin evacuation of
downstream areas.

Dam failure inundation maps were not available at the

time of dam failure.

The evidence indicates that authorities were still

able, without inundation maps, to access and determine which areas were at
risk.

Every known means of communication was used to transmit the warning

and evacuation messages.

People living in areas within 20 miles of Teton

Dam learned of the failure as follows (Idaho Falls Chamber of Commerce):
Radio

- 44 percent

Neighbor

- 28 percent

Telephone -

7 percent

Police

7 percent

Other

- 14 percent

The failure resulted in damages that were estimated to be about
$0.5 billion.

More than 35,000 people were evacuated from their homes.
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The overall effectiveness of the warning and evacuation can be judged by
what happened at Sugar City and Rexburg, two of the communities closest to
the dam.

Sugar City, a community of about 600 people, is located about 12

miles downstream from Teton Dam.

Floodwaters reached this community about

1 hour after Teton Dam failed with depths of up to 15 feet being recorded.
No fatalities were recorded in Sugar City.

About 80 percent of Rexburg,

with a population of 10,000 people, was inundated to depths of 6 to 8 feet.
Floodwaters reached this community, located about 15 miles downstream from
Teton Dam, about 1 hour 40 minutes after Teton Dam failed.

Two nondrowning

fatalities were recorded in Rexburg.
Despite the warnings that were issued, there were a total of 11 fatalities
attributable to the failure of Teton Dam.
just below the dam drowned.

A 21-year-old person fishing

He was the only deceased person who had not

received a dam failure warning message from some source.

All other people

who died had varying beliefs or degrees of knowledge concerning the dam
failure and associated danger.

An elderly couple failed to evacuate after

receiving an in-person warning from their 23-year-old grandson.
drowned.

The couple

A group of three men drove from an area of safety into an area

that was soon to be flooded in order to help remove household items from
the home of a relative of one of the three.
saying:

The homeowner was quoted as

"I told (the three men) there would be a lot of water coming down

the canyon, but they seemed to think they had time to put another load in
that pickup (truck).

I was awfully scared, I thought I would have a heart
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I had to leave."

(Idaho Falls Chamber of Commerce, page 70)

three men remained at the home and drowned.
being evacuated from the flood area.

A 94-year-old woman died after

Another person died of an accidental

gunshot wound sustained while removing a gun from his vehicle.
died from heart attacks.

The

Two people

A woman living outside of the flood-damaged area

committed suicide 5 days after the dam failure.
Kelly Barnes Dam, near Toccoa Falls, Georgia, November 6, 1977
At the time failure, Kelly Barnes Dam impounded about 630 acre-feet of
water and the water was about 34 feet deep.

The dam failed at approximately

1:30 a.m. during a flood that the Geological Survey estimated to have a
10-year frequency of recurrence.
dam was not being monitored.

The warning process failed because the

Thus, the dam failure went undetected until

floodwaters crashed through the campus of Toccoa Falls College, drowning 39
people all of whom, at the time of the failure, were located within 1 mile
of the dam and 500 feet of Toccoa Creek.

This was a very large number,

considering that only a few hundred people were at risk.

This points out

that large numbers of people can perish when lethal flash floods are not
predicted or detected.
O.M.A.D. Dam, near Delta, Utah, June 23, 1983
D.M.A.D. Dam was named using the first letters of four private irrigation
companies.

The dam failed on a Thursday at about 1:00 p.m.

The dam,

located northeast of Delta, contained about 16,000 acre-feet of water, with
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a maximum depth of 30 feet, at the time of failure.

This case study is

nearly a textbook example of how an emergency action plan and warning
system should be developed and operated.
During the days preceding the failure, construction crews were at the dam
trying to prevent spillway failure due to headcutting in the downstream
channel which was moving toward the dam.
(attended) 24 hours a day.

The dam was being monitored

There was an awareness among residents in the

area that the dam might break.
Before the failure, residents were directed to listen to the Delta radio
station.

The station remained on the air 24 hours a day prior to and

immediately after the failure.

The local public safety officials had

planned on channeling all relevant information concerning the safety or
integrity of the dam through the station.

A sheriff was in the radio stu-

dio for the purpose of alerting the residents of the imminent danger of a
possible failure when word was received by the sheriff that the dam had
actually failed.

Within 60 seconds of the failure, the sheriff was

reporting live on-the-air.

A list of people living in the flood plain and

their telephone numbers had been prepared prior to the dam failure.
people were called by Millard County dispatchers and secretaries.

These
Sheriff

deputies also went door to door notifying residents that they were in immediate danger and advising that they leave.
were not available prior to the failure.

Dam failure inundation maps
The Millard County Administrator

indicated that the telephone list was prepared based upon an educated guess
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of which areas were most flood prone.

Additionally, prior dam failures in

the area proved useful in determining which areas were at risk.
reports indicated that about 500 people evacuated.

Newspaper

The reports also stated

that the evacuation "was almost like a rehearsal," and that "people were
calm and methodical."

"Most people were gone within two hours" and "the

maj ori ty went to the homes of re1at i ves and fri ends. "

(Madsen)

Gunnison Bend Dam, located about 8 miles downstream from D.M.A.D. Dam, was
intentionally breached in order to prevent a catastrophic or uncontrolled
failure of the structure.

This work was carried out under a plan made days

before the D.M.A.D. Dam failure.

The leading edge of the flood moved

downstream from D.M.A.D. Dam at about 2 miles per hour reaching the communities of Oasis and Deseret during hours of darkness, some 7 to 12 hours
after the D.M.A.D. Dam failed.

Much damage resulted from the failure of

D.M.A.D. Dam, although few homes were totally destroyed.
A man, thought to be a transient, died after an unsuccessful attempt to
cross the swollen Sevier River in the community of Deseret by clinging to a
cable strung across the river.
washed out.

The bridge in this community had been
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THE BOULDER FLASH FLOOD DETECTION AND WARNING SYSTEM
Donald G. Van Wie
Systems Concepts of Colorado, Inc.
In the early 1970's there was a limited awareness of the threat posed by
flash flooding in Boulder County. Then, 40 miles to the north, the Big
Thompson Canyon was ravaged and 139 lives were lost. The issue of local
preparedness moved from academic interest to pressing urgency. The legacy of
graphic images, in print and in the minds of those who assisted in the Big
Thompson disaster, galvanized a keen interest in developing a flood detection
and warning system that could reduce the loss of lives from a similar flood in
Boulder County.
In this atmosphere, cooperation was excellent among various public safety,
flood control, and emergency management agencies. The Urban Drainage and Flood
Control District (UDFCD) offered to put up half of an initial $150,000 flood
detection system. The matching funds were contributed by Boulder County and
the City of Boulder, and Boulder County assumed responsibility for system
maintenance and operation. A condition of the funding from UDFCD was the
development of an adequate flood warning plan, with annual review and testing.
The planning effort reached its peak in early 197B. Representatives
of public safety, emergency management, and flood control agencies of the City
of Boulder, Boulder County, the University of Colorado, the UDFCD, and many
others, worked to develop a suitable plan. Two major components emerged:
first, a system to detect flooding and make decisions on warning and
evacuation; and second, a plan for the dissemination of warnings to-the
public.
~xs_~~11! Xl_~n_n.i_n_g..a.r:<! .Qes_i.g.n.
Early in the planning process, the time line of a flood scenario was
developed and compared with a similar time line for a successful detection and
warning effort. The results of that juxtaposition were striking. The time
constraints thus revealed dictated the requirements of the detection system and
its operating plan. These time lines are summarized in Figure 1.
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Work by the Corps of Engineers and other hydrological consultants
indicates that flood flows can develop in the canyon areas within 1 to 2 hours
of peak rainfall in a 100-year storm event. The time for a flood to travel
down the channel to major populated areas is considerably less--typically 30 to
50 minutes. In a worst-case situation, flooding can occur in Boulder within 3
hours of the beginning of rainfall.
The time required for the detection and warning process was analyzed
working backward from the time of flood arrival. The planners proposed a
warning process that would use special alert radios, sirens, pUblic address
systems on fire and police cars, and the broadcast media. The warning process
acknowledged the need for the public to hear specific and mutually confirming
messages from multiple sources in order to be induced to act. This warning
process was estimated to take 30 to 40 minutes; to allow time for public
response, the process would have to begin at least one hour before flood
arrival.
The proposed warning process, and the direction of the public's response,
is labor-intensive. On-duty personnel must be supplemented by off-duty and
volunteer personnel in order to fully execute the plan. Further, some of the
public safety facilities are themselves in the flood plain, and measures must
be taken to move equipment and take other protective actions before public
warnings begin. This mobilization process takes another hour, and, therefore,
must begin about 2 hours before flood arrival. In order to trigger a
mobilization decision, the detection system must be fully operational still
earlier - two and a half to three hours before flood arrival. Comparison of the
two time lines shows that:
•

The time required for warning is greater than the flood travel time
down the channel. The decision to warn the public, therefore, must
be made before the flood has gathered upstream.

•

Mobilization of the public safety sector must begin before enough
rain has fallen to be sure that a flood will occur.

•

The detection system must be staffed and operational from virtually
the beginning of the storm.

The central goal of the detection and warning system is to produce
warnings that are both timely and accurate. Since any successful warning
operation will be highly disruptive, it is essential that warnings be
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implemented only at a time when there is high confidence that flooding will
occur. It can also be expected that any false alarms will severely damage the
credibility and effectiveness of future warnings. Yet the time constraints
indicate that preparation for warning must begin long before any certainty of a
flood exists. It became clear to planners that success of the system would
hinge on the wi Ilingness of the public safety agencies to to begin mobilization
perhaps dozens of times for each time warnings are actually issued. That
commitment was made, and resulted in a high degree of involvement of the
Boulder County Sheriff's Department in the development, operation and
maintenance of the system.
System effectiveness is also dependent on integrating information from
multiple sources. The following make major contributions to the detection
effort:
•

N~tional

Weather Service and private meteorological forecasts

•

weather radar from Limon, Colorado and Cheyenne, Wyoming

•

event-driven, telemetry reporting rain gages in the foothills

•

automatically reporting stream gages

•

decision aids, in the form of rainfall-runoff tables, hydrologic
prediction programs, inundation zone maps, and formatted messages.

Each of these has a unique value in the system. Accurate meteorological
forecasts are essential to starting the detection process. Without competent
analysis of synoptic patterns and mesoscale trends, the detection process would
require the commitment of personnel virtually every time it rained. But with
reliable forecasts, mobilization of the detection process can start early, yet
still be restricted to those situations in which there is known atmospheric
potential for flood producing storms.
Weather radar fills the critical gap between a meteorological forecast and
ground truth. Present meteorological capabilities can identify the potential
for flood producing thunderstorms over Boulder County, but cannot identify a
single basin or time of occurrence. Real-time weather radar allows detection
personnel to track the formation, growth, location, movement and severity of
the specific storm cells of local interest.
The remote rain and stream gages allow direct analysis of rainfall
reaching the ground. If the detection system depended solely on this data to
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start operations, warnings might come too late. Once detection operations are
underway, however, data from automatic gages is the central tool for evaluating
the situation. Combined with radar and synoptic data, data on actual rainfall
also becomes a major part of the prediction system.
~':e. _I.f!. ~t. ~a. Ul.e.t.e.c:t _i.C!.f!._S)'.s.t.e.m.
The flood detection center is located adjacent to the Boulder Regional
Communications Center, which provides police, fire, and emergency service
dispatching for most of the county. Weather radar imagery, rain and stream
data, and decision aids have been made available there, supported by a fault

tolerant communications system and an uninterruptable power supply. A defined
organizational structure spells out job assignments for the various personnel
involved in the flood detection process.
These personnel include public safety officials, city and county flood
control engineers, and jurisdiction heads. From the flood detection center,
they can communicate directly with the contract meteorological service, NWS,
and field observers.
Once initiated by general meteorological conditions, flood detection
operations center on interpreting data on rainfall in the 180 square mile flood
catchment zone in the foothills. In the earliest stages of the system,
volunteer firefighters, alerted from the communications center, read rain gages
and manned staff gages painted on bridge abutments on 7 creeks. This system
was only marginally workable. There was an enormous impact on the pUblic safety
communication network as questions and data flowed from the detection center to
observers and back. Interpretation of the data was sometimes impossible
because the initial condition of the rain gages was unknown. And it was
difficult for volunteers to dedicate manpower to this task for the time periods
required. The volunteer system was retained as a backup measure when
automatically reporting rain gages were installed.
The remote gages are battery-powered and report by radio with the
accumulation of each millimeter of rain. The initial system consisted of 8
rain gages and 4 stream gages, all in the Boulder and Fourmile Creek watersheds
above Boulder. Data was recorded on paper tape and displayed on a LED wall
display. Data reduction was done manually using Thiessen polygon averaging
techniques on lO-minute intervals during intense rainfall periods. Since data
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from automatic rain gages is immediately available, reliable, and objective,
confidence in the detection system grew rapidly.
~~~_~~Q~~~_~t~~~~

The remarkable improvements in detection system performance induced the
county to continue to expand the system into other basins; by 1986, 42 rain
gages had been installed along with 12 stream gages covering the entire
foothills area.
As the quantity of data increased, the data collection system
evolved from paper logging, to a dedicated microprocessor with ALERT software,
and finally to a fully multi-tasking, multi-terminal computer capable of
extensive data reduction and multiple simultaneous flood detection functions.
Changes in the data collection system were driven by the need for flood
detection personnel to rapidly and accurately assimilate data from numerous
sites, to spot potential problem areas quickly, and to identify the type of
action required. While manual techniques were acceptable for a few gages,
expansion made automation imperative. The lack of suitable commercially
available software led the Boulder County Sheriff's Department technical staff
to develop STORRM, the Sheriff's Telemetry Operated Rainfall and River Monitor.
The STORRM system is a collection of interrelated programs using a shared data
base and common user-defined system parameters. One program provides
continuous data collection, validation, filing, and archiving. A second
program, called Monitor, also runs continuously; it monitors rainfall amounts
and stream levels, generates alarms based on hydrologic activity, calculates,
stores, and displays the average rainfall in each basin over several time
periods, and watches system integrity. The outputs of this program inclUde a
continuously updated screen display; display screens are installed in the
regular work areas of flood detection personnel. This display is also
available to outside users, such as NWS, by remote terminal.
The alarms generated by the Monitor program are received in the Boulder
Regional Communications Center, where dispatchers notify appropriate personnel.
Alarms include rainfall rate, rainfall amount, stream level, and stream rate of
rise. Data integrity alarms provide early notification of CPU or data
collection failure, or failure of any of the three data repeaters relaying data
from the gages.
Point rainfall data are converted to area rainfall using a weighted
average technique. The area rainfall values are then used to produce rainfall
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averages for the various basins and sub-basins. These are displayed, as well
as used as the inputs to a hydrologic analysis program. A map showing the
location and amount of rainfall throughout the gaged area can be produced with
a time resolution of 10 minutes, and a spatial resolution of 2.25 square miles.
A typical rainfall map is shown in Figure 2.
Another program used during flood detection operations analyzes the
recurrence interval of the basin average rainfall, estimates resulting stream
flow and its recurrence interval, and provides "what if" outputs based on
projection of the present rainfall rates over 3 and 12 hour periods. More
sophisticated hydrologic analysis routines are currently in the development and
testing stages.
The STORRM system allows simultaneous operation of a simulated event along
side real time data collection. This feature provides an excellent training
and testing tool. A simulation database can be developed to represent any type
of storm event und outcome. System users can then be given free use of the
various analytic tools, as well as simulated inputs from other sources such a
radar, to gain experience in use of the system or to sharpen their decision
making skills.
~~~r:.~~~<:.~_~~~~_t_~~_~~t_~111.

The system has been in place for several threshold events. While use of
STORRM has not led to a decision to warn the public, there have been several
occasions on which issuance of warnings was avoided only as a result of the
remote rainfall data available at the flood detection center.
The system has been exercised one to three times annually for testing and
training purposes, and has entered the mobilization phase on real events with
about the same frequency. As far as they have gone, the real events have
confirmed the experiences of the simulated events, and this has increased
confidence in the system. Direction and guidance for operational refinements
and future development have come primarily from the organized critiques held
after each use of the system.
Future efforts will focus on increasing the automation of data analysis in
order to reduce the number of people required to staff the detection operation.
Likewise, further automation of the warning process will reduce staffing
requirements for dissemination of warning. These staffing reductions will
produce corresponding reductions in the required mobilization time, which in
turn will improve the timeliness of warnings.

STORRM
INTERVAL
RAINFALL MAP
Report Parameters

Date: 06/12186
Duration: 00:10
Start: 09:45
End: 09:55
Matrix Files Used:
ITVL97.SEQ

O.. td

LEGEND
no rain
trace rain

up to 0.03 inches
up to 0.10 inches
up to 0.20 inches

o

up to 0.30 inches

Ned.tl.ncf

more than 0.30 inches

FIGURE 2

WARNING SYSTEMS IN THE 1985 CHEYENNE FLASH FLOOD
John H. Sorensen
Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Introduction
Over the past 20 years, an average of 163 people have died in flood events in
the United States (Natural Hazard Observer, 1986). These have primarily resulted
from flash flooding. The year 1985 proved to be no exception; 166 people lost
their lives. Despite a decade of experience since the catastrophic Big Thompson,
Colorado, flood, yearly fatalities have not decreased significantly. During this
period, our understanding of human response to warnings has increased greatly
(Perry et al., 1981; Mileti and Sorensen, 1986). Even with this increase in
knowledge and improved warning technology, fatalities continue to occur.
The purpose of this research is to analyze the warning efforts in the 1985
Cheyenne, Wyoming, flood in which 11 persons were direct victims of the flash
flooding. Early reports attributed these fatalities to a poor warning effort in
which a tornado warning was issued just prior to a flash flood warning. As a
result, this research sought to identify the warning procedures implemented and to
investigate the role that the warning played in contributing to the fatalities.

Warning Content and Dissemination
August 1, 1985, began as a typical summer day in Cheyenne. People listening
to the weather forecasts for the day heard that it would become partly cloudy in
the afternoon with widely scattered thunderstorms, possibly with high winds and
hail. The chance of rain was 20%. As the evening hours arrived, it would become
cloudy and the chance of thundershowers would increase to 50%. This forecast was
reaffirmed at 12:50 P.M. when the National Weather Service (NWS) issued a Severe
Thunderstorm Watch which was in effect until 8:00 P.M. Warning information and
recommended protective actions were issued by the National Weather Service for the
remainder of the day. This information was transmitted to the public from the NWS
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in three ways. First, it went out over weather wire teletype to the media for
general broadcast. Second, it was broadcast over NOAA weather radio. Third, all
warnings were relayed to the Cheyenne Civil Defense by a 911 telephone call. The
Civil Defense then disseminates the information over cable television using an
interrupt system which reaches about 20,000 homes in Cheyenne, over MUZAK, a commercial music service which is broadcasted in about 100 commercial and office
buildings in Cheyenne, and over the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) radio. As
the storm developed, standardized NWS information went out to the public alerting
them to possible high winds, hail and heavy rains, and advising them to listen for
further information.
At 6:20 P.M., the situation was upgraded to a Severe Thunderstorm Warning
indicating that the storm had hit. People were advised to seek reinforced shelter
and to listen for more information. At 7:20 a Tornado Warning was issued due to a
sighting west of town. Peo~le were advised to go to a basement shelter or
interior room and to abandon cars and mobile homes if "in the path" of the tornado. At 7:40 the public was told that the tornado has touched ground and to prepare to take cover. At 7:50 the position of the tornado was confirmed. At this
time the NWS issued the first information to the public about the possibility of
"minor flooding." At 7:55 the Civil Defense sirens were sounded to alert the
public of the tornado. They continued for 20 to 30 minutes. Tornado warnings
were broadcast on cable television override, MUZAK, and EBS radio as well as
other radio stations.
At about the same time (7:48 P.M.), the NWS received a report from a weather
observer in Western Hills of 3.5 inches of rain. This was the first indication
that the amount of rain falling may lead to severe flooding. Minutes later the
NWS received radio reports of flooding on Dry Creek. As a result, they issued a
Flash Flood Warning at 8:00 P.M. and advised people to seek high ground. Cars and
trucks were reported to be floating down Dry Creek. After receiving a call over
the 911 line at 8:00 P.M. from the NWS, the Civil Defense issued the flash flood
warning on cable television override, MUZAK, and EBS radio. Warning messages
began reaching the general public by 8:05 P.M. At 8:35 P.M. the severity of the
situation was confirmed. The NWS described the storm as being extremely
dangerous, and reported extensive flash flooding. People were advised to go to
high ground and to stay indoors. Driving was described as dangerous. The head
of the Cheyenne NWS Office broad casted this information directly over one of the
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local radio stations. Other local radio stations as well as the Denver television stations announced the warning and various severe weather statements which
updated the warning. At 9:00 P.M., the NWS issued another Severe Thunderstorm
Warning until 10:00 P.M. telling people creeks were flooding and not to drive.
At 9:40 P.M., a new threat developed when a dam west of town on Crow Creek
was reported to be in danger of collapsing. This prompted another Flash Flood
Warning at 10:00 P.M. Extensive flooding and cars in high water clogging intersections were reported. Throughout the remainder of the night people were told to
be alert for more flooding and to remain inside. At 12 midnight the warning was
extended until 4:00 A.M., although precipitation had ended. At 3:55 A.M., it was
announced that the warning would end at 4:00 A.M.; shortly thereafter the first
reports of possible fatalities were issued to the public.
Institut ional War'nings Activities
National Weather Service
The manifestation of two discrete hazardous events from the same storm presented the NWS and local emergency organizations with several real problems. The
NWS was much more concerned with the tornado situation as several years earlier a
tornado devastated a large area on the north side of the city. Flash flooding, on
the other hand, was not viewed as a large problem in Cheyenne. As a result the
forecasters were much more alert for detecting and warning of a tornado than a
flood. Flash flood guidance for the day received from the NWS Kansas City Office
called for a maximum 2.7 inches of rain. This is not generally a level that would
cause a concern for a potential flood threat. At 8:00 P.M., when flooding began
to occur, only 1.5 inches of rain had fallen at the airport, which was not enough
to predict that major flooding would occur. The first indicator of a flash flood
potential was the weather observer's report, which occurred almost simultaneously
with the landing of the tornado. An automated upstream rain gauge would have provided some additional warning time. A slightly earlier indication of major
flooding would have allowed more coordination for issuing a dual hazard warning
and, thus, avoided the confusing information dissemination process. The NWS,
despite the confusing circumstances, acted quickly to change the warning from a
tornado to a flash flood. Their redundant communications insured that the message
went directly and rapidly to local emergency officials.
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Local Emergency Organizations
Like the NWS, the local Civil Defense, police and sheriff office's were not
geared for flash flood warnings. They, too, were more concerned about the
possible tornado threat. Furthermore, the major flooding problems had come from
overbanking on Crow Creek and not flash floods on Dry Creek. When a flood has
occurred on Crow Creek, the Civil Defense had a good understanding of how to
respond, given past experiences. No plan or understanding existed about how to
respond to a flood on Dry Creek.
When the NWS called in the flash flood warning, the Civil Defense acted
quickly to change the messages that were disseminated to the public. No time was
spent on deciding whether or not to go with the new warning despite the radically
different protective actions required. When communications were lost, the initial
warnings had been disseminated by media. No attempts were made by law enforcement
agencies after being notified of the flood to warn the public in the Dry Creek
area with loudspeakers or go door-to-door. As waters rose on Crow Creek the
police assisted in evacuating residents of low-lying areas without difficulties.
Shortly after getting the initial flood warning out, water began to leak into
the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Workers sealed the doors the best they
could using blankets. ~y 8:30 P.M., water was ankle deep inside the EOC but 4 ft.
high outside the doors. At 8:45 P.~1., water from the sewer began to fill the
generator room. A decision was made quickly to evacuate the EOC due to fear of
electrocution. At g:OO P.M., the EOC was closed and operations were moved to the
County Commissioners' Offices. Since radios would not work out of this office, a
mobile communications van was set up outside and communications were reestablished. A short time later (9:45-10:00), the transformer in the police building
failed and the EOC was forced to evacuate because of the loss of power.
Communications were not reestablished until midnight.
This series of failures and relocation had two important effects on the
issuance of warnings. The major impact was that it refocused the attention of the
Civil Defense from the external problems of the flooding to maintaining their own
internal capabilities. As a result, the Civil Defense spent their time attempting
to restore operations and could not maintain vigilant attention to the flood.
Second, it physically removed the main communications system (911 phone) for coordination during an emergency. This removed the capability for central command and
i nformat i on exchange. Informat i on from 1aw enforcement personnel work i ng in the
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field could not be fed back to an organization or individual with a global picture
of the emergency. This likely hampered the distribution of resources and
constrained the ability to update warning messages to the public.
Public Response
There is little doubt that the almost simultaneous development of dual
hazards and warnings presented an ambiguous situation to the public. Many residents reported that they were confused by the situation. Some residents in the
Dry Creek area apparently received warnings of the flood just before being inundated. Others learned when water came pouring into basements after they had
sheltered following the tornado warning. Many had to flee quickly to avoid the
rising waters. Some people seeking shelter in basements may have detected the
flooding earl ier' than if they had been upstairs. Others at risk in their homes
heard no flood warnings and were trapped by rising waters until emergency workers
could rescue them. On Crow Creek, residents were more alert to flooding and
received adequate warning to take protective actions. When the tornado warning
was issued, people in trailer parks in the Crow Creek area evacuated to a nearby
community college. This removed people from some low-lying areas that eventually
fl ooded.
Following the flood, public criticism surfaced regarding how some business
and commercial organizations handled the warning dissemination. People in stores,
malls and movie theaters complained of not receiving warnings of the tornado, the
flood, or both. This lack of warning likely contributed to some fatalities. This
paucity of action was not universal. One store, for example, reportedly locked
its doors until the nature of the flooding was established and customers could be
notifi ed.
The Warning System and Fatalities
Eleven persons drowned in the August 1st flood. Of these, ten were
automobile-related (Table 1). An early rumor suggested that people drowned
because of the confusing warnings which first told people to shelter in their
basements and then to seek high ground. Only one victim possibly died because of
basement sheltering. In this case, the evidence is inconclusive. The victim was
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an elderly woman at home and alone at the time. Her house was not in a flood
plain nor in a minor drainage system. The basement flooded due to heavy overland
sheet flow. It is possible that she sheltered due to the tornado warning and was
trapped by a door which stuck shut, or, alternatively, fell and could not escape.
Equally feasible is that she may have gone to the basement to determine if it was
flooding and been trapped or fell. Regardless of the cause, this case underscores
several points regarding vulnerability to disaster. One is that people who are
alone at the time of disaster are more vulnerable because they have no one to
assist them if they are in danger. Second, the elderly are often less physically
able to respond in rapid-onset and/or life-threatening circumstances.
As in the Austin, Texas, flood in 1981 (Moore et aT., 1982) and the Big
Thompson, Colorado, flood of 1976 (Gruntfest, 1977), deaths came because people
attempted to traverse the flooding stream. Table 1 lists the locations along a
mile long section of Del Range where vehicles attempted to cross Dry Creek, were
swept into the channel flow, and some occupants drowned. At the time they went
in, the seriousness of the flooding was not readily apparent. Dips in the road
over culvert crossings made it difficult to estimate the depth of the flood waters
which were probably 3 to 4 feet over the road hed of the crossing, but likely
looked lower. Most fatal ities occurred between 10:00 and 11:00 P.M. which was
likely the time of peak flood discharge. Six of the victims were under 20, and,
of these, four were under ten. One of the dead included a sheriff's officer who
was attempting to rescue a young girl after he had successfully saved her parents.
He and the child were swept away when the line he was attached to broke. The nine
victims were in six cars and one truck. In four of these same vehicles, a total
of eight persons survived because they were pulled out of the water by rescue
workers or swam to safety by themselves. All were teenagers or adults.
From what sketchy evidence we have, it seems that of the seven vehicles in
which fatalities occurred, only one of the parties had likely received a strong
warning message. In the remaining vehicles people may have received information
over the radio while in their vehicles but the warning was likely not strong or
perhaps specific enough to prevent them from travelling across the creek to reach
a safe destination. As mentioned, some of these people had been at a movie at a
nearby shopping mall and received no announcement regarding the flash flood.
Given the time of the deaths, which occurred at least two hours after the first
flash flood announcement, it is clear that the tornado warning played no role in
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causing the flood fatalities. Warning messages regarding the dangers of driving
were being disseminated as early as 8:30 P.M. Either this information did not
reach some people who were driving or was unsuccessful in preventing them from
engaging in what proved to be maladaptive behaviors.
Comparision With the Big Thompson Flood
The Cheyenne experience was similar in many respects to that of the Big
Thompson flood but different in others. In both instances, floods were rare
events and had not been experienced by many at risk. In both cases, the warning
came late in the stage of the event; many received no "official" warning but were
alerted instead by suddenly rising water. In both events, some people underestimated the gravity of the situation.
The floods differed in that the Big Thompson was a more severe flood, having
a much greater flow volume and velocity. The Big Thompson flood also occurred in
a narrow canyon, while the Cheyenne flood was in a low-flow creek bed. The former
event impacted people living or vacationing in the canyon while the latter
occurred in a residential and commercial area of the city.
The fl oods we re simil ar with respect to vi ct imi zat ion. In both events,
people who sought higher ground when the waters hit survived. In both events,
people died in their automobiles. At Big Thompson many were attempting to evacuate. At Cheyenne, many were just attempting to drive home. In both cases,
ignorance of the flood severity, the lack of warnings and the lack of specific
warning information contributed to the deaths by automobile.
At Big Thompson, fatalities occurred because people failed to leave structures or did so too late and were swept away. This did not happen at Cheyenne.
The difference is likely attributable to the difference in severity and speed of
onset of the flood waters and land use. Few structures in Cheyenne were in the
floodway and few sustained heavy structural damage. When water flooded buildings,
people were able to escape without going through the high velocity flows.
Implications
The experience at Cheyenne and the comparision to the Big Thompson event
point out several lessons for improving flood warning systems. First, Cheyenne

Sorensen

181

illustrates the difficulty in warning the public of two hazards occurring at
almost the same point in time. This was further complicated by the radically different nature of protective actions desirable for floods and tornados. At the
time of the incident, no guidance in NWS operating procedures existed on how to
handle the situation. In retrospect, the NWS personnel were quick to adjust and
get the flood warnings out. Their messages could have been improved, however, by
telling people why the tornado was no longer a problem and then proceeded to focus
the public's attention on flooding. Guidance on handling concurrent events and
closely spaced subsequent threatening events would be of use in future situations.
Second, this study reconfirms the problem of warning people who are not at
home at the time of an emergency. In the Cheyenne case, it was primarily moviegoers and shoppers. At Big Thompson, it was campers. Ways in which such populations can be alerted and given adequate warning information needs further
attention. Third, this study shows that while the problem of vehicles in flash
floods are known from events like the Big Thompson, solutions to the problem have
not been fully developed and implemented. General types of public information on
hazards are not likely to be the solution because flash floods are infrequent
events and often in locations where the public does not perceive a risk.
Fourth, the experience at Cheyenne shows that while progress has been made in
improving warning messages, they are still not as effective as they could be.
More forceful and informative statements could have been made. This finding
suggests that the NWS should review their standardized warning statements in light
of current knowledge about message effectiveness.
Fifth, the experiences of the Cheyenne flood point out the desirability of
and need for redundant communications and coordinations capabilities in a warning
system. In this case, removal of central communications also removed centralized
leadership. This contributed to the difficulties experienced with maintaining a
warning during the peak flooding. Steps to insure adequate backup communications
should be taken by state and local emergency organizations.
Sixth, while plans may not be highly useful in some emergencies, the lack of
planning for a flash flood was evident in both disasters. The experience of going
through a planning process for floods could have reduced the amount of time
required to learn what was needed to be done and by whom. Even with communications problems, planning would have enabled individual organizations to
function more efficiently on their own and deliver more effective warnings.
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Table 1
Information On Flood Victims

Age

Sex

73

F

?

2

33

M

3

18

4

No.

Time of
Day

Activity

location

In basement; reason
unknown

400 W7th
Ave

10:45

Rescue work

Ridge Road

M

10 to
10: 30

Going home from
movie

Ridge Road

16

F

10 to
10: 30

Going home from
movie (with 3)

Ridge Road

5

6

F

10:45

In van with parents

Ridge Road

6

7

F

10:15

Riding home from
movie with parents

Ridge Road

7

17

F

Probably driving home

Ridge Road

8

3

F

Riding home with
parent

Ridge Road

g

59

M 10:45

Oriving truck

Windmill

10

27

F

10:40

Driving home

Mountain

11

5

M

10:40

Riding home with
parent (10)

Mountain

10:30

MINNESOTA NETWORK FOR DISASTER STRESS INTERVENTION
Joseph Huber
American Red Cross
St. Paul and Minneapolis Chapters
When mental health services are provided in any organized sense, they are
usually set up after a particular disaster has occurred. This means that services
are relatively unplanned and can be expected to leave out parts essential to a well
rounded service. The Minnesota Network for Disaster Stress Intervention (MNDSI) is
an attempt to produce a practical plan for the delivery of mental health services
during the time of disaster.
The Network
Nearly two years ago, a Galaxy Airline charter flight from the Twin Cities to
Reno, Nevada, crashed on take-off from Reno. All but one passenger were killed.
There were minimal mental health services provided at the time of the incident for
family and friends living in the Twin Cities area. Six months later, many different
groups independently thought of how to provide the needed services for the survivors
of this crash and for disasters in general. In their discussions, these groups
discovered each other and met in July, 1985. MNDSI was an idea whose time had come.
The mission statement agreed upon at the first meeting in July of 1985 stated
that the purpose of MNDSI would be to "develop a service system and coordinated
network for the prevention, early identification, and treatment of psychological
problems subsequent to disaster. This is intended to serve victims, survivors,
disaster workers, and their families." Even though this statement was written about
a year ago, new implications for service are still surfacing and the group continues
to update and expand the plan. The kind and extent of services being planned are
much larger than ever envisioned at the start.
The original plan called for MNDSI to serve the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area.
This includes the two core counties of Hennepin and Ramsey, containing the major
cities of Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Bloomington, and five counties that surround
the core counties: Anoka, Washington, Dakota, Scott and Carver. These seven
counties make up the traditional metro area. The two counties containing the
state's two nuclear power plants are also being included in the service area.
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During its second year, MNDSI hopes to expand on the Twin Cities "model" to form a
true statewide network. MNDSI will make use of the overlap of the Red Cross's major
regional chapters and the Community Mental Health System for the basis of this plan.
The original conception of the mental health service system was that it be part
of a larger disaster service delivery system, such as a state or regional civil
defense system. After consideration of these systems, the Red Cross, with its
delivery system of Family and Nursing Services, seemed a more appropriate choice.
It is the agency that provides shelters, social service centers, feeding stations,
and nursing stations, all places where disaster victims would gather. A second
reason for being part of a larger, recognized service delivery system, is the need
for adequate and recognized identification. For access to disaster sites and
control of mental health services providers, use of the auspices of a known disastel'
agency provides instant recognition to victims and workers alike.
The Plan
Before the Disaster
In planning for disaster response, MNDSI took many things into consideration.
For instance, there are many agencies, public and private, who are involved in
disaster work and could benefit from education about mental health services, who
they are for, how they work, where to find them. These agencies include county and
local emergency preparedness, National Guard, county and local law enforcement,
fire, and emergency medical service personnel, coroners and funeral directors.
MNDSI works as a parallel service to the Family Services and Nursing Services
already provided by the Red Cross. The pre-existing services have their own
independent operating systems, from the Family Service and Nursing Officers at the
disaster headquarters down to the supervisor and workers at each site. Mental
health staffing has been added at each level of these systems, necessitating the
inclusion of three social services where there were two.
MNDSI is maintaining a library with books and articles dealing with the effects
of disaster on mental health. An annotated bibliography of these resources will be
made available to all members.
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Volunteer Mental Health Workers
There are several functions that have to be completed with regard to the
recruitment,training, and supervision of volunteer mental health workers.
Screening. MNDSI determined that volunteer mental health workers should be
screened as to their education and training, experience in crisis and disaster
counseling, special skills (e.g., second language, ability to sign), standing in the
professional community, and knowledge of professional ethics. Job functions and
standard qualifications have been written and sent out to many mental health
organizations and associations for recruitment of disaster volunteers. (Available
upon request is the application and screening form.)
Training. The two major areas needing coverage in volunteer training are:
general disaster orientation and functions, and mental health effects and their
treatment for people in time of disaster. Many mental health workers, even those
with extensive crisis experience, may have never experienced a disaster either as a
worker or victim. They may have only a vague notion of what victims and workers
experience. It is not the intention of MNDSI to have volunteers go through a kind
of "culture shock" when they are trying to provide services. Volunteers need to be
aware of what it is like to work in an area where there can be extensive human and
environmental or property destruction. Also, the need to know how to work with the
inter- and intra-agency operations involved in any disaster is essential. Often,
these operations appear from the outside to be a disaster all by themselves.
Crisis workers may not know what to expect in terms of intensity and diversity
of outcome of mental health reactions of people during times of disaster. Training
in disaster-caused mental health problems, symptoms, course and treatment (short and
long term) are part of the MNDSI training package. Also, problems may differ with
different classes of people. MNDSI has set up a working group to consult with
different classes of people. MNDSI has set up a working group to consult with
representatives of special needs populations, such as children, elderly, disabled,
and minorities. It is the intent of the group to identify as many special concerns
as possible in working with these higher risk populations.
The Service System
There are four major functions for which volunteer mental health workers will
be recruited: assessing needs, coordinating services, on-site supervision, and onsite counseling. This system dovetails with the current Red Cross Family and
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Nursing Service structure. Following is a listing of the job functions and their
duties.
Needs assessment. This worker may go out with the Red Cross "windshield"
survey team to assess the amount of damage, size and number of disaster sites, and
estimate number of people affected. This assessment occurs very early in the
recovery from a disaster. The information gathered is used to determine the number
and location of on-site workers. The needs assessor should have experience in
direct service, administration, and a working knowledge of the local mental health
service system.
Coordinator. This person has the major responsibility for all mental health
activities during (and perhaps after) the disaster. The coordinator obtains
information from the needs assessor and Red Cross Job Director, decides which
locations will be staffed, which workers will be called, establishes a schedule for
workers, provides referrals for ongoing services and coordinates with Red Cross
Family Service, Nursing, and outside mental health agencies. The coordinator's
qualifications include being a mental health professional with experience in crisis
intervention and direct service, supervision, and administration of services. An
extensive knowledge of the local mental health resources is essential.
On-site counselor (direct service volunteer. These workers have the responsibility of providing direct mental health service to victims and emergency workers.
Counselors should be mental health professionals with crisis counseling and direct
service experience. In some cases, the on-site supervisor or counselor may provide
outreach services through off-site home visits.
A computerized file of all volunteers, their skills,job description, location,
and availability exists with 24-hour access and hard copies provided to all coordinators. There is a phone-tree network set up for rapid access to volunteers.
After a Disaster
After the disaster, MNDSI moves into a new phase of operations amounting to a
review of services at several different levels.
Debriefing. After each disaster there is an indepth debriefing of the mental
health service. this debriefing then becomes part of the overall critique of Red
Cross services provided during the disaster.
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Case review. All Red Cross cases (mental health and otherwise) are reviewed
for completeness before each case is closed. This includes checking on whether
clients accepted referrals and if the referrals were appropriate and helpful.
Case review brings up one problem that MNDSI is still grappling with. It deals
with the issue of how to make referrals for ongoing treatment services beyond the
crisis intervention period of approximately three days. Mental health services
provided during a disaster are free of charge provided by volunteer professionals
who make their livelihood doing these services at other times. They will find it
very difficult to provided ongoing services to those who need it on that same free
basis. Community resources which normally have long waiting lists, may not be able
to handle any overload a disaster could create in a timely manner. Insurance
companies, HMOs and Medical Assistance (federal program for low income clients) tend
not to pay for the treatment of symptoms normally seen in a disaster (including
post-traumatic stress syndrome and adjustment and stress reactions). As the free
services are used up or overbooked and the fee-charging services do not want to pay,
referrals for clients can become difficult.
There are three other services MNDSI is considering providing to Red Cross
volunteers and other emergency workers.
•

Preventive education. Sessions for emergency workers about the
causes, symptoms and alleviation of stress on the job.

•

Debriefing.
shi ft.

•

EAP. Possibly providing Employee Assistance Program-like services
for volunteer workers who would not have access to an EAP through
their employer.

Providing personnel to debrief workers as they come off

MNDSI has also prepared generic handouts for the media which detail victim information, symptoms of stress and the need for appropriate community response toward
disaster victims. As some of the public are very sensitive about being stigmatized
by the use of mental health services, "stress" and "stress counseling" are the terms
used in media releases. MNDSI has trained spokespersons who handle contact with the
media.

LESSONS FROM AUSTRALIAN WARNING EXPERIENCE
John W. Han dmer
Australian National University
Edmund C.

P~n~ing-Rowsell

Middlesex Polytechnic

£lO_~(LWarning

in Australia:

The Last Ten Years

The last decade has been a frustrating period for those involve'"! in flood
It is ten years since a major inquiry into the federal
warnings in Australia.
Bureau of Meteorology, an organisation with national stat:ltYy
the meteorological

aspects

"~~ponsibility

for

of flood warnings and which provides river height

forecasts for many major streams in eastern

AtJst.r~l i

a.

The inquiry recofTJfTJcnderl

that the Bureau's flood warning functions be handed to the states (::[W1, 197fi).
But, the states showed little enthusiasm, and in the absence of firm action I)y
the federal government the situation has been uncertain ever since.
The

uncertainty created by indecision

available for warning systems.

of funding available to the Bureau.
needed immediately
flood

has effectively reduced the funds

This is greatly exacerbated by the general level
The Bureau estimates that some AS50D,OOO is

(ie for the 1986-87 fiqancial year) to replace and upgrade

forecasting equi pment.

To put thi s request in

perspecti ve the 1985-86

capital allocation to the organisation's flood warning program was approximately
A$50,OOO. Fortunately, the Bureau's fortunes may be about to change. A recent
report by the Australian House of Representativ~s' Standing Committee on
Expenditure

(1986:x)

urges

that

the

government

Meteorology's accelerated re-equipment plan.
upgrade of the Bureau's basic infrastructure".

"endorse

the

Bureau

of

The plan will enable a long overdue
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Admini strati ve Arrangements
Despite

its

central

position

in

Australian

floor!

involvement varies greatly between states and territories.

warning

the

1ureau's

In general the Bureau

provides quantitative and qualitative river height warnings in the four eastern
states,

and

generalised

warnings

based

on

weather

predictions

Australia (WA), South Australia (SA) and the Northern Territory (NT).

for

Western

To a large

extent this emphasis correlates well with the extent and severity of i:l1e floorl
problem.

However, even within the eastern states arrangements vary greatly.

Queensland

(Qld)

the

Bureau

not

only

makes

river

disseminates them to the police and media as -,o/ell.

height

predictions,

In
but

It is important to note that

the federal government, through the Bureau, pays for this additional service.
the other hand the Bureau's role in Victoria is relatively limiter!.

On

Although the

Bureau issues flood warnings for Melbourne to the :nedia it is simply pussing on
forecasts generated hy the r~elhourne and Metropolitan Boarrl of '10rks (MMBW).
Clearly the inequity in servi ce provi si on and thus resource allocati on is an
important issue.
The roles of other components in
greatly.

the floorl e:nergency services also vary

Generally the Bureau and State E,nergency Services (SES) issue warnings

through the media often in collaboration with local authorities, and the SES a'1d
police contact the pUblic directly.
South Wales

(NSW)

all

However, this varies, for example i'1 New

precise (river

height) warni'1gs are issued by the SES

following ge'1eral alerts from the Bureau.

Table 1 shows that the Bureau has '10

monopoly over issuing war'1ings, a'1d that in some jurisdictio'1s the disseminatio'1
arrangements involve a mixture of organisations.
Local or community warning systems for flash flooding from urban creeks anrl
storm sewers are poorly developed and need attention.

A questio'1naire

survey

of

22

key

professionals,

:nainly

scientists

anr!

engineers, working in Australia's flood forecasting and warning systems helped to
establish the issues.

The survey was undertake'1 at a workshop on flood warni'1gs

Table 1:

Flood warnings arrangements in Australia

ACT

QLD
Hydromet.
data
collection
&. fO'"t!cast
preparation:

BaM &. LAs.

BaM, SES & LAs.

SES " LAs flood
functions often
merge oue to
cross
appointments.

VIC

RoM &. ~C
joint 1y predi ct
flows.

NT

TAS

Rwe provi des
data where
it operates

HEC provi des
some of the
riata to !kiM.

DEWS.

PWD.

Poli ceo

PWD
to
SES.

Police
to
SES •

storag~s.

Coords with
flaM.

MMBW opel'" at es
the Melbourne
system.
Warnin9
BaM" LAs
dissenl1natlon: issue warning
to police
.!, med1 a.
~major

resource
commi tment
by BoM.

Preliminary
warnings from
BaM to media
sES etc.

Bo"1 .\.

~C?

to SES, Police
" others.

Preci se pre~
di ct ion are all
issued througrl
SES.

Where Rwe
has stOl"'ages it
generates
warnings in
coord with BaM.
floM issues
warnings to
publi c, media.
and SES. Some
LAs provide
interpr-et fve
serv1 ces.

BaM provides all !'JEWS
pf"imary warnings to
to the media.
SES.
Police" SES also
pass on warnings
with local
interpretive info.

MMBW 1ssues
warnings to SES
~

B~.

BoM

issues them to
the media.
Abbrevi Jt io'ls
BaM
LA
SES
DHC
RWC
MMBW
HEC
DEWS
PWLJ

Bureau of Meteorology
Local authority
State (or territory) Emergency Service
Department of Housing and Construction (federal)
Rural Water COllTTli ssion (Victori a)
Melhourne and Metropolitan Board of Works
Hydro Electric COllTTlission
Department of Engineering i!l'i0 Water Supply (South Australia)
PUblic Works Department (Western Australia)

1.

Arlditional bodies are involved in NSW.
The River Murray Cormdssion issues flooo pr'edictlor'lS fOt' the lower
Murray.
The Water Resources Commission provides information from the storages it operates and the Snowy
Mountains Authority provides a local service.

2.

Bo"1 is to take over much of the responsibility over the next two years.

in Australia held at CRES, ANU February, 1986.
and Tasmania were not represented.

The states of Western Australia

Results of the survey are reported in full in

Pennin9-Rowsell and Handmer (1986a).
Instituti onal Change
The dominant result is that of a question asking what single action woulrl rio
Near ly two thirds of the
most to improve flood warnings in Austr aI i a.
respondents identified some form of institutional change as desirable,
principally:

clarification

of

the

roles

of

the

many

age1ci~.,

involved;

increasing the expertise within the Bureau through upgraded resources; or taking
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respon si bi 1ity for
reali stic
service

funding
(Table 2).

fl ood warni ngs away from the Commonwealth,
to enable the states
Even

if

and

this last

local

government

accompani eo by
to

provide the

option was implemented it

should be

reali sed that the Bureau would sti 11 he invol ved in flood warnings through its
meteorological function.
Table 2:

Analysis of the nominated 'single action' to improve the flood warning
situation in Australia.
PERCENTAGE

ACTION
1.

2.

3.

4.

INSTITUTIONAL/FUNDING
e.g. Clarify institutional arrangements
Clarify the role of the Bureau of Meteorology
Pass responsibility from Met. Bureau to States
POLICY ISSUES
e.g. Resolve policy vacuum
Establish flood warning

58%

21%
cost-~ff~ctjveness

PUBLIC NEEDS/RESPONSE ISSUES
e.g. Community preparedness
Public education on hazards

16%

OTHER ISSUES

5%
100%
•

-

u

_

A question on the three main issues in flood warning provided aoditil)nal
detail.

The Ileed for established and consistent institutional arrangements was

seen as particularly important in a field where operational efficiency can only
be tested rarely - during floods - and where administrative arrangements have to
be kept intact and effective for many years between such occasions.

Who pays for

flood warning services was a secondary issue but still central to the perceived
institutional
financial

deficiencies.

The general

vievlf/as that

a totally inadequate

allocation was being made to the implementation of new technology to

improve the flood forecasting service.

Other important issues concern the neeo

for better warning dissemination and pUblic preparedness.

Although these points

were not seen as important as the institutional/policy iss<les, they were stressed
in the final session of the Workshop.
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When the institutional
institutional
dominate.

issue was polarised into the technical

versus the

limitations to effective flood warning syste'ns the latter still

Only three respondents indicated that the key problems were technical

rather than institutional.

Those suggesting that technical problems are the most
techqic~l

important either emphasise t'le

difficulties in their ability to justify

expenditure to their political masters, and thus are referring to problems of
warning

system evaluaticl1,

or

stress that

technical

expertise is central

to

operating a flood warning system and that it must therefore be most important.
Sat is fact i on wit h

~i!!'_~ in 9

di ssemi ':.?~.i_<?~uarr an gemen t s

There was general sati sfaction with the warning di sse'nination arrangements
within all areas of Australia covered, although reservations ,'Jere expressed and
some respondents were definitely

~

happy

\~ith

their local arrangements.

Aho'Jt

tv/o thirds of the respondents felt that the present arrangements were "good" or
"sati sfactory".
difficulties
forecasters

The

main

experienced
to

the

weaknesses

in

the

communic~ting

in

public

through

present

technical

vario,]s

local

syste'ns
information
anrl

state

conce"'1

th"?

fro'Tl

til"?

govern,nent

organisations such as the police and the State Emergency Services (SES).

Worse,
some cases it appears that local personnel may not be involved at all.
Sometimes local decision-makers are 'j,);: I'eceiving the correct information, anrl
the public may not know what to do v/hen warned. Occasionally this may be rlue in
part to the lack of Bureau staff to undertak,~ till' ,,~cessary liaison activities
in

during

floods.

A different

problem occurs when

there

are competing floorl

forecasts wllere a local individual or group may i)'lillicise a different expected
flood height, in addii; i '1'1 to the official forecast, thus calisin'J (I)'lfusion.
This

last

problem has

become relatively

-/110:11,1110'1,

<11HI

one of the main

percei ved strengths of the present arrangement in some eastern states is that
forecasts now come from one authority (see Table 1).

Rapid communication was

another positive aspect, but the communication system is also a ,najor source of
problems due

to hreakdowns.

The main

suggestions

for

j'I1!l"I)velnents focus on

enhancing coorrlination between the various levels of goverq,nent.

An important

additional point was the need to provide education and infor.natiolj to everyone
involved - not just "the public".
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Lega 1 Li abil ity
An issue not mentioned by the interviewees but one which has been assuming

increasing importance in Australian flo01,)lolin management is the legal liability
of

local

government

(Handmer,

Some

1985).

states

have

passed

legislation

limiting the liability of local government for- fl,),)dplain ,nanagement decisions
and for advice given with r-espect to floods.

However, the extent of liahility is

unclear as there is insufficient case law in Australia (Partlett, 1986).
is

quite

possible

that

once

local

governments

be!c;\'q~

':~s:):)nsible

But, it
for

the

operation and maintenance! of flood warning systems they may be 1 iable for losses
associated with avoidable system failure.
Level of Technology
Largely because of a shortage of funds the level of technology employed by
the

Australian

countries.

Bureau

of

i~eteorology

is

lower

One needs to look beyond the reasonable

than

other

covl~r'age

t:l'~

f'ir:ilii:ies.

r-adar-s and a small

networ-k of

use of automatic weather stations to the age and reliability of
For-

example,

the

country now has

offshore automatic weather-

25

weather-

industrialised

:)y weather- r-adar- and

stations, but much of this equipment is obsolete,

unreliable and due for- replacement (Table 3). Not one r-adar is digitised so that
the data it collects can be transferred electronically.
Table 3:

Location and age of weather radars in Australid.'\ge in ye,il's is in
brackets (Button, 1986).
Dampier
Gove
Town svi 11 e-Ai r port
Carn ar von
Learmonth
Broome
Mt Kani ghan
___________ u

(new)
(n e\~)

(new)
(2)
(7)
(10)
(11)
u

Gl adstone
Townsvi lle-Mt Stuart
t1ackay
Darwi n
Sri sbane
Port Hedl and
Coli rn s
n_n

n

nn

(13)

(14)
(14)
(17)
( 17)
(18)
(23)
_

However, viewed nationally the picture is not as bad and is improving.

The

Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works runs a sophisticated flood warning
system for the city of Melbourne (some 3 million people) where warning times are
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very short, the federal 90vernment recently announced that it would make 'lloney
avai lable for local flood warning systems, some local governments are tal:i,]J the
initiative, and satellite imagery is widely employed.
Most respondents felt that technology had so far had only

influence

li,~ited

on flood warnings in Australia, although some stressed that there was potential
for

incr(~ilses

performance

Interestingly,
assessment,

these

implying

and

views
a

lack

investment in new technology.

pointed

were

not,

of

to
on

rigorous

Also, it was

minor
the

improvements

whole,

evaluation
doubt~d

based
of

wheth~r

th~

(Table

on

4).

systematic

potential

for

t!le 'ninor operational

improvements Obtained had been translated into improvements in public response.
The excepti ons were two respondents who

f~lt

t'lili; i;",chnology had rec",ntly made

very large contributions to improviilJ f1,)')'! "idrnings.

Both of these people

involved in areas with very short 'warning lead times:

one had recently

>t~r",

d~v",loped

a darn break warning system (Linforth, 1986), and the other is concerned with
urban

catchments where times of concentration

(Geise,nan,

1986).

weren't before".
high

technology

forecast.
Table 4:

Here

"in

are in the order of 2-4 hours

some cases warnings are now possible where they

These exceptions therefore highlight the logical ilpplication of
to

areas

where real

time data are essential

to providing a

Both cases receive funds from urban authorities.
Effect of new technology on the overall performance of flood warni<1g
systems

-----.-.--._---_ .. -------- - - Respoll s~

None/very little
Little/but has potential
Improvement (but qua I ifi ed)
Moderate**
Gr eat i mpr ovement
Don I t know

*
#

**

Systematic evaluation made
of technology's effects

5
4
4
1
2#

Yes

No

2
1

3
3
4
1

2*

3

Representing the fact that warning is now
previ ous ly
Both cases of short warning lead times
R~sp~ldellt had no operational field experience

possible

where

it

was

not
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We emphasise that the level of applied technology does not reflect badly on
the Bureau.

They simply have not had the resources.

But, they are developing

hardware for improved communication between field observers and central computers
and other equipment.
new

technolo~y

We need to consider the extent to which the application of

wi 11

!2-~~:_'1!s

of reduceE flood

highli~hts

the importance of

improve warning effecti veness

damages (Penning-Rowsell and Handmer, 19B6b).

This

establishing the cost-effectiveness of warning systems and of putting resources
into improving warning di sseminati on and co'n,nuni ty preparedness.
Concl usi on

-~------

Although

knowledge

in

many

areas of flood

forecasting

and

warni'1~5

'ViS

expanded in the last decade, indeed the available technology is vastly improved,
problems remain.

The main

lesson

from Australian

problems are dominantly of an institutional nature.
responsibility,
funding,

improvements

to

inter-agency

and the possibility of legal

experience is

that

these

They concern allocation of

co:n'nunication,

mechanisms

for

liability associated with local warning

systems.
Resolution of these problems and consequent improvement to warning syste,n
effectiveness

depends

on

political

decisions

concerning

the allocation of
responsibility and resources, improved communication and coo r rli'1dtio'i :)~i;,~een
emergency service agencies, and clarification of the legal position.
This may
require some statutory limitation of local government liability, as is already
the case for

floodplain

management in

emergency service agencies.

some states, and restructuring of the

Lack of available technology is not a major problem,

and apart from cases of short lead time such as dam failures and flooding from
urban creeks,

t'le application of new technology is not expected to make much

difference to

flood

warnings

apart

from

improving reliability.

;Iethods

for

assessing flood warning effectiveness in terms of flood damage reduction would
assi st the funding process.

Without doubt improvements are needed to warning

dissemination and public preparedness, but here the primary need is to find ways
of applying existing social science knowledge.
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This perhaps is how our understandln9 of miti9ation has changed.
flood

warnings

require

not

only

appropriate

technology

and

Effective

individual

and

community preparedness hut also a workable institutional framework.

The

authors

thank

the

US

National

Science

Foundation

for

funding

John Handmer's participation in this conference.
References
----Australian House of Representatives Standing Committee on Expenditure
1986
Gone \~ith the winds (Inquiry into '1eteorological
Canberra: na"lia'ne'1t of the Commonwealth of Austrilliil.
Button, J.
1986

Services).

"Senator Button tabled information on the Bureau of Meteorology".
Hansard. Senate 19 February: 656-657.

CIBM (Committee of Inquiry into the Bureau of Meteorology)
1976
Report of the Committee. Canberra: AGPS.
Gi eseman, M.
1986

"11elbour"e's flood warning system" in Smith, 0.1. & Handmer, J.W.
(eds).
Flood warni_~9 __ in Australia:.
insti~ll_t_ton5., pr)licies and
technology. Canberra: CRES, ANU.

Handmer, J."i.
1985
"Flood policy ,'eversal in New South Wales, Australia".
9(4) :279-285.
Linforth, S.
1986

1i-----sasters

"Development of a dam break warning Sj5te.n" in S:nith, ILl. &
Handmer, J.W. (eds).
Fl ood _~_a.r.~j ng i '1 Aus~C.?l:...:.i:::.a.:..: _...:.i'-',.ns.~ i tuti on s,
policies and technology. Canberra: eRES, ANU.

Par t 1ett, '). F•
~!iabili.!..!:' __ 9s~ects
1986
(Draft): CRES, ANU.

of

damfa_i.lure_~fl~ding.

Canberra

Penning-Rowsell, E.C. & Handmer, J.W.
a SUrV'ly of
1986a
Flood _•.forecasting _.~nd... ~'!~__ i~•. __Australia:
institutions and policies. Canberra: CRES, ANU (Working Paper).
Penning-Rowsell, E.C. & Handmer, J.W.
the
conceptual,
1986b
Evaluating
flood
warning
effectiveness:
melhod_o_l Og1 ca 1-- iiiia-- pr act 1ca I -re·seaC.c.h prob 1em:-- Can berr a:
CREs,
ANU (Working Paper 1986/6).

THE SOCIAL IMPACTS OF DISASTER HAPPENINGS
AND EMERGENCY SITUATIONS
C. Nelson Hostetter
Mennonite Disaster Service
Much has been researched, studied, and then written by the academic and
scholastic world on the Big Thompson Canyon flood and the general disaster and
emergency fields. The practitioners have benefited to greater and lesser degrees,
dependent on the practicality of the research, the effort to understand the results
of the studies, and the transfer of knowledge, also based upon the interest and the
level of application by those organizations and persons who operate and respond
after the fact.
Attention to the needs of the adversely affected individuals, families, and
suffering communities must be addressed carefully and comprehensively by the helping
agencies and dedicated personnel. As an organization, Mennonite Disaster Service
(MDS) was involved at Big Thompson for three days after the flood, in private
property cleanup, and up to a year and a half of repairs and reconstruction for
homes damaged or destroyed by the surprise storm and subsequent flood.
visited
our project and with the cooperating agencies on a quarterly basis during that time.
In general, I would summarize the recovery operations by governmental programs-federal, state, county and municipal--voluntary agencies such as American Red Cross
and ad hoc community organizations, and religious groups such as Salvation Army,
Church World Service National Programs, local interfaith and denominational
programs, all in concert and as a total team taking care of the situation with the
approved and available benefits and resources, as an above average accomplishment.
The individual disaster victim's needs must be given attention at the
individual level. Caseworkers should counsel in a careful, but direct conference.
The needs of families, when the circle is small or larger, must be adequately
covered after an evaluation of their immediate loss, their current resources, and
their future long-range benefits are all put together in a comprehensive package and
then assistance and help should be arranged. Allow me to state the extra dimension
that MDS adds in trying to rebuild a home, and not just a house. The suffering
communities should receive consideration for public assistance based on total loss
versus the ratio of population affected in the micro or macro situation, the income
status and wealth per capita of the affected community, and the solvency/insolvency
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ratio of the local, state, and federal governments. Of course, we are all aware of
the financial situation of the federal government, and are appalled at times when
the two senators and district congressmember and their staffs promise the "rainbow"
to the suffering communities, or ask for "pork barrel" programs and benefits.
MDS has focused its recovery efforts on private property cleanup, temporary and
permanent repairs for the elderly and underinsured, and reconstruction for low
income victims, disadvantaged minorities, and the handicapped. We have also made an
effort to train our long-term leaders and volunteers, and orient short-term and
rotating workers to understand personal emotional trauma and stress, to cope with
family strain and tenuous relationships, and perceive any negative dynamics and
counter-dynamics within the community, as well as positive communication
possibilities.
Allow me to add to this discussion that on a regional basis, MDS has been
involved and is available to disaster areas and programs for crisis counseling and
mental health support through 10 Mennonite Mental Health Service Centers in Canada
and the United States
The servanthood of MDS is motivated by religious concern and so, as persons
with conviction and as an organization with the belief that we should improve this
good world while we are privileged to live here, we also have a responsibility for
presenting spiritual issues and values. We assist first because of a need, and our
interest in service, and we are cautious not to convert or proselytize. However, as
we stay longer in a community and have the opportunity to work and serve directly
with individuals and families, we can communicate our common hope for their better
total lives and the rebuilding of community.
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HYDRDLOGIC RESEARCH RELATED TO THE 1976 BIG THOMPSON RIVER FLOOD, COLORADO
Robert D. Jarrett
U.S. Geological Survey
Abstract
A multidisciplinary study of precipitation and streamflow records and paleoflood
studies of channel features was made to analyze the flood hydrology of foothill and
mountain streams in the Front Range of Colorado, because conventional flood-frequency
analyses do not adequately characterize the flood hydrology. In the foothills of
Colorado, annual peak flows are caused by snowmelt at higher elevations in the
mountain regions, by rainfall at lower elevations in the plains and plateau regions,
or by a combination of rain falling on snow. Above an elevation of about 7,500 feet
(which varies slightly with major river basin), snowmelt rather than rain contributes
to the flood potential. Regional flood-frequency methods, supported by paleoflood
data, were developed that indicated the 1976 Big Thompson River flood has a recurrence
interval of at least 10,000 years.
Introduction
More than three-fourths of Colorado's population is concentrated along or near
foothills at the base of high mountains. Many foothill streams flow through scenic
canyons before flowing onto flat plains or plateaus. Because of the esthetic setting, development is increasing rapidly in these canyon areas. However, foothill
streams are subject to frequent and commonly destructive floods. Foothill streams
flood as a result of both excessive snowmelt and rainfall; historically, the most
destructive flooding results from "cloudburst-type" rainfall associated with severe
thunderstorms during the spring and summer.
Techniques used to determine flood characteristics for foothill streams are inadequate or unverified; thus, vastly differing results can be obtained from different
techniques of analyses using the same flood record. Because some floods result from
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snowmelt at higher elevations, whereas others result from intense rainfall at lower
elevations, available flood records for foothill streams are applicable only to the
specific collection site or to nearby sites on the same stream.
As a result of these problems and the potentially serious consequences, a
comprehensive, multidisciplinary project was undertaken to evalute the flood hydrology of foothill streams in Colorado (McCain and Ebling, 1979). On July 31, 1976, the
need for a study of this type was dramatically reinforced by the occurrence of the
devastating Big Thompson flood along the Front Range foothills (McCain and others,
1979). As much as 12 inches of rain fell on about 60 square miles of the drainage
area. The flood lasted only a few hours; but, during that time, it caused the loss
of 139 lives, and property damage estimated at $35 million. This paper provides an
overview of multidisciplinary studies of flood hydrology conducted by the U.S.
Geological Survey, which relate to the 1976 Big Thompson River flood.
This comprehensive study of streams in the foothills region of Colorado concentrated on: (1) An analysis of available streamflow and precipitation data, (2) the
use of paleohydrologic techniques in flood-hydrology studies, and (3) flood information-transfer techniques. A multidisciplinary study, in which the analysis of
available streamflow and precipitation data is complemented with geomorphic and
stratigraphic techniques commonly can answer questions about the flood hydrology of a
nearby area that has little available hydrologic data; generally, studies limited to
a single discipline cannot provide these answers.
Analysis of Streamflow Data
Typically, records from streamflow-gaging stations have been used to derive
flood-frequency characteristics for gaged sites. The predominant computation technique is to fit the log-Pearson Type-III frequency distribution (U.S. Interagency
Advisory Committee on Water Data, 1981) to the observed annual flood series. This
conventional hydrologic analysis fails to properly account for the mixed population
of rainfall-runoff and snowmelt-runoff peaks contributing to the total population of
flood peaks in the foothills region. As a result, the computed statistics are not
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correct and do not fit the data. Therefore, peak flows need to be separated
according to meteorological cause and a frequency analysis made on each distribution
(Crippen, 1978) to provide more reliable statistics describing the occurrence of
fl ood peaks.
Streamflow records of 69 unregulated streams in the South Platte River, the
Arkansas River, and the Colorado River basins were examined to determine peak discharges from snowmelt and rainfall runoff during each water year of record (Elliott
and others, 1982). Hydrograph shape and weather records were used to determine the
meteorologic source of runoff. Snowmelt-runoff peaks result from the seasonal
ablation of snowpack and they appear on the hydrographs as low peaks that fluctuate
diurnally. Rainfall-runoff peaks resulting from convective storms or from frontal
weather systems affect streamflow much more quickly and appear on the hydrographs as
rapidly increasing dhchilr°ge with relatively sharp peaks.
Methods described by the U.S. Interagency Advisory Committee on Water Data
(1981) were followed to determine the station flood-frequency curves, including
development of generalized skew coefficients for the rainfall-runoff and snowmeltrunoff peak-flow arrays. If the peak flows are classified according to meteorological cause, separate frequency curves for each meteorological cause or population
can be constructed and a composite flood-frequency curve can be created. Because the
snowmelt-runoff and the rainfall-runoff flood-frequency curves at a given station
each represent independent populations they can be combined by using the equation:
P (composite) = P (snowmelt) + P (rainfall) - P (snowmelt) x P (rainfall),
where P is the probability of occurrence (Crippen, 1978).
Flood-frequency relations representing snowmelt, rainfall, and composite peak flows
for two sites in the Big Thompson River basin are shown in figures 1 and 2.
Inspection of the plotted rainfall and snowmelt flood-frequency curves indicates which meteorological cause predominates at a station. The following comparison between a high- and a low-elevation streamflow-gaging station helps demonstrate
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Figure 1.

Flood-frequency curves for Big Thompson River at
Estes Park, Colorado.

that the change from snowmelt- to rainfall-dominated flooding is abrupt over a 2,200
feet range of elevation in about 15 miles (this distance would vary by basin). The
higher elevation (7,500 feet) Big Thompson River streamflow-gaging station at Estes
Park (fig. 1), with a drainage area of 137 square miles, is a snowmelt-dominated
stream with peak flows (runoff predominates) well in excess of the 100-year (0.01
probability) flood. In contrast, the lower elevation (5,300 feet) Big Thompson River
streamflow-gaging station at the mouth of a canyon near Drake (fig. 2), with a
drainage area of 305 square miles, is a rainfall-dominated stream with peak flows in
excess of the 2-year flood (0.50 probability) and a snowmelt-dominated stream only
for peak flows less than the 2-year (0.50 probability) flood.
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Figure 2,

Flood-frequency curves for Big Thompson River at
mouth of canyon, near Drake, Colorado.

Similar comparisons were made for all 69 stations; these comparisons indicate
that snowmelt runoff dominates above an elevation of about 7,500 feet (elevation
varies slightly with major river basin). Above this elevation, rainfall generally
does not contribute to floods having a recurrence interval of less than 100 years
(0.01 probability of occurrence). Below about 7,500 feet, rainfall-produced peak
flows predominate.
Streamflow data from the South Platte River basin in the Colorado Front Range
(one area of the foothill study region) indicate that snowmelt floods predominate
above 7,500 feet. This elevation limit varies slightly by major river basin. Where
rainfall does contribute to floods above about 7,500 feet, discharges per unit
drainage area are extremely small, compared with lower-elevation floods resulting
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from rainfall. In basins above 7,500 feet, large floods initially attributed to
intense rainfall, that were investigated and used in rainfall-runoff-derived floodhydrology studies, were, in fact, debris flows (which are commonly caused by snowmelt
or low to moderate rainfall) and not waterfloods (Costa and Jarrett, 1981). A debris
flow is a gravity-induced rapid mass movement of a body of granular solids, water, and
air. Debris typically cO;lstitutes 70% to 80% or more, by weight, of the flow. Use
of debris-flow data in flood hydrology studies leads to inaccurate and extremely
overestimated estimates of rainfall and flood discharge.
Analysis of Precipitation Data
Precipitation records indicate that large rainstorms frequently occur far below
an elevation of about 7,500 feet. Miller and others (1984) list many storms in Colorado, including the 1938 Spring Canyon storm near Fort Collins, the 1938 Missouri
Canyon storm near Masonville, the 1948 Fort Collins storm, the 1948 Tucker Gulch
storm at Golden, and the 1975 Big Thompson River Canyon storm, all resulting from
intense thunderstorms. However, documented floods resulting from intense rainfall
are practically nonexistent above about 7,500 feet. Streamflow and precipitation
records for the Big Thompson River flood indicate that precipitation was small above
7,500 feet except around isolated mountain peaks. Several studies that have evaluated higher elevation precipitation in Colorado support the conclusion that snowmelt
floods predominate above 7,500 feet.
Henz (1974), in an analysis of Lamar, Colorado, radar imagery of summer thunderstorms, found that a thunderstorm's hot spots originate at or below 7,500 feet and
generally move easterly into the plains. Hansen and others (1978), in their study
of the climatography of the Colorado Front Range, report that all large floodproducing rainstorms east of the Continental Divide occurred below 7,500 feet. Crow
(1983) studied the climatology of the Colorado Front Range by analyzing data from
six climatological stations, each having a record of 30 years or more. He found
that the available moisture in the higher elevations is a small fraction of the
available moisture that feeds convective storms at the lower elevations of the plains
just east of the mountains. Payton and Brendecke (1985) analyzed records of two
precipitation stations in the Boulder Creek watershed. These two stations are south
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of Estes Park at elevations of 9,900 feet and 12,280 feet with record lengths of 21
and 18 years. These authors found rainfall intensities less at the higher station
than at the lower station, and intensities at these sites were much less than has been
observed at lower elevation stations.
Paleoflood Studies
Historic and prehistoric floods in foothill streams in Colorado are recorded as
distinctive deposits and landforms in valleys and channels. The interpretation of
these deposits and landforms can provide important supplemental information about
the spatial occurrence, magnitude, and frequency of large floods. In paleoflood
investigations, discovering a lack of evidence of the occurrence of extraordinary
floods is as important as discovering tangible onsite evidence of such floods.
Geomorphic evidence of extraordinary floods in steep mountain basins, such as in the
upper Big Thompson River, is unequivocal, easy to recognize, and long-lasting because
of the volume and size of sediments deposited (Jarrett and Costa, 1986).
Extensive paleoflood studies have been conducted in the Front Range of Colorado, particularly in the Big Thompson River basin. Paleoflood investigations
indicate that frequent and large floods have occurred in basins below 7,500 feet.
No unequivocal evidence of large water floods much higher than bankfull discharge was
found in any stream valley above about 7,500 feet in the Colorado Front Range.
Costa (1983) developed methods to reconstruct velocity, depth, and discharge from
the maximum size of boulders in historic flood-boulder deposits. The frequency of
extraordinary floods can be estimated in a number of ways (Costa, 1978a, 1978b).
Following the catastrophic flood of 1976 in the Big Thompson River downstream from
Estes Park (McCain and others, 1979), radiocarbon dating of truncated and eroded
landforms yielded an estimate of relative frequency of the 1976 flood. This dating
indicated that the 1976 flood was the largest since the occurrence of glacial melting
8,000 to 10,000 years ago.
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Regional Flood-Freguency Relations
Flood characteristics also are needed at ungaged sites. Past applications of
regional flood-frequency techniques have failed to adequately describe the flood
hydrology of foothill streams; generally these techniques significantly overestimate
flood magnitude (Jarrett and Costa, 1986). Investigators have assumed that the total
basin area contributes runoff during rainstorms. However, studies by McCain and
Jarrett (1976); Jarrett and Costa (1983); and Jarrett and Costa (1986) have demonstrated that rainfall floods are limited to areas below about 7,500 feet in the
foothill region of Colorado. Jarrett and Costa (1986) developed regional rainfall
flood-frequency relations for the foothills area of the South Platte River basin in
Colorado. This analysis only used drainage areas below 8,000 feet, which is considered a conservative elevation selection. These relations are unbiased and agree
with discharge-frequency relations developed from streamflow-gaging station data.
For basins above 8,000 feet, snowmelt-runoff-derived flood characteristics are used
according to methods developed by Kircher and others (1985).
Conclusions
A multidisciplinary study has been undertaken to provide a better understanding
of flood hydrology in the foothills and mountains of Colorado. Precipitation,
streamflow, and paleoflood data from the foothill region indicate that snowmelt
floods predominate above 7,500 feet (varies slightly with major river basin), and
rainfall floods predominate below 7,500 feet in the Colorado Front Range. However,
the theories presented in this report also may be applicable to mountainous areas in
adjoining States, but the applications vary according to elevation. The u.S.
National Weather Service now issues flash-flood watches in the Front Range of Colorado, recognizing the greater flash-flood potential below 7,500 feet (Denver Post,
July 24, 1985).
Estimates of the recurrence interval of the 1976 Big Thompson River flood vary
widely when using different techniques to develop a flood-frequency relation. Also,
recurrence intervals, based on the regional relations and on paleohydrology, range
widely from less than a 2-year flood at Estes Park to approximately a 10,OOO-year
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flood in the areas of most intense precipitation. Computed recurrence intervals also
indicate a 300-year flood for the Big Thompson River at the mouth of the canyon and
about a 10-year flood at the river's confluence with the South Platte River, because
of attenuation of the flood peak from overbank storage and streamflow diversions
(Jarrett and Costa, 1986). Flash floods are extremely rare at high elevations
(above about 7,500 ft) but can occur frequently at low elevations.
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A GEOLOGISTS PERSPECTIVE OF THE 1982 ESTES PARK FLOOD
Wi 11 i am H. Hoyt
Department of Earth Sciences
University of tlorthern Colorado

Introduction
Floods have invoked terror in the minds of humans throughout all of our
existence on this planet. Virtually every ancient culture has recorded terrifying
accounts of catastrophic floods. Examples include Mesopotamian floddS from the
Tigris and Euphrates River, Indian floods from the Ganges and Brahmaputra Rivers,
and the Noachian flood from the Bible's Old Testament. Today, we may have even more
reason to be wary of floods than the ancients did.
Among the many types of natural disasters which occur on the planet
(earthquakes, volcanoes, vicious storms, El Nin~, etc.), floods stand alone in one
important respect: they occur with more frequency and greater magnitUde today than
they ever have in the past. Why? What is it that causes more severe and more
frequent floods in this mOdern age? Is there some natural explanation, or have we
ourselves brought on this danger? One need not look far to discover that mankina
has undertaken a "campaign of peril" which has dramatically increased the likelihood
of major floods in many river valleys. The major factors include: 1) the
construction of dams and reservoirs, 2) the paving of vast river-valley areas, and
3) the deforestation/defoliation of large land areas. All of these have the effect
of concentrating much larger quantities of water in rivers than WOUld be there
otherwise. For example, the peak discharge during the Lawn Lake flood (calculated
for the Roaring River - Fall River junction shown on Figure 1) was approximately
12,UOOft 3/sec. (Jarrett and Costa, lY84). Considering that the "bOO year flOOd"
here contains peak discharges of only about 400 ft 3/sec., it becomes obvious that
the Lawn Lake dam failure cannot even be considered as a natural flOOd for the
Roaring River drainage basin.

We have created a "supernatural" flood by impounding
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large excess volumes of water behind an artificial dam. In addition, we have
continued to build our dwellings in perilous spots, despite some state and federal
regulations designed to protect us from such peril.
Although dams provide the means to store our most valuable planetary resource,
they also store vast potential energy in the form of liquid water. When a dam
fails, gravity accelerates water downhill as an awesome torrent which can cause
destruction almost beyond comprehension.
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Figure 1.

Map of the study region west of Estes Park, Colorado.

The second factor, paving of river valleys, has the effect of preventing
rainwater and runoff from percolating into the soil and being stored there.

10',')',
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Without this storage in the aquifers, the water drains into the river and overtops
its banks. (Incidentally, the loss of recharge to the aquifer is another serious
environmental consequence). Since most major industrial centers and cities of the
world are on major rivers, we have a no-win situation where paving of the city
damages the capability of the river system to handle flood waters and the river
system therefore damages the city more severly. New Orleans is a major example of
this carried to extremes.
The third ana final factor is the oeforestation and defoliation of land
areas. This also has the tendency to reduce the amount of water used by plants as
well as reduce the amount of water stored in the soil and in aquifers. As in the
case of paving, this action increases runoff into rivers and thereby increases the
frequency and magnitude of floods. This denudation of the landscape also
accelerates soil erosion and produces a badly damaged landscape.
The bad news in this situation is that we continue to place ourselves in more
serious peril by increasing these deleterious effects. Unfortunately, other
natural disasters such as earthquakes, volcanoes, and storm' ~ften trigger floods
and then magnify damages. The good news is that now education, early warning
systems, and emergency preparedness often warn peopl p to escape the path of the
deadly flood waters, at least in countries where communications are very swift and
effective. An example of how these speedy communications can radically reduce the
death toll from a flood has been afforded by the recent floOdS on the Fall River
and Big Thompson river system in Colorado. Even though they were both in the same
general area, the 1976 Big Thompson Canyon floOd killed 140 people but the 1982
Estes Park flood killed only three. Awareness, education, communication, a bit of
luck, and the lessons of 1976 made the difference.
An excellent example of catastrophic sediment emplacement during a flood has
been provided by the "alluvial fan" floOd deposit which resulteo from the Lawn Lake
flood. Detailed sedimentary analyses of this flood deposit have been made in an
effort to use this modern flood deposit to understand and identify ancient flood
deposits.

The Setting of The Flood
On that peaceful July morning, the author was going over an examination with
twenty geology students at the University of Northern Colorado's Old Man Mountain
Lodge, a mere 300 meters from the Fall River above Estes Park, Colorado. It was a
typical Rocky Mountain dawn in Estes Park--clean, crisp, and quiet. Quiet until
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about 8:30 a.m., that is. In the duration of about five minutes, helicopters
swarmea overhead, sirens blared out, the power went out, the phone went dead, ana
the water stopped flowing from the taps. A feeling developed that something big
was happening and that our plannea geology excursion down the Big Thompson Canyon
was in some jeopardy. Upon investigation of the situation, we discovered that the
Fall River had turned into a terrifying torrent of mud ana boulders. The river was
up out of its banks, over the roads and bridges, and some 14 times more water was
coming down the river than just a few minutes earlier. The house on the corner was
gone, moving downstream like some giant battering ram. The entire central section
of Estes Park became a river bea and the buildings in the main axis of flow were
sometimes dismantled and destroyed. The exact sequence of events has been
thoroughly discussed by Miller, 1~82; Costa and Jarrett, 1983; Hoyt, 1~83; ana
Jarrett ana Costa, 1984.
The beorock terrain through which the floOd haa passed was largely granite
with lesser amounts of gneiss, schist, and a small amount of volcanic rock
(Richmond, 1974; Chronic, 1~8U). Just above Horseshoe Falls, the flooa waters had
cut down about 20 meters through a glacial lateral moraine which had been depositea
during the last major glaciation in the area (Figure 2). The two mineral species
which dominated the assemblage of materials eroded by the flood were quartz ano
feldspar.
One main focus of geological research on the flood has been the spectacular
fan-shaped pile of boulders, cobbles, sand, silt, and clay deposited just down from
Horseshoe Falls (Figure 3). One of the first questions to be answerea was how much
sediment was deposited in the fan. Based on new topographic maps assembled by Hoyt
(1983) and his co-workers as well as measurements maae by Coata and Jarrett (1983)
and Crews and others (1985) the fan deposit was found to be up to 20 meters thick
6
at its thickest point and contains on the order of 10 metric tons of rock. That
is enough to fill a large football stadium up to the top.
Around the peripheral areas of the fan, an inexpensive but accurate method of
thickness measurement was used. Virtually every Aspen tree (Populus tremuloides
Michaux) in this area has been scarred by Elk "bJrking". This leaves a datum plane
on the trees 203 cm ~24cm off the ground (based on 100 Aspen trees measurea in the
area). The thickness of the deposit can be calculated from partly buried trees.
Issues for the Future
Every time a flood occurs, we learn more about the processes and proaucts of

217
these catastrophic events. Jarrett and Costa (1983) have produced a thorough
synthesis of new information about the Lawn Lake floOd ana tney have concluded that
the volume of water which came down the Roaring River during the Lawn Lake floOd
had not been equalled in the past 10,000 years or longer.

Figure 2.

View of glacial moraine atop
granitic bedrock at Horseshoe
Falls. The flood waters cut
some 20 meters down through
the boulders, sand, and silt
of the lateral moraine (note
person for scale at the middle
of the photo).

Figure 3.

Photograph looking
aown the boulaerfan deposit to the
southeast. Horseshoe Falls is
directly behino
the photographer.

It is certainly clear that now we are directly creating certain conditions which
increase the likelihood of dangerous and costly floods. The Lawn Lake Dam break
and subsequent Fall River flood raised again the issue of culpability: who is
responsible for paying for $31 million in damages? Lawn Lake itself is on
National Park Service land, but the dam was inspecteo by state personnel and the
water in the lake was owned by a farmers co-op in northeastern Coloraoo. The
issues are so legally complex and clouded because the dam was constructeo about
the turn of the century and has clearly outlived its expected engineering life.
Governments and citizens seem to accept the precarious balance many of our dams
exist in. We also seem to take for granted that there are no workable solutions.
Let's change this. There are several policy changes which would greatly
reduce the danger of major flood disasters in the United States. These can be
oivided into two types:

1) policies which would reduce the likelihood of a flood
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ever starting, and 2) procedures and technology to constantly monitor the
structural integrity of dams. The objectives of the first type would be to
reduce the amount of paving, deforestation, defoliation, and construction of dams
in river valley areas (floodplains) as sacred grouno not to be "developed." The
river needs that land to help control itself. Furthermore, the placement of dams
in high mountain valleys above population centers seems unnecessary; indeed the
only argument in favor of trapping water in areas of steep and "hydraulically
dangerous" terrain is that we feel compelled to hold onto an archaic and legally
complex water policy. It makes much more sense to let the water flow downhill
from the mountains to the plains where the water is needea anyway. If a dam
fails an the gentle gradients of the plains, the threat to life and property will
generally be much less.
The second imperative which seems obvious is to improve our ability to
constantly monitor the structural integrity of dams. Why do we feel compelled to
wait until the wall of water is bearing down on us before we are willing to do
anything about prevention? Various industries rely on advanced deformation
meters called strain gauges to monitor movement of earth materials (in mine
shafts, for example); at the very least, warning devices could be cheaply
installed downstream from dams. Then we will know the instant a dam fails and
imperils life and property. I am quite convinced that such a warning system
could have been installed at Lawn Lake for consiaerably less than $31 million ana
three human lives. Of course that is an overstatement, but even if we add all
the sites of potentially dangerous dams in the whole state of Colorado, the cost
would still probably be below $31 million. The monetary and human losses coula
have been much worse--Estes Park was relatively lucky this time.
There has been significant progress on these fronts in recent years, but the
progress seems painfully slow. The threats of flooas seem as dire taday as they
were last year, but we always seem to be surprised by these catastrophies. I
believe the time is overaue to reassess our water policies in managing river
valleys. We have technology which could help us, but we are not using it to our
full advantage. ~y hope is that common sense will soon overcome the bureaucratic
process so that management of high mountain river valleys will better assure the
safety of mankind.
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POLICY AND RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS
Eve C. Gruntfest
Department of Geography and Environmental Studies
University of Colorado, Colorado Springs
After Thursday and Friday's plenary and paper sessions, working groups
were convened to establish policy and research agenda in three categories:
mitigation and recovery, hydrology and geomorphology, and forecasting and
warning. The groups met and developed flash flood guidelines and
recommendations for the rest of the century. At the closing session, reporters
from the working groups reported the results of the sessions; these are listed
at the end of this discussion. Five main points emerged from the working group
recommendations.
1. There is a greater need for transfer of available flash flood

hazard mitigation information to a broader range of constituencies
than there is for acquisition of new data.
Translating research results for use at the local and state levels has become a
higher priority for many physical and social scientists. Accountability for
work in natural hazards mitigation generally goes beyond the case study or
laboratory setting to at least recommendations for application by local
officials. The relationship between the research and policy communities is
better established and focuses more frequently on problem-solving. The
contributions of researchers and policy makers, particularly in the working
group sessions, at this Symposium are evidence of this constructive trend.
2. The call for heightened public awareness continues but with a more
varied definition of "publics".
While the interest in raising public awareness has been a constant feature of
natural hazards research since the early 1970's, the nature of the efforts has
become more subtle and sophisticated. For example, local flash flood public
education efforts now not only describe the hazard dynamics, but also point out
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the advantages and constraints of a local wdrning system. Public awareness
programs anticipate the information needs of the elderly, children, industries,
and public officials in the event of a flash flood.
3. Better estimates of flood losses, benefits and costs of mitigation
strategies, and impacts of future and present conditions are
essential for improved decision making.
This recommendation was made in several working groups. The National Flood
Insurance Program, Federal Emergency Management Agency, state emergency
services agencies, and even private insurance companies need better data on the
expected costs and benefits of a selected mitigation strategy. More precise
calculation of intangible costs of floods might significantly improve the
likelihood that long-term strategies for flood loss mitigation, such as
acquisition and relocation, would be more attractive to local communities.
There is a continuing need for better quantification of the impacts of
potential urban development on downstream flood hazards so that the risks are
simply not shifted to pre-existing downstream structures.
4. Different levels of government and private consultants need to
clarify the extent of their legal and ethical responsibility with
regard to public protection from flooding.
There are serious questions about the distinct opportunities and best
allocation of resources between the public and private sector, particularly in
terms of provision of weather forecasting and flood insurance. Communities can
benefit from the coordinated efforts of the National Weather Service and
private forecasting firms. Flash floods have short lead times, but communities
at risk can utilize a private firm to provide the maximum amount of time and
the most precision in forecasts. However, the goals should not be competing;
they should be integrated in order to provide the most local and timely
information possible to the community at risk. Extensive focused debate is
necessary to clarify not only how best to coordinate the efforts, but also to
identify the legal limit of what the public can expect with regard to dam
safety or warning reliability. The perennial question, "How safe is safe
enough?" should be better resolved.
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5. The distinctions between flash floods and slow-rise floods
should be clarified.
Traditionally, flood hazard mapping has identified flood plains without regard
to debris therein which will compound the effects of flooding. For the Big
Thompson flood, serious disagreement exists among the hydrologists concerning
the flood's return interval and the altitude at which we can expect serious
mountain precipitation causing flash floods to occur. Better understanding of
the unique characteristics of flash floods may help resolve the disagreement,
or at least clarify the points on which hydrologists agree.
The Symposium marks an important milestone with regard to flood hazard
mitigation. Thirty federal representatives, 12 state officials, 20 local
officials, 29 university representatives, four members of of the press, 17
private consultants, and four private non-profit organization representatives
took part in the Symposium. This distinguished and varied group gathered to
assess flash flood vulnerability and mitigation alternatives. The stage is now
set for further post-audits. In June, 1987, a lS-year anniversary symposium
will be held in Rapid City to review achievements and challenges since that
1972 catastrophe. New communication channels established among various levels
of government, and among states, researchers and policy makers will ensure that
flash flood loss reduction has a higher priority. While not all the Symposium
discussions focused on accomplishments, difficult challenges were identified
and a coordinated approach for meeting them in the future was proposed by
participants.
Enumerated below are kernals that should grow into further investigations
and a broader exchange of ideas in flash flood hazard mitigation.
Recommendations are divided into four categories: mitigation, recovery,
hydrology and geomorphology, and forecasting and warning.
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Po1isx.
The mitigation policy recommendations emphasize the need for education,
knowledge transfer, and coordination among agencies and industries.
1) Promote education of children, professionals, public officials,

and the general pub 1i c.
2) Encourage greater participation of real estate and insurance
industries.
3) Mandate federal interagency coordination.
4) Promote local hazard awareness.
5) Foster knowledge transfer.
6) Emphasize multiple benefits of mitigation strategies.
7) Encourage the adoption of mandatory mitigation actions.
Research
The mitigation research recommendations emphasize the need for research in
mitigation methods--existing and future--and related economic concerns.
1) Validation of existing physical-economic-sociological models.

2) Comparative values of mitigation techniques and their adequacy, e.g.,
the 1985 evaluation of TVA programs.
3) Analysis of existing methods and development of improved methods for
evaluating disasters.
4) Inclusion of time element in these methods.
5) Assessment of impact of mitigation for total vs. partial destruction.
6) Economic incentives/costs in mitigation.
7) Economic impacts of disclosure.

Gruntfest
8)

Multiobjective economic concerns in development and rehabilitation.

9)

Legal and policy implications of mitigation and recovery measures,
present and future.
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10) Risk identification, assessment, management, and communication.
11) Continued and upgraded mapping efforts at all levels.

Po 1.-i.-c..l
The recovery policy recommendations stress economic concerns and the need
for streamlining the recovery process.
1) Determine who pays for what.
2) Analyze who benefits.
3) Promote multiple benefits of recovery efforts.
4) Encourage creative financing, ie., pre-event mechanisms
and conditional aid.
5) Streamline the recovery process.
6) Evaluate rebuild versus relocate.
Research
The recovery research recommendations emphasize the need for increased
communication and knowledge transfer, and an assessment of the role of
insurance.
1) Transfer of knowledge for specific uses/users.
2) Communication enhancement among scientific and research communities
(research and operations).
3) Local/victims input in research.
4) Development of criteria for normalized, general and specific
data/information.
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5) Economic considerations/parameters in research.
6) Innovative financial mechanisms for research.
7) Assessment of relation between risk and insurance rates in recovery
and mitigation.
8) Effectiveness of insurance as mechanism in recovery and mitigation.
9) Impacts of actual and future insurance schemes.
10) Liability as factor in research.

Policy
The hydrology and geomorphology policy recommendations emphasize the need
for increased specific knowledge on which to base policy decisions and
assessments of the impacts of development on future flooding.
1) All governments should take into consideration the risk of lifethreatening floods related to dam safety and flood plain
management.
2) Flood plain analysis should be based on geomorphologic considerations
(erosion potential, debris flow) as well as on hydrologic
considerations.
3) Determine if future (fully urbanized) hydrology or existing condition
hydrology should be used to identify the regulated flood plain.
4) Government should insure that adequate information is available
before decisions are made.
5) Policy should be based on the best available hydrologic,
geomorphologic, meteorologic, and environmental information.
6) Development should pay for the increased runoff it causes.
7) Hydrologic policy associated with dam safety should take into account
spillway design flood frequency, PMF versus another frequency, and risk
analysis; it should promote hydrology training of dam owners; and
it should determine responsibility and who should pay.
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Research
The hydrology and geomorphology research recommendations emphasize the
need for an examination of the distinctions between flash floods and slow-rise
floods, of the return time of events, and of debris bulking.
1) Differences between riverine flooding processes and predictions and
flash flood processes and predictions.
2) Determination of dates and return periods of historic and prehistoric
major flash flood events.
3) Relationship of return periods for specific sites to risk at a
regional level.
4) Comparison of exceptional rain event above Drake with possible similar
events elsewhere in the Big Thompson basin.
5) Study of geologic processes triyyered by intense precipitation.
6) Thresholds for debris flows (bulking) initiation.
7) Mapping to determine areal and altitudinal extent of flash flooding in
mountain regions.
8) Impact of overbank fill on peak flood discharges (i .e., floodway fringe
in flood insurance studies).
9) Erosional, transport, and depositional processes during peak flows.
10) Selection of channel cross-section for water surface profile
computation and thalweg determination (to avoid errors in crosssectional areas and understanding flood magnitude CQ).
11) Changes in channel (i.e., predicted flood plain elevations) because of
deposition and erosion.
Forecasting and Warning
Policy
Three main terms were defined:
Forecasting: hydrologic-meteorological, data collection (hardware includes
new precipitation gauges which offer more coverage at low cost but are
less accurate), and modeling and prediction (forecast modeling includes
GOESNEX. NEXRAD. VERTICAL PROFILING. and NEXRAD Algorithms);
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Warning: message preparation and dissemination; and
Response: damage-reducing and life-saving action by communities and
individuals (includes preparedness).
1) Policy should take reliability of flood predictions into account.
2) Promote technology transfer.

3) Foster maximizing appropriate responses.

4) Increase mapping (application of existing knowledge).
5) Promote awareness of "public" and local officials, especially
difficult in absence of recent flood experience.
6) Emphasize value of additional time and reliability (criteria).

7) Encourage system installation.
8) Coordinate federal activities in forecasting, warning and response.
9) Define role of different levels of government and private action.

10) Determine what land officials should be taught.
Research
There was consensus that forecasting is the primary area in which research
is needed. Response rated as the second-most critical area for future
research. The percentages, based on the participants attending this working
group, are shown below.
Forecasting and Warning Research
Key Issues (N=ll)
Forecasting
Warning
Response
Agency Coordination
Identify High Risk Sites

1st
54%
9%
36%

2nd
30%
20%
30%
10%
10%

(W=10)
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APPENDIX II
SUPPLEMENTAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION

WHAT PEOPLE DID DURING THE BIG THOMPSON FLOOD
Eve C. Gruntfest
According to several of the deputies and highway patrolmen who issued
warnings, most of the people in the Big Thompson Canyon on July 31, 1976, were
not warned officially to evacuate. The person-to-person warning concentrated
on the area at the mouth of the canyon. Two patrolmen were in the vicinity of
Drake trying to keep traffic from travelling up the canyon and to encourage
people to climb to higher ground. An account of the types of warnings issued
will shed some light on the situation prior to flood impact.
The Colorado State Patrol in Estes Park received word of traffic tie-ups
in the canyon around 7:30 pm. This was not unusual for a weekend evening. The
patrolman went to check out the problem 7.5 miles down the canyon, and reported
on the radio that there were trees, mud, and rocks blocking U.S. Highway 34.
Following an 8:45 pm message of flooding from the patrolman near Estes Park,
the Larimer County Sheriff's Department and the Colorado State Patrol began
intensive warnings of campgrounds and motorists. At that time, the patrolman
advised that warnings be issued down the canyon. At the lower end of the
canyon, where it was not raining, it seemed hard to believe that a flood was
possible. Even some of the deputies who were responsible for warning others
thought the Olympus Dam near Estes Park must have broken in order to cause a
flash flood. (It held through the flood, though the base suffered some erosion
during the storm.)
Several miles up the canyon, just to the west of the Narrows, the
community of Cedar Cove sits below the road and adjacent to the river. This
area received warnings from a sheriff's deputy, a highway patrolman who later
lost his life near Drake, a member of the Loveland police department, and a
private citizen.
Ten people were at the Covered Wagon Cafe just one mile west of Cedar
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Cove. The customers finished their meal and started up the canyon. When
rockslides prevented their passage through to Drake, they returned to the
restaurant. One waitress had been sent home early because the bridge leading
to her home across the river was notoriously low. The proprietor thought it
wise for her to get home before the water rose too high. The people in the
restaurant did not receive an official warning, but the water was rising in
front of the restaurant. Everyone moved to the proprietor's house adjacent to
the restaurant. When the waitress who left early reached her home, she called
the restaurant to tell them she was safe. While she was on the phone, the
proprietor's home and restaurant were washed away. All who were in the home
were swept to their deaths.
At the Canyon Inn near Cedar Cove, approximately 20 people, including
employees and guests, were conversing about how slow business was that night.
No one had an explanation for this until reports were received that landslides
had occurred west of the restaurant. At approximately 8:30 pm, a sheriff's
deputy came into the restaurant to warn people of rising water and possible
flooding. He instructed them to cross the river and climb up the mountainside.
The people took no action in response to this warning. Twenty minutes later he
returned with the message that the dam at Estes Park had broken and the people
in the restaurant should cross the river and climb immediately. People did
respond to this second warning. Some drove out of the canyon, and others
climbed as instructed. The water was three and one half feet deep in the
restaurant soon after the warning. Some perceived no danger from a flash flood
warning, yet responded quickly to the message that the dam at Estes Park had
broken. This adaptive action may be linked to the extensive media coverage of
the Teton Dam collapse in Idaho, five weeks before the Big Thompson flood.
One sheriff's deputy involved in the issuance of warnings explained how
patrol cars circled two or three times in one campground with loud speakers.
Some people responded immediately, including a couple who remembered the Rapid
City flood of 1972. Others responded following the second and third warnings.
At least two people did not move from their camping spot and were among the
victims.
Drake, at the confluence of the North Fork and the Big Thompson, was hit
hardest by the flood. For most people there, the only warnings came from
environmental cues: the river rising, the severity of the rainfall, or a change
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in the sound of the river. One state patrolman who was notified of the problem
caused by rising water west of Drake advised several people at Drake to drive
down the canyon rather than try to drive up. He had no idea what the eventual
impact of the flood downstream would be. It is not known how many people did
try to drive down or what happened to them.
A highway patrolman had been watching the Olympics on television with his
wife in Estes Park when he heard about potential rock slides from the
dispatcher. He drove to Drake to evaluate the situation. At 9:00 he reported a
sudden rise in the river and told the State Patrol to warn the people of
Loveland and those east of the Narrows. Fifteen minutes later the dispatcher
in Greeley recorded Purdy's final report, "I'm stuck, I'm right in the middle
of it, I can't get out ••• about a half-mile east of Drake on the highway. Tell
them to get out of that low area down below. And as soon as the water starts
picking up ••• (static) ••• high ground •••• " The dispatcher tried to recontact him
without success.
Later, Sergeant Purdy's body was found downstr~am; his car remained where
it was, crushed under a slide of mud and rock (McComb, 1980,
p. 20). One couple he warned was returning from an evening in Estes Park.
They thought he was exaggerating the seriousness of the situation when he told
them to get out of their car and climb. They died in the flood.
At least one couple at Waltonia had developed a personal contingency plan
in the event that the dam at Estes might one day fail. They were so accustomed
to the usual sound and height of the river that as soon as the sound noticeably
changed, they responded to this environmental cue and climbed the mountain.
Sixteen people died in two separate motels at Waltonia. The only warning
reported was an unofficial one from a motel manager. Some people managed to
escape down the canyon in cars; others climbed up the mountainside. Details of
the situation in Waltonia are difficult to ascertain since neither the motel
owners nor their families survived the flood.
In the Cedarmont and 7 Pines area near Glen Comfort, no warnings were
reported to have been received. At one of the four motels located in this
area, a family had just taken a room. Because it was raining so hard, the
manager invited the family inside for coffee and cookies. They accepted the
invitation and left their belongings in the car, planning to move into their
room when the rain let up. This family was in the Big Thompson Canyon only
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because they could not find a motel room in Estes Park. As they consumed the
treats provided by the proprietor of the motel, the river got louder and seemed
to be getting closer. After a coke machine floated by and water began seeping
under the door, the father in the family decided it was time to mover to higher
ground. The only steps to the upstairs portion of the motel were on the
outside of the building. Since he could not get outside safely, he cut a hole
in the sheetrock ceiling and the wood floor above. His family, and that of the
proprietor, climbed out of the motel. They spent the rest of the night on the
mountainside. The motel was not washed away, but the water rose four feet and
the damage to the building exceeded 50% of its total worth.
At 7 Pines Motel, six miles from Estes Park, two people from Ohio were
camping. Earlier that day their tire needed fixing, and one of the campers had
just returned from Loveland where he had it repaired. It was raining so hard
that they moved their camping gear into the car and sat listening to the radio.
When the car began floating away, they were able to move it to higher ground
with considerable effort. When they checked with a nearby motel office, the
manager sent them back down toward the river to try to rescue two young women
in a streamside cabin. In order to get to the cabin, they had to cross a low
flat area. When they saw a wall of water rushing down the canyon, they clung
to a nearby car.
When it began floating away, they grabbed a shrub which also
was undermined by the water. They were holding onto a pine tree when the cabin
was swept away. One of the young women managed to get out of the cabin and
held on to a tree downstream; the other one was crushed in the cabin. The two
young men survived.
A busload of campers and a van from a camp outside Estes Park was
returning from a trip to Cheyenne Frontier Days. There was an air of excitement
on the return trip since a dance was scheduled. The group stopped at the power
plant park for a quick dinner; then the rain began. After dinner the two
vehicles headed up the canyon: one went up Route 34, and the other took the
north fork route. Neither vehicle got very far; their progress was blocked by
fallen trees, blinding rain, stopped cars, and boulders on the road. The two
vehicles met in Drake and decided to drive back down the canyon and back to
camp via Loveland. They must have escaped just seconds before the numerous
less fortunate cars and their drivers were swept away. Many people were
extremely lucky, abandonning their automobiles at the last second. One group
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said they had four flat tires and the road was blocked before they got out and
climbed the hillside. Imagine the violence they must have been driving through
before they finally escaped to high ground.
Throughout the evening, many tourists driving through the canyon met with
landslides and rockfalls. Some turned back to Estes Park or Loveland, and
others abandoned their cars and climbed the canyon wall. Those in the latter
group had the best chance for survival. When one hears of the number of close
calls, people who escaped at the last second, it is incredible that the death
toll was not higher.

LAND ACQUISITION IN THE BIG THOMPSON CANYON FOLLOWING THE 1976 FLOOD
Carole Huber
Following the 1976 flood, Steve McMillan of the Flood Recovery Office
identified land most susceptible to flooding along the Big Thompson River. The
owners of these identified flood-prone parcels were given the option of selling
their land. The decision to sell was completely voluntary; no pressure was
applied to land owners. The identification process took six months, and it was
an additional 12 months before Larimer County completed the purchase of
parcels. The last Forest Service acquisition was not completed until 1981.
The identified parcels consisted of both undeveloped land and land on which
owners were not allowed to rebuild because damage to their homes exceeded 50%
of their value. Approximately 30 homeowners were allowed to rebuild within the
100-year flood plain because their homes suffered less than than 50% damage.
In addition, the county's Flood Review Board granted three variances which
allowed reconstruction in the 100-year flood plain of homes damaged in excess
of 50%.
Property was appraised and purchased at pre-flood values. The majority of
land was purchased by the Larimer County Parks Department. Acquisitions by the
Parks Department totaled 124 parcels purchased from 98 property owners at a
cost of $1,547,771. Twenty-nine owners chose not to sell 34 parcels, the
appraised value of which totaled more than $175,000. Fifty percent of the
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money for acquisition by the Parks Department was obtained from the Colorado
State General Fund, the Four Corners Regional Commission, and Larimer County.
The remaining fifty percent consisted of matching funds from the Land and Water
Conservation Fund. The United States Forest Service also purchased flood-prone
properties in the Canyon, the majority along the North Fork of the Big Thompson
River. Twenty-four parcels totaling 956.08 acres were acquired by the Forest
Service at a cost of $860,533. Twelve owners chose not to sell their property
to the Forest Service.
A board of Canyon residents identified suitable park land from the parcels
that the Larimer County Parks Department had purchased. Based on location and
accessibility, nine areas were identified as suitable park sites. Of these
nine areas, three were selected to be developed into parks. These three parks
--The Narrows, Fork's Park and Sleepy Hollow--were developed between 1981 and
1984 at a total cost of $69,822 (of which half was returned to the County by
the Land and Water Conservation Fund), and are maintained at an annual cost of
approximately $12,000. At present, there are no plans to develop any of the
other acquired parcels.

LARIMER COUNTY LAND ACQUISITION
IN BIG THOMPSON CANYON
No. of
Parcel s

AREA
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area
Area

No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.
No.

TOTALS*:

1
2
3
4
4a
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12a
12b
13 (Forest Servo Acq. )
14
15 (Forest Serv. Acq. )
16
17
18
18a
19 (Forest Servo Acq.)
19a
20
20a
21
22
23

No. of
Property Owners

Appraised Cost
$

1
0
0
4
3
1
1
3

3
0
3
0
1
3
13
1
2
3
6
2
11
21
0
6
0
2
8
0
1
0
0
4
3
1
1
2

123

97

$1,544,771

5
0
3
0
1
8
17
2
2
3
14
2
12
23
0
6
0
2
10
0

90,700
-078,800
-029,300
7B,800
159,960
28,500
42,000
28,860
113,200
31,690
160,300
203,450
-0101,810
-071,000
176,070
-07,760
-0-077 ,141
12,600
6,300
13,430
33,100

*Pursuant to the compilation of these figures, an additional purchase was
completed, bringing the total acquisition by Larimer County to 124 parcels
purchased from 98 property owners at a total appraised cost of $1,547,771.
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APPENDIX III
ABSTRACTS DF PAPERS NOT INCLUDED IN PROCEEDINGS

1) A DECADE OF PROGRESS IN FLOOD WARNING AND RESPONSE
Curtis B. Barrett
Office of Hydrology
NOAA/National Weather Service
In the past ten years, there has been significant progress in the
improvement of flash flood warning and response. More Federal, state, local
and private officials are aware of the potential for a major flash flood
disaster. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has determined that
there are 20,000 communities vulnerable to flash floods. Of these 20,000
communities, over 17,000 now subscribe to the Flood Insurance Program. Many of
these communities have taken steps to mitigate flood damages through improved
flood warning and response systems.
There are over 65,000 dams in the United States. According to the
Interagency Committee on Dam Safety, 10,000 of these dams would cause a major
catastrophe if they failed. Approximately 3,000 dams are unsafe. Many
Federal, State, and private owners are taking steps to reduce the risk of dam
breaks.
The past decade, a combination of new technology and significant
reductions in cost of microcomputers has resulted in the development and
implementation of automated local flood warning systems. Currently, there are
over 200 communities utilizing state-of-the-art automated systems. This
increased demand for flood warning service has caused many Federal and State
agencies to increase their role in the flood warning effort. There are now
five vendors actively involved in the establishment of automated flood warning
systems.
The National Weather Service has significantly improved the ability to
forecast and detect flash flood events. The establishment of a 24-hour unit to
forecast heavy rain (quantitative precipitation forecasts, or QPF) has provided
advanced alerting of heavy rainfall in many cases.
The enhanced use of satellites to estimate heavy rainfall for convective
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rainstorms has increased our ability to detect flash flood producing
thunderstorm cells. The NESDIS Synoptic Analysis Branch utilizes an
interactive flash flood analyzer to monitor many areas for flash flood
potential.
The same GOES satellite used to detect rainfall via imagery processing is
also used to relay rainfall and streamflow data collected from remote data
collection platforms (DCP). There are now over 2,000 DCP's collecting rainfall
data used in the recognition of heavy rainfall events and a tenfold increase in
the number of DCP's is anticipated over the next 5 to 10 years. Ten years ago,
there were less than 100.
Still, flood damages continue to increase each year and people continue to
inhabit the flood plain. Until a substantial increase in hydrologic sensors
occurs, many communities will remain vulnerable to flash flood events.

2) PREPAREDNESS CAN REDUCE BOTH RISK AND LIABILITY
John Pat Byrne
Colorado Department of Public Safety
Division of Disaster Emergency Services
Although the magnitude and timing of flash floods cannot be predicted with
precision, their locations and relative frequencies can be identified from the
historical record. The risk of loss for those vulnerable to these events can
be reduced by acting on available information. Similarly, the obligations of
government to increase awareness of exposure, warn of occurrence, and reduce
damage where possible are best met by informed action. Potential costs to both
groups can be reduced where preparedness is perceived as a shared
responsibility.
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3) METEOROLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE BIG THOMPSON
FLASH FLOOD OF 31 JULY 1976
Charles F. Chappell
Weather Research Pro9ram
NOAA/Environmental Research Laboratories
Descriptions of the meteorological conditions that produced the
devastating flash flood in the Big Thompson Canyon on 31 July 1976 are
presented. The storm developed when strong low-level easterly winds to the
rear of a polar front pushed a moist, conditionally unstable air mass upslope
into the Front Range of the Rocky Mountains. Orographic uplift released the
convective instability, and light south-southeasterly winds at steering levels
allowed the storm complex to remain nearly stationary over the foothills.
Minimal entrainment of relatively moist air at middle and upper levels, low
cloud bases, and a slightly tilted updraft structure contributed to a high
precipitation efficiency for the storm. Meteorological conditions that
produced the Big Thompson Flash Flood are quite distinct from those associated
with typical summer thunderstorms over the Rockies. This fact is helping
meteorologists to identify a set of meteorological conditions that have the
potential to produce excessive rains over the Front Range watersheds.

4) FLASH FLOOD FORECASTING RESEARCH SINCE THE BIG THOMPSON
FLASH FLOOD OF 31 JULY 1976
Charles F. Chappell
Westher Research Program
NOAA/Environmental Research Laboratories
The occurrence of the Big Thompson Flood of 31 July 1976 had a major
impact on research to understand and improve forecasts of flash flood producing
storms. This research has included the investigation of the synoptic and
mesoscale environments which produce excessive convective rains, as well as
detailed case studies of individual events. This research has led to the
recognition of several meteorological patterns which favor the development of
flash flood producing storms over the United States. Meteorologists are now
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capable of identifying several hours in advance, with some skill, "watch" areas
where excessive rains and flash floods may occur. This research is also
helping radar meteorologists to better identify and monitor in real-time those
storms with flash flood potential. This burst of research into excessive rains
and flash flood forecasting has also spread to other countries, where similar
research efforts have accelerated.

5) THE POSSIBILITY OF DEBRIS BULKING OF THE BIG THOMPSON FLOOD
J. Ernest Fl ack
Civil, Environmental, and Architectural Engineering
University of Colorado

Recent research on mUdflows, debris and mUdflooding in mountainous terrain
has demonstrated that concentrations of sediment and other material in flood
waters may exceed 80% by weight in some cases. In this paper the possibility
that the Big Thompson flood of 1976 may have been increased in both volume and
peak due to incorporation of eroded sediment will be explored. A synthetic
flood hydrograph will be developed USin9 standard hydrologic techniques of
converting rainfall to runoff using the observed and estimated precipitation
for the 1976 storm event. This hydrograph will then be routed downstream and
then bulked by the estimated amount of sediment erosion that was in suspension
during the flood. This estimate of erosion will be based on the areal and
depth estimates of scour that occurred during the actual flood. The resulting
bulked hydrograph will be compared with the actual flood hydrograph(s) as
developed by various sources. This comparison will give some indication of the
possibility of sediment bulking increasing the hydrographs for floods occurring
in mountainous terrain.
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6) CHANGES IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN THE BIG THOMPSON CANYON
William I. Gordon, Director
Office of Emergency Management
Fort Collins, Colorado
Study of Big Thompson Flood of July 31, 1976 revealed
emergency preparedness problems, some of long-term nature,
and temporary--all of which contributed to the excessively
list. Since that time, federal, state and local emergency
agencies have addressed each of those problems with a view
any future event would not suffer similar consequences.

a series of
others coincidental
large casualty
preparedness
toward insuring that

Problem:

Residences in the floodplain.

Correction:

Floodplain regulations adopted which restrict building
residences in the floodway. Funds obtained to purchase land
in the floodway which otherwise might have been used for
residences.

Problem:

Highway, paralleling river in a narrow canyon, was washed
away by rushing waters which carried cars and occupants
downstream.

Correction:

Highway rebuilt to withstand lOO-year flood.
Major channel improvement effort.

Problem:

Some residents and visitors, unfamiliar with characteristics
of flash floods, refused to abandon their homes and cars,
and many attempted to drive through flood waters.

Correction:

Signs in approaches to canyon advising motorists to climb
to safety in the event of a flash flood. Safe areas along
highways are designated. Familiarity with the effects of a
flash flood has changed the attitude of local residents and they
are now fully cognizant of needed protective measures.
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Problem:

Information about the potential flood threat was not
disseminated early enough to warn residents and visitors.

correction:

Contract with local weather service and organization of
spotters. Fulltime emergency manager appointed--on call 24
hours a day. Sheriff's Department improved communications and
capabilities. Emergency operations plan developed and
exercised.

Proof of success of our efforts was recognized during Lawn Lake Flood
of 1982.

7) FLASH FLOOD FORECASTING:
DEJA VU 1976 AND VU JADE 1986
John F. Henz
Henz Kelly & Associates
Denver, Colorado
In the author's opinion, the art of flash flood forecasting was almost
nonexistent in 1976 prior to the Big Thompson Flash Flood. Few if any papers
existed in the scientific literature dealing specifically with flash flood or
heavy rain forecasting. Interest in these predictions was heightened by the
deadly Rapid City flash flood of 1972. The author was involved in a post-storm
analysis of this flash flood while at Colorado State University with Prof. Lew
Grant, Mike Fritsch and Vince Scheetz. Post-storm meso-analysis of this storm
by several groups pointed out some key storm ingredients but these analyses
stopped short of providing a forecasting scenario to be applied operationally.
However the post-storm analysis was sufficient to prompt a "deja vu" forecast
of the Big Thompson potential four years later in an operational setting. As
the storm's potential unfolded and was realized, conventional hourly surface
observations, typed radar observations or remote radar fax reports, and "a
seasoned look out the window" provided the key short term forecasting inputs.
By way of contrast, the high-tech 1980's have provided the operational
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meteorologist with the improved insight into flash flood forecasting afforded
by numerous excellent research papers, post-storm analyses and methodologies.
Additionally significant improvements in the presentation of weather radar,
satellite and surface observations have assisted the weather prediction
problem. Remote rain and stream gage systems can monitor rainfall and verify
forecasts though these systems have been oversold as warning tools. The "vu
jade" refers to the integration of these observational improvements with high
powered personal computers and operational prediction models to allow highly
reliable and accurate predictions of flash flood occurrence before the event
happens. The consistent application of these advances in the flash flood
prediction program approach in Denver has led to a highly successful warning
program which was only dreamt of in 1976.

8) SUCCESSFUL FLASH FLOOD FORECASTING
IN COLORADO 1983 TO 1985
John F. Henz and Ron A. Kelly
Henz Kelly & Associates
Denver, Colorado
The Urban Drainage and Flood Control District established a flash flood
prediction program in response to the deadly Big Thompson Flash Flood of 1976
in 1979. Recent significant flash flooding events which occurred within the
District underscore the ability of the program to predict and reliably warn
communities in the District of flash floods.
Results of the operational prediction of the Cherry Creek Flash Flood of
July 1983, the Denver Mega-Rain/Hail Storm of June 1984, the July 19, 1985
South Suburban Cloudburst and the Cheyenne Flash Flood of August I, 1985 will
be presented. Each of these storm systems was accurately predicted 3-6 hours
before the storms formed with total storm rainfall, peak storm hourly rainfall
intensity, storm track, duration, basin coverage and associated severe weather
predicted. In all cases appropriate local governments were issued the
forecasts before the event. The Cheyenne Flash Flood case is especially
interesting since the Denver area was alerted for a "Cheyenne-type" storm
potential 6-8 hours before the flash flood occurred. The Denver alert was
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dropped by late afternoon as it became apparent the potential was focussing to
the north. The implications of this "miss" will be discussed.

9) ROLE OF THE MEDIA
IN THE BIG THOMPSON DISASTER OF 1976
Daryle W. Klassen
Larimer County Commissioner
Loveland, Colorado
Some points to be discussed during this presentation include:
1. Media mis-understandings and distortions at the time of the catastrophe;

2. Media contribution to the problems at hand;
3. Methods of minimizing media problems;
4. Media can be, and were, of great assistance in problem solving; and
5.

~ledia

economic impacts upon affected disaster area.

10) A CLIMATOLOGICAL VIEW OF LARGE PRECIPITATION EVENTS
Thomas B. McKee and David Changnon
Department of Atmospheric Science
Colorado State University
Severe precipitation events in eastern Colorado, those producing damaging
floods, occur on the average once every four years. The climatology of these
large events, the elevation factor, the probability of a Big Thompson-type
storm at Fort Collins, as well as other methods of climate estimates are
presented. Storms centered most often on the Front Range and Palmer Divide
areas of Colorado produce the localized flooding conditions such as that
experienced in the Big Thompson Flood of 1976.
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11) PUBLIC RESPONSE ELEMENTS FOR FLOOD WARNING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Dennis S.
Hazards Assessment
Department of
Colorado State

Mileti
Laboratory and
Sociology
University

A review of empirical studies of human response to warnings of impending
disaster reveals a six-step decision making process that outlines what can lead
to public protective actions in response to those warnings. These six steps
are: hear, understand, believe, personalize, decide and respond. A variety of
factors that can be incorporated into emergency preparedness for flood warnings
enhance this process, and these include warning source credibility, information
consistency, message accuracy, information clarity, message certainty, level of
detail in information, provision of guidance concerning response, warning
frequency, clarity in risk location, and channel of conveyance. This paper
synthesizes the state of knowledge regarding what preparedness can do to
maximize the odds of sound public response to warnings of flood disasters.

12) HOW THINGS HAVE CHANGED IN FORECASTING SINCE 1976
Maurice E. Pautz
Area Manager for Colorado
National Weather Service Forecast Office
During the last decade, significant changes in forecast technology as well
as the introduction of new tools for the forecaster to use, have taken place.
The use and impact of new numerical forecast models will be discussed.
Improved methods of radar displays and severe weather detection are detailed.
Very significant changes and improvements in satellite displays and
interpretation are discussed. Advances in the understanding of mesoscale
weather systems and use of dense mesoscale surface data networks are explained.
Recent introduction of remote sensing atmospheric profilers have added a new
dimension to the operational forecast framework. Additional remote sensing in
the form of Data Collection Platforms (DCPs) for the hydrologic and flash flood
programs have recently been an addition that provides the operational
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forecaster with approximately 150 sites in the State of Colorado for automated
river stage readings and precipitation values. Significant new forecast
technology is on the immediate horizon for the National Weather Service
Forecast Office in Denver by the fall of this year. A new workstation for the
Public Forecast Program will utilize the latest technology as developed by the
Program for Regional Observing and Forecasting Systems (PROFS) office of the
Environmental Research Laboratories (ERL) in Boulder. This workstation will
enable the forecaster to time-lapse various combinations of radar, satellite,
nesonet and conventional data in ways heretofore not available to the
operational forecaster.

13) NEW DISASTER RESEARCH METHODS IN MENTAL HEALTH
AND THE MOUNT ST. HELENS STUDY
James H. Shore, M.D.
Department of Psychiatry, School of Medicine
University of Colorado Health Sciences Center
The major volcanic eruption of Mt. St. Helens in 1980 with an explosion of
historical dimension and subsequent floods became an acute and long-term
disaster threat. A research method was developed in psychiatric epidemiology
that included systematic diagnostic criteria (The Diagnostic Interview
Schedule), community-wide sampling in the disaster and a control community,
documentation of the immediate and longer-term stress response patterns, and a
nultivariant analysis. More than one thousand subjects were evaluated. The
variables included psychiatric adjustment, sociodemographic characteristics,
past physical and mental health history, present state symptomatology,
interpersonal networks, and perception of the disaster stress.
A high exposure group was identified by external criteria. This high
exposure group showed a significant increase in psychiatric morbidity. The
findings demonstrataed a step-wise dose response relationship that suggested a
progression of severity from control to low to high exposure subjects.
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14) DAMAGES CAUSED BY GEOLOGICAL PROCESSES
DURING THE BIG THOMPSON FLOOD, COLORADO, 1976,
AND SIMILAR PAST STORM AND FLOOD EVENTS IN THE COLORADO FRONT RANGE
James M. Soule
Colorado Geological Survey
The Big Thompson flood of 1976 caused considerable damages throughout the
area of heavy raninfall and/or flooding, both in the flood plains of the Big
Thompson River and its tributaries, and on valley side slopes outside of stream
courses. Many of these damages were caused by movement of solids by rapidly
moving water and rapid mass wasting of earth materials on slopes outside of
floodplains. After the 1976 flood, the Colorado Geological Survey and others
attempted to compare after effects of and damages caused by geologic processes
in the Big Thompson area to other similar drainage basins in the Colorado Front
Range. Current land-use patterns in other canyons indicate that similar
disasters are possible in the other areas.

15) WEATHER FORECASTING TOOLS FOR THE 1990's
Dennis Walts
Office of Systems Development, National Weather Service
and
PROFS Program Office
Durin9 the late 1980's and early 1990's, the National Weather Service
(NWS) will be under90ing a major pro9ram to modernize its field offices. This
effort is desi9ned to enable the NWS to provide better forecasts and earlier
warnings for mesoscale weather phenomena such as the Big Thompson Flood event.
At the heart of this modernization pro9ram is the development and deployment of
two systems: NEXRAD (NEXt generation RADar), a nationwide network of
sophisticated doppler weather radars and AWIPS-90 (Advanced Weather Interactive
Processing System for the 1990's), a system for real-time ingest, processing,
and display of meteorological data from a variety of sources.
A functional prototype of future AWIPS-90 workstations is bein9 developed
by the Program for Regional Observing and Forecasting Services (PROFS). On
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October 1, 1986 this workstation will be placed into operation in the Denver,
Colorado Weather Service Forecast Office (WSFO). It will be used to support
the public forecast and warnin9 responsibilities of the Denver WSFO on an
around-the-clock basis. This will provide the first opportunity to
operationally evaluate a subset of both AWIPS-90 capabilities and NEXRAD
products. This project, the Denver AWIPS-90 Risk Reduction and Requirements
Evaluation, will also provide the NWS with the information necessary to plan
the development of the system to be used through the year 2000. This paper
provides details of the new capabilities provided to the forecaster, and
explores the effects of these capabilities on the forecast and warning
process.
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